Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 23STCV18736, Date: 2025-06-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV18736    Hearing Date: June 6, 2025    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE:     June 6, 2025               TRIAL DATE: September 23, 2025

CASE:                         Moayed Harb v. Ford Motor Company, et al.

CASE NO.:                 23STCV18736           

MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION OF PERSON MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

MOVING PARTY:               Plaintiff Moayed Harb

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant Ford Motor Company

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

            This is a lemon law action filed on August 8, 2023. Plaintiff purchased a 2019 Ford F150 equipped with a 10R80 transmission system which he alleges has a series of known defects causing hesitation, shuddering, and shifting issues.

Plaintiff moves to compel a deposition of Defendant’s Person Most Knowledgeable and the production of documents associated with that deposition notice.

TENTATIVE RULING:

            Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Deposition of Person Most Knowledgeable is GRANTED IN PART.

Defendant is ordered to designate and produce its person most knowledgeable to testify as to Categories 1, 2, 7, 9, 10, 13, 16, 18, 19 (as to the Magnusson-Moss Act only), and 20-29 within 30 days of this order.

Defendant is also ordered to produce all documents responsive to Requests for Production Nos. 17, 19, 31, 36, 39, 76-80, 82, and 83 accompanying the Amended Notice of Deposition within 30 days of this order.

//

//

DISCUSSION:

Plaintiff moves to compel a further deposition of Defendant’s person most knowledgeable and for production of documents at that deposition.

Legal Standard

California Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450, subdivision (a) provides:

If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent's attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450(a).) Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480 further provides that “[i]f a deponent fails to answer any question or to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing under the deponent's control that is specified in the deposition notice or a deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer or production.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.480(a).)

Meet and Confer

A motion to compel a deposition must include a meet and confer declaration stating facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2025.450(b); 2016.040.) 

            Attorney Tyson R. Smith, counsel for Plaintiff, states that he sent a single email to Defendant regarding the outstanding discovery dispute on May 12, 2025. (Declaration of Tyson R. Smith Exh. 9.) This is not sufficient to satisfy Plaintiff’s statutory meet-and-confer obligations. Nevertheless, in the interest of facilitating a speedy resolution of this dispute, the Court will consider the motion on its merits.

Deposition Testimony

            Plaintiff moves to compel deposition testimony on 20 matters identified in an Amended Notice of Deposition served on Defendant on March 26, 2025. (Smith Decl. Exh. 6.) The categories at issue on this motion concern (1) the use and structure of Defendant’s databases relating directly to the subject vehicle (Exh. 6.A Nos. 1-2); (2) databases containing efforts to investigate similar defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle (No. 7); (3) investigations, analysis, communications, and involved individuals concerning similar defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle (Nos. 9, 10, 13, 16, 18, 20-22); (4) Defendant’s document databases, search methods, and efforts pertaining to Defendant’s response to discovery in this matter (Nos. 23-27); (5) Defendant’s policies regarding compliance with the Song-Beverly and Magnusson-Moss Acts (No. 19) and regarding repurchase requests under the Song-Beverly Act (No. 31); and (6) Defendant’s advertising policy and procedures (Nos. 28-29.)

            In response to each category of testimony at issue, Defendant served substantively identical boilerplate objections, claiming the requests are vague, overbroad, unduly burdensome, irrelevant, oppressive, invade the attorney client privilege and work product doctrine, and are not reasonably calculated to the discovery of admissible evidence because it is not limited merely to the subject vehicle. (See generally Plaintiff’s Exh. 7.) With respect to Defendant’s privilege and work product objections, Defendant offers nothing beyond the bare conclusion that these privileges apply and has therefore failed to substantiate those objections. The Court therefore limits its analysis to only those remaining objections asserted in Defendant’s opposition as regarding specified categories of testimony sought.

1.      Year, Make, and Model Discovery

With respect to categories Nos.  9, 10, 13, 16, 18, and 20-22, Defendant argues that these materials are not relevant to the action as it currently stands, relying upon the Court’s October 30, 2024 ruling granting judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Claims. (See October 30, 2024 Minute Order.) In so arguing, Defendant neglects the existence of Plaintiff’s claim for fraudulent concealment regarding the defects alleged to exist in the subject vehicle. The reasoning which renders evidence of defects and remediation in vehicles of the same year, make and model in Song-Beverly actions, which do not require intentional fraud, is no less applicable when fraud is the claim alleged. (Donlen v. Ford (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 143-44, 153; Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 973, 978-79, 986.) To prove fraudulent concealment in this action, Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendant knew of the transmission defects alleged and intentionally failed to disclose them. (See Hambridge v. Healthcare Partners Medical Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 124, 162 [elements of fraudulent concealment].)

Defendant also asserts that these requests are overbroad and unduly burdensome, relying on the unsupported conclusions of a design engineer and of Defendant’s legal counsel in other matters. (See Declaration of Erich Kemnitz ISO Opp ¶¶ 19-24; Declaration of Jodi Schebel ISO Opp. ¶¶ 30-33.) Neither of these declarants has the type of information, technology experience and training which would provide a basis for their conclusions. Nor is the Court persuaded by Defendant’s bare assertions that these requests are inappropriately vague. Plaintiff is entitled to further deposition testimony on these matters.

2.      Statutory Compliance

Defendant objects to categories 19 and 31 on the grounds that these requests pertain to Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly claims which have already been dismissed with prejudice by the Court’s October 30, 2024 ruling. With respect to category 31, Defendant is correct. However, category 19 also seeks testimony regarding compliance with the Magnusson-Moss Act, which was not dismissed as part of that ruling. As Defendant does not address the remainder of that category, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to obtain deposition testimony regarding category 19 as pertaining to the Magnusson-Moss Act only.

3.      Advertising Policies and Procedures

Defendant also objects to categories 28 and 29, regarding advertising policies, as irrelevant to this action. The Court disagrees. Advertisements are facially relevant to demonstrate what Defendant did—and, crucially, did not—disclose to the public regarding the subject vehicle. Plaintiff is entitled to obtain deposition testimony regarding these categories.

4.      Databases, Document Retention, and Preservation

Defendant objects to categories on 1, 2, 7, and 23-27 as irrelevant because they are “discovery on discovery.” Defendant cites no authority standing for the position that these requests are improper under California law. Federal district court cases concerning federal rules of civil procedure are wholly inapposite. (See, e.g., Watkins v. Hireright, Inc. (S.D. Cal. 2013) 2013 WL 10448882.) Plaintiff is entitled to obtain deposition testimony regarding these categories.

Document Production

            Plaintiff also seeks to compel, at deposition, production of twelve categories of documents.

Where production of documents is sought in connection with the deposition, the motion must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the production. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450(b)(1).) These facts must also be set forth in a separate statement filed by the moving party. (Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1345(c).) This burden “is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

At issue in this motion are twelve categories of documents concerning, again summarized broadly, investigations into defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model, and communications and technical service bulletins for vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 6.B Nos. 17, 19, 31, 36, 39, 76-80, 82-83.) These categories of documents overlap with the year, make, and model testimony sought above, and, for the reasons stated establishing the relevance of these documents, good cause exists for production of these documents is facially apparent. The Court therefore rejects Defendant’s challenge to these documents as irrelevant. Moreover, Defendant’s assertion that these requests are an improper evasion of the Court’s previous ruling on a Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production is not well-taken. Plaintiff is entitled, by statute, to require the production of documents at a deposition through a deposition notice, and such discovery is separate from a demand for inspection pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210 et seq. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.220.) Plaintiff is entitled to production of the documents at issue at the deposition.

CONCLUSION:

            Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Deposition of Person Most Knowledgeable is GRANTED IN PART.

Defendant is ordered to designate and produce its person most knowledgeable to testify as to Categories 1, 2, 7, 9, 10, 13, 16, 18, 19 (as to the Magnusson-Moss Act only), and 20-29 within 30 days of this order.

Defendant is also ordered to produce all documents responsive to Requests for Production Nos. 17, 19, 31, 36, 39, 76-80, 82, and 83 accompanying the Amended Notice of Deposition within 30 days of this order.

Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:  June 6, 2025                           ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.