Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 23STCV19553, Date: 2023-11-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV19553    Hearing Date: November 17, 2023    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE:     November 17, 2023               TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

CASE:                         Alyssa Cienfuegos v. Shabani Institute, et al.

CASE NO.:                 23STCV19553           

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF COMPLAINT

MOVING PARTY:               Defendants B. Daniel Shabani, Inc., d/b/a Shabani Institute

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Alyssa Cienfuegos

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

            This is an action for employment discrimination and wrongful termination that was filed on August 16, 2023. Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated because Defendants did not wish to reinstate her after taking leave for her pregnancy.

Defendant moves to strike portions of the Complaint pertaining to punitive damages.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED.

DISCUSSION:

Defendant moves to strike portions of the Complaint pertaining to punitive damages.

Legal Standard

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a). The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. Id., § 436(b). The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. Id.§ 436. The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. Id.§ 437. “When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.” Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768. A motion to strike can be used where the complaint or other pleading has not been drawn or filed in conformity with applicable rules or court orders.  Code Civ. Proc., § 436(b). This provision is for "the striking of a pleading due to improprieties in its form or in the procedures pursuant to which it was filed."  Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528 (emphasis in original).

Meet and Confer

 Before filing a motion to strike, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who has filed the pleading subject to the motion to strike and file a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a).) However, an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to grant or deny a motion to strike.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a)(4).)

Defendant’s moving papers make no mention of any efforts to meet and confer with Plaintiff’s counsel before filing this motion. In fact, Defendant concedes in its reply brief that it did not meet and confer with Plaintiff at all before seeking relief. Defendant is in total violation of its statutory obligations. Nevertheless, the Court will consider the merits of the motion in the interest of an expedient resolution of this dispute.

Punitive Damages

Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have not properly set forth facts supporting a claim for punitive damages.

Generally, punitive damages may be awarded only when the trier of fact finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant acted with malice, fraud, or oppression. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) As nonintentional torts support punitive damages when the defendant's conduct “involves conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others,” our focus is on malice and oppression. (Gawara v. United States Brass Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1361 [74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663].) As defined in the punitive damages statute, “[m]alice” encompasses “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others,” and “[o]ppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1), (2).) The term “‘despicable,’” though not defined in the statute, is applicable to “circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725 [34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 898, 882 P.2d 894], quoting 4 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 529.)

Under the statute, “malice does not require actual intent to harm. [Citation.] Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences. [Citation.] Malice may be proved either expressly through direct evidence or by implication through indirect evidence from which the jury draws inferences. [Citation.]” (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228 [44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197].)

(Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc., (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299 (bold emphasis added).)

Civil Code § 3294(a) provides:

In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”

Subdivision (b) defines liability for an employer for the malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive conduct of its employees:

An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.

Civil Code § 3294(c) defines malice, oppression and fraud:

(1) ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

(2) ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.

(3) ‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

(Bold emphasis added.)

To withstand a motion to strike punitive damages allegations, the complaint must set forth facts supporting a claim for punitive damages:

The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. (Citation omitted.) Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.

(Grieves v. Superior Court (Fox) (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 (emphasis added).)

            Defendant argues that the Complaint consists entirely of conclusory allegations devoid of specific facts showing malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive conduct, or that any officer of Defendant ratified that conduct. Plaintiff, in opposition, argues that even conclusory allegations are sufficient because a claim for discrimination is an allegation of malicious conduct on its face. (See Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7 [conclusory allegations sufficient to show malice where retaliation was alleged].) The relevant factual allegations in the Complaint are that Plaintiff was terminated, that she was pregnant, and that Defendant terminated her did so to avoid having to reinstate her after her pregnancy leave. (Complaint ¶¶ 10. 12.) However, even construed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court finds that these allegations are not sufficient. Terminating a pregnant person to avoid having to continue to pay them after they return to work represents a conscious disregard of that party’s right to be free of discrimination. Such an action may arguably constitute despicable conduct. However, the Complaint is entirely devoid of allegations that her termination was authorized or ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. A conclusory allegation that the corporation itself sought to terminate Plaintiff is not sufficient.

            The Court is therefore persuaded that the allegations pertaining to punitive damages are insufficiently pled and must be stricken.

CONCLUSION:

            Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED.

            Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:  November 17, 2023                            ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.