Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 23STCV16478, Date: 2025-06-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV16478    Hearing Date: June 10, 2025    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE:     June 10, 2025                                     TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

CASE:                         George Ortega, et al. v. Galpin Motors, et al.

CASE NO.:                 23STCV16478           

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

MOVING PARTY:               Plaintiffs George and Miguel Ortega

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant Ford Motor Company

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

            This is a lemon law action filed July 14, 2023. Plaintiffs purchased a 2020 Ford Super Duty which developed electrical and transmission defects.

Plaintiffs move for an award of fees and costs pursuant to a settlement.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff is awarded $13,780.50 in attorney’s fees and $1,369.28 in costs.

DISCUSSION:

            Plaintiffs move for an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $20,670.75 plus costs in the amount of $1,369.28.

Entitlement to Fees

            Plaintiffs seek an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to a settlement agreement reached by the parties. Plaintiffs brought claims for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. (Civ. Code § 1790 et seq.). Civil Code section 1794(d) states:

If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.

            On December 4, 2024, Plaintiffs signed an offer to compromise under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 to repurchase Plaintiff’s vehicle for $157,500. (Declaration of Roger Kirnos ISO Mot. Exh. C.) The offer provided for Plaintiffs to petition for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees. (Id.)

            Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney’s fees because they purportedly rejected Defendant’s offer to compromise. Defendant offers no evidence of this assertion—the mere fact that additional attorney’s fees were incurred while the offer was pending does not evidence a rejection of the offer.

Reasonableness of Fees

            Plaintiff requests a total fee award of $20,670.75, based on $13,780.50 in fees accrued by Plaintiff’s counsel (Kirnos Decl. Exh. A), plus an additional $ 6,890.25 resulting from a 1.5x multiplier.

            Reasonable attorney’s fees are allowable costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc § 1033.5(a)(10), (c)(5)(B).) In actions that are based on a contract, “where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract… shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.” (Civil Code § 1717(a) [emphasis added].) A recovery of attorney’s fees is authorized even in noncontractual or tort actions if the contractual provision for fee recovery is worded broadly enough. (See Code Civ. Proc § 10211; Maynard v. BTI Group, Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 984, 993 [agreement to award fees based on outcome of “any dispute” encompasses all claims, “whether in contract, tort or otherwise]; Lockton v. O'Rourke (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1076; Lerner v. Ward (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 155, 160.)

Reasonable attorney’s fees shall be fixed by the Court and shall be an element of the costs of suit. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(c)(5)(B).) Reasonable attorney’s fees are ordinarily determined by the Court pursuant to the “lodestar” method, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (See PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096; Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004 [“California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys' fee award.”].) “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award….”  (Ibid.) In setting the hourly rate for a fee award, courts are entitled to consider the “fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community for similar work.” (Bihun v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 976, 997 [affirming rate of $450 per hour], overruled on other grounds by Lakin v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 664.)  The burden is on the party seeking attorney’s fees to prove the reasonableness of the fees. (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 615.) 

The Court has broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee award, which will not be overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1393-1394.)  The Court need not explain its calculation of the amount of attorney’s fees awarded in detail; identifying the factors considered in arriving at the amount will suffice. (Ventura v. ABM Indus. Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 274-275.)

1.      Base Fee Requests

Plaintiff has provided an itemized list of the attorney and paralegal time billed in connection with this case by Plaintiff’s counsel. (Kirnos Decl. Exh. A.) Plaintiff’s counsel billed 35.8 hours at hourly rates ranging from $175 per hour to $550 per hour. (Id.) Attorney Kirnos attests to the skills, training, and experience of Knight Law Group’s attorneys as the managing partner, and to the veracity of KLG’s time entries. (Kirnos Decl. ¶¶ 23-29.) The Court also observes that, notwithstanding the length of time spent on this case, that Plaintiff’s counsel has exercised billing judgment, assigning research and drafting tasks to associates and junior partners, and reserving more strategic and editing pursuits to senior partners charging higher rates. (See generally Exh. A.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s fee request should be reduced because the case was overstaffed, as it involved 11 different lawyers over the course of this litigation. The Court has discretion to reduce a fee award if the Court finds that the case was so overstaffed that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted. (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 35.) Here, however, Defendant provides no justification for the assertion that the number of attorneys working on the case led to inefficiencies and inflated fees. Defendant has therefore failed to demonstrate that the fee award should be reduced on this basis.

Finally, Defendant argues that the hourly rates sought by Plaintiff’s counsel are excessive. Defendant claims that $350 per hour is a reasonable rate, citing Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240. Defendant’s authority does not stand for the position advanced in the papers. In Mikhaeilpoor, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in a 2018 ruling adjusting a fee award to reflect an hourly rate of $350 per hour. (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 256.) That opinion did not state that hourly rates billed at more than $350 per hour are per se unreasonable, only that the Court’s reasoning in imposing that limitation was supported by substantial evidence in that case. The Court is thus not persuaded that Plaintiff’s fee request should be limited on this basis.

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2.      Fee Multiplier

Plaintiff requests that the lodestar be enhanced by a multiplier of 1.5x, which would result in an additional award of $6,890.25.  Plaintiff contends that this multiplier is reasonable considering the contingent nature of this action, Plaintiff’s counsel’s experience and knowledge, the difficulty of this litigation, and the favorable result achieved for Plaintiff.

Multipliers for successful representation on a contingency basis have frequently been awarded. (See, e.g., Santana v. FCA US LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 352.) Here, however, there is little in the record demonstrating that such a multiplier is warranted, let alone one as substantial as what is sought here. Plaintiff has not proven any substantial risks undertaken. Prosecuting a case through discovery disputes, motions practice, and preparations for trial shows legal representation that embraces risk despite the contingent character of receiving fees. A Song-Beverly action where the case largely sat idle on the Court’s docket before resolution—notwithstanding negotiations and mediation to which the Court was not privy—and where there was no substantive motion practice before settlement and no trial preparation does not demonstrate risk. Nor were there any novel, difficult, or complicated issues confronted in this case. The level of expertise exhibited by Plaintiff’s counsel in securing this favorable settlement is amply accounted for in the substantial hourly rates sought as their market rates. The Court cannot conclude that a multiplier should be applied to the sue-and-settle approach adopted here.

            The Court therefore concludes that an award of $13,780.50 is proper in this case.

Costs

            Plaintiff also seeks an award of costs in the amount of $1,369.28.

            A prevailing party on a Song-Beverly claim may also seek to recover costs reasonably incurred, as well as attorney’s fees. (Civ. Code § 1794(d).) Once a request for costs is properly challenged, the burden shifts to the propounding party to demonstrate why such costs are recoverable and proper. (Whatley-Miller v. Cooper (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1103, 1113.) Costs are normally sought by way of a memorandum of costs pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1700(a).

Here, Plaintiffs served and filed a memorandum of costs on May 6, 2025. No motion to tax costs has been filed, and Defendant does not challenge any of the claimed costs in the memorandum. Plaintiffs’ request for costs is therefore granted.

CONCLUSION:

            Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff is awarded $13,780.50 in attorney’s fees and $1,369.28 in costs.

            Moving Parties to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:  June 10, 2025                         ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.