Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 23STCV18293, Date: 2024-06-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV18293 Hearing Date: June 4, 2024 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: June 4, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET
CASE: Mesa Underwriters Specialty Ins. Co. v.
Nelson Bardales, et al.
CASE NO.: 23STCV18293
MOTION
FOR ORDER DISCHARGING STAKEHOLDERS FROM LIABILITY
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Mesa Underwriters Specialty Ins. Co.
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant Farmers
Ins. Exchange
CASE
HISTORY:
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is an interpleader action.
Plaintiff insured Defendant Nelson Bardales d/b/a Local Roofer for liability
for property damage and bodily injury occurring during the operation of
Bardales’s roofing business. Plaintiff contends that it has received several
claims on the proceeds of Bardales’s insurance policy, asserting that
Bardales’s negligence allowed rain intrusion at a condominium building at which
Bardales was performing roof renovations.
Plaintiff has deposited the proceeds
from the insurance policy with the Court and moves to be discharged from
liability.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Plaintiff’s
Motion for Discharge of Liability is GRANTED.
Plaintiff
is awarded $10,000 from the disputed funds in attorney’s fees.
DISCUSSION:
Plaintiff has deposited the
proceeds from the insurance policy with the Court and moves to be discharged
from liability.
Legal Standard for Interpleader
“Any person, firm, corporation,
association or other entity against whom double or multiple claims are made, or
may be made, by two or more persons which are such that they may give rise
to double or multiple liability, may bring an action against the claimants to
compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 386(b).) “When a person may be subject to conflicting claims for money or
property, the person may bring an interpleader action to compel the claimants
to litigate their claims among themselves. (Id.) Once the person admits
liability and deposits the money with the court, he or she is discharged from
liability and freed from the obligation of participating in the litigation
between the claimants. [Citations.] The purpose of interpleader is to prevent a
multiplicity of suits and double vexation. [Citation.]” (City of Morgan Hill
v. Brown (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1122.)
“In an interpleader action, the
court initially determines the right of the plaintiff to interplead the funds;
if that right is sustained, an interlocutory decree is entered which requires
the defendants to interplead and litigate their claims to the funds. Upon an
admission of liability and deposit of monies with the court, the plaintiff may
then be discharged from liability and dismissed from the interpleader action.
[Citations.] The effect of such an order is to preserve the fund, discharge the
stakeholder from further liability, and to keep the fund in the court's custody
until the rights of potential claimants of the monies can be adjudicated.
[Citations.] Thus, the interpleader proceeding is traditionally viewed as two
lawsuits in one. The first dispute is between the stakeholder and the claimants
to determine the right to interplead the funds. The second dispute to be
resolved is who is to receive the interpleaded funds. [Citations.]” (Dial
800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 32, 42–43.)
Request for Judicial Notice
Plaintiff
requests that the Court take judicial notice of four complaints in other
actions asserted against Defendant Bardelas. As these cases are not material to
the Court’s ruling, Plaintiff’s request is DENIED. (Gbur v. Cohen (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 296, 301 [“[J]udicial notice .
. . is always confined to those matters which are relevant to the issue at
hand.”].)
Analysis
Plaintiff
seeks an order discharging it from liability for the proceeds of Defendant
Bardales’s insurance policy. Interpleader is proper if the stakeholder disavows
interest in the property sought to be interpleaded and the Court can resolve
the entire controversy without the stakeholder. (Pacific Loan Mgmt. Corp. v.
Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1485, 1489-90.)
Here, Plaintiff
states that the various other Defendants in this action have asserted numerous
claims based on Defendant Bardales’s alleged negligence under an insurance
policy with limits of $1 million per occurrence and $2 million aggregate.
(Declaration of Marty Hunger ISO Mot. ¶¶ 2-3.) Plaintiff affirmatively
disclaims any interest in the policy limits and will pay whatever sums Bardales
is obligated to pay as damages up to the aggregate limit, which has been
deposited in the Court. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.)
Defendant
Farmers Insurance Co. does not object to interpleader or to Plaintiff being
discharged from liability for the proceeds of the policy, but argues that
Plaintiff’s proposed order—which was never presented to the Court—exceeds the
permissible scope of an interpleader action. According to Defendant, the
proposed order goes beyond discharging Plaintiff from liability for the insurance
proceeds and instead discharges any liability arising from the underlying
incident. As there is no proposed order from Plaintiff before the Court, the
Court declines to rule on the propriety of that order. That said, the Court
concurs with Defendant that the interpleader statutes pertain only to competing
claims to a sum of money in the party’s possession or control. (See Code Civ.
Proc. § 386(b); 386.5.) Other issues of liability are not before the Court, and
the Court cannot reach those issues here. Plaintiff has disclaimed any interest
in the proceeds from the aggregate policy limit, and is entitled to discharge
from liability as to those funds.
Attorney’s Fees
Plaintiff
also requests attorney’s fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
386.6. This code provision expressly authorizes a plaintiff in interpleader to
seek and be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees from the amount in dispute which
has been deposited with the Court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 386.6.)
Reasonable attorney’s fees shall be fixed by the Court and
shall be an element of the costs of suit. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(c)(5)(B).)
Reasonable attorney’s fees are ordinarily determined by the Court pursuant to
the “lodestar” method, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied
by the reasonable hourly rate. (See PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000)
22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096; Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982)
134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004 [“California courts have consistently held that a computation
of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to
a determination of an appropriate attorneys' fee award.”].) “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for
comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court
based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty
of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the
extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the
attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award….” (Ibid.)
In setting the hourly rate for a fee award, courts are entitled to consider the
“fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community for
similar work.” (Bihun v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th
976, 997 [affirming rate of $450 per hour], overruled on other grounds by Lakin
v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 664.) The burden
is on the party seeking attorney’s fees to prove the reasonableness of the
fees. (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 615.)
The Court has
broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee
award, which will not be overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion, a
prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial
evidence.” (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th
1379, 1393-1394.) The Court need not explain its calculation of the
amount of attorney’s fees awarded in detail; identifying the factors considered
in arriving at the amount will suffice. (Ventura v. ABM Indus. Inc.
(2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 274-275.)
Here,
Plaintiff requests attorney’s fees in the amount of $20,000, plus costs in the
amount of $2,440.19. Plaintiff bases this request solely on the declaration of
Wendy Schultz in support of the motion, which claims an even 80 hours of
attorney time at $250 per hour, and does not provide timesheets or an itemized
breakdown of the costs incurred. (Declaration of Wendy E. Schultz ISO Mot. ¶¶ 3-5.)
Although, strictly speaking, detailed billing records are not required (see Syers Properties III, Inc. v.
Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698-699), the Court expresses some
skepticism at the accuracy of the hours claimed, especially where the hours and
fees asserted in such conspicuously round numbers. The Court will therefore
apply a 50% reduction to the fee request to account for overestimation in Plaintiff’s
billing, equivalent to a $10,000 reduction in the fees. Moreover, as Plaintiff
provides no insight into or support for the costs incurred, the Court has no
method of determining whether those costs were reasonable. The Court therefore
declines to award costs.
CONCLUSION:
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
Motion for Discharge of Liability is GRANTED.
Plaintiff
is awarded $10,000 from the disputed funds in attorney’s fees.
Moving
Party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 4, 2024 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It
should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still
conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you
have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you
should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an
order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.