Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 23STCV15517, Date: 2024-02-23 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 23STCV15517    Hearing Date: March 1, 2024    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

 

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

 

 

HEARING DATE:     March 1, 2024                        TRIAL DATE: September 17, 2024

                                                          

CASE:                         Stewart Marroquin v. CS Hotel LLC et al.

 

CASE NO.:                 23STCV15517           

 

MOTION TO QUASH THIRD PARTY DEPOSITION SUBPOENA FOR BUSINESS RECORDS

 

MOVING PARTY:               Plaintiff Stewart Marroquin in pro per.

 

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendants CS Hotel LLC and Percy Cifuentes

 

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

           

            This is an employment discrimination action that was filed on July 5, 2023. Plaintiff alleges that he was harassed because of his physical disability, and that Defendants refused to provide him with reasonable accommodations for his condition before wrongly terminating him on the basis of his disability.

 

Plaintiff moves to quash a deposition subpoena for business records propounded to Santa Monica College Admissions & Records., or, in the alternative, for a protective order limiting the scope of the subpoena.

 

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Third Party Deposition Subpoena for Business Records is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.  Specifically, the Court grants the motion to quash as described above as to Plaintiff’s course syllabi and content, transcripts, requested accommodations, attendance-related communications relating to class attendance, or any other educational records, other than his class schedules and attendance records, based solely on Plaintiff’s relevance and overbreadth objections, and otherwise denies the motion. 

 

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DISCUSSION:

 

Plaintiff moves to quash a deposition subpoena for business records propounded to Santa Monica College Admissions & Records, or, in the alternative, for a protective order limiting the scope of the subpoena.

 

Legal Standard

 

            Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 provides:

 

If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.

 

(Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1(a).) There is no meet and confer requirement in section 1987.1. There is also no requirement for a separate statement when no response has been provided to the request for discovery. (Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1345(b)(1).) Furthermore, there is no requirement for a showing of good cause for production of documents in connection with a deposition subpoena. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2020.510(b); Terry v. SLICO (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 352, 358.)

 

Analysis

 

            Plaintiff moves to quash a subpoena propounded to Santa Monica College Admissions & Records. Defendants served the subpoena on December 7, 2023. (Declaration of Stewart Marroquin ISO Mot. Exh. 2.) Attachment 3 to the Subpoena sets forth the documents sought from January 1, 2013 to the present relating to Plaintiff as “[a]ll transcripts, class schedules including with start/stop times for each class, attendance records, class withdrawal records, syllibi or class content and communications relating to class attendance pertaining to student STEWART MARROQUIN.” (Id. Exh. 2 Attach. 3.) Plaintiff contends that this category is overbroad, irrelevant, unduly burdensome, invades Plaintiff’s privacy, seeks documents which are protected from disclosure, and seeks documents which would not be admissible at trial.

 

            At the outset, as to Plaintiff’s contentions that certain evidence sought would not be admissible at trial, such an argument is insufficient to demonstrate that the materials sought are not discoverable. Evidence may be discoverable if it is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, even if it is, itself, not admissible. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.)

 

In ruling on a privacy objection in the context of discovery, the party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.) The party asserting a privacy right must also establish an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances. (Id.) Further, the party asserting a privacy right must establish a threatened intrusion that is serious. (Id.) The Court need not proceed to the fourth step of balancing competing interests if all three of the above are not satisfied. (Id. at 555.)

 

If the Court reaches the fourth step, the Court must balance these competing considerations: The party seeking information may raise whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure may serve. (Id. at 552.) The party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. (Id.) Courts may not require the party seeking discovery to demonstrate a “compelling need” simply because discovery of any facially private information is sought. (Id. at 556-557.) When a privacy interest is asserted, the party seeking production must show that the information sought is directly relevant to a cause of action or a defense. (Harris v. Superior Court (Smets) (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 665, citing Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859-62.)

 

            With respect to Plaintiff’s privacy objections, Plaintiff contends that he has a legally protected interest in his personnel records, relying various cases including those addressing discovery of third-party personnel records (see, e.g., Harding Lawson Associates v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 7, 10), but does not offer any authority that his educational records fall under the same protections.  Even so, Plaintiff provides no basis for the conclusion that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the specific documents at issue in this case. Further, Plaintiff provides no basis to support a conclusion that the threatened intrusion is serious. Plaintiff has therefore failed to carry his burden to justify his privacy objection.

 

Finally, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s overbreadth and relevance objections.  Defendant contends that its request for Plaintiff’s transcripts, class records, attendance records, and course syllabi are reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence pertaining to Plaintiff’s claims for lost earnings and are necessary to independently verify that Plaintiff has been attending Santa Monica College since 2015, as attested in his responses to Defendant’s form interrogatories. In this respect, Plaintiff’s class schedules and attendance records have some relevance to the feasibility of concurrent employment, because Plaintiff’s educational time commitments would limit the hours that he might otherwise spend earning wages.

 

Defendant’s argument that the course syllabi and content of the courses is somehow relevant to “Plaintiff’s level of sophistication,” with respect to Defendant’s defenses of Avoidable Consequences however, is much less persuasive. To prove the defense of Avoidable Consequences, an employer must demonstrate it took reasonable steps to prevent and correct workplace harassment, that plaintiff unreasonably failed to use those preventative and corrective measures, and that reasonable use of those measures would have prevented some or all of the plaintiff’s harm.  (CACI 2526.)  Defendant’s vague contention that Plaintiff’s “level of sophistication, particularly in workplace interactions and understanding of legal matters” is somehow relevant to this defense is not well-taken. Nor is the Court persuaded that these records are indicative of Plaintiff’s job skills and knowledge, as pertaining to the Failure to Mitigate Defense. In an employment action seeking damages from wrongful termination under FEHA or in violation of public policy, an employer advancing a failure to mitigate defense must prove that employment substantially similar to the plaintiff’s former job was available, that the plaintiff failed to make reasonable efforts to seek and retain such employment, and what amount plaintiff could have earned from this employment. Plaintiff’s efforts to better himself through additional study have no bearing on any of these elements which are all pegged to the process of replacing the job lost with a substantially similar one, not on getting a new or different position based on additional education.

 

Defendant also claims that Plaintiff’s educational records are likely to include information on requested accommodations, which it claims are relevant to Plaintiff’s disability causes of action. The Court disagrees. Accommodations requested from or provided by the university for Plaintiff to facilitate his education are wholly unrelated to the accommodations which Plaintiff sought or received pertaining to the physical requirements of his position as a busser or drink runner. Defendant also offers no arguments as to why Plaintiff’s transcripts or attendance-related communications are themselves relevant, appropriately narrow, or reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. The Court therefore finds that Defendant is not entitled to compel production of those records.

 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants have demonstrated the relevance of their request for Plaintiff’s class schedules and attendance records, and that these requests are not overbroad. However, Defendants have not demonstrated that Plaintiff’s course syllabi and content, transcripts, requested accommodations, attendance-related communications relating to class attendance, or any other educational records should be produced.

 

            The Court therefore grants the motion to quash as to Plaintiff’s course syllabi and content, transcripts, requested accommodations, attendance-related communications relating to class attendance, or any other educational records, other than his class schedules and attendance records, based solely on Plaintiff’s relevance and overbreadth objections, and otherwise denies the motion. 

 

CONCLUSION:

 

             Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Third Party Deposition Subpoena for Business Records is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.  Specifically, the Court grants the motion to quash as described above as to Plaintiff’s course syllabi and content, transcripts, requested accommodations, attendance-related communications relating to class attendance, or any other educational records, other than his class schedules and attendance records, based solely on Plaintiff’s relevance and overbreadth objections, and otherwise denies the motion. 

 

            Moving Party to give notice.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated:  March 1, 2024                                    ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

 


            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.