Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 23STCV19723, Date: 2025-05-02 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV19723 Hearing Date: May 2, 2025 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: May 2, 2025 TRIAL DATE: November 25, 2025
CASE: Cheryl Sanchez v. Hellmuth, Obata, &
Kassabaum, Inc., et al.
CASE NO.: 23STCV19723 
MOTION
TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Cheryl Sanchez.
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant
Hellmuth, Obata, & Kassabaum, Inc.
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is an employment discrimination action that was filed on August 17,
2023. Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated in retaliation for taking a
leave of absence due to being diagnosed with multiple sclerosis.
Plaintiff moves to compel responses
to Requests for Production propounded to Defendant Hellmuth, Obata, &
Kassabaum, Inc.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion
to Compel Further Responses is GRANTED IN PART with respect to Request No. 73
as described herein.
Both
parties’ requests for sanctions are DENIED.
DISCUSSION:
Plaintiff moves to compel responses
to Requests for Production propounded to Defendant Hellmuth, Obata, &
Kassabaum, Inc.
Legal Standard
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (a), a court
may order a party to serve a further response to a demand for inspection when
the court finds that: “(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is
incomplete[;] (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate,
incomplete, or evasive[; or] (3) An objection in the response is without merit
or too general.”
The burden is on the moving party to “set forth specific facts showing
good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) These facts must also be set forth in a separate
statement filed by the moving party. (Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1345(c).) This
burden “is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (TBG Ins.
Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)
Timeliness
A motion to compel further
responses to requests for production must be served “within 45 days of the
service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on
or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding
party have agreed in writing.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(c).) The 45-day
requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional. (Sexton v. Superior Court¿(1997)
58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)
Pursuant to a stipulation by the
parties, the Court ordered at a March 4, 2025 Informal Discovery Conference
that the parties meet and confer regarding potential supplemental responses,
with a deadline on a motion to compel further responses set for March 28, 2025.
(March 4, 2025 Minute Order.) In subsequent email correspondence, the parties
agreed to multiple extensions, with the final deadline to serve this motion
being April 3, 2025. (Declaration of Armando M. Galvan ISO Mot. Exhs. I-K.)
This motion was served and filed on that date. (See POS.) The motion is
therefore timely.
Meet and Confer
A party making a motion to compel further responses must also include a
declaration stating facts showing a “reasonable and good faith attempt” to
resolve informally the issues presented by the motion before filing the motion.
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).)
The same correspondence which Plaintiff relies upon to demonstrate the
timeliness of this motion also demonstrates the parties attempted to informally
resolve this dispute via electronic correspondence but were unsuccessful. (See Id.)
Plaintiff has satisfied her statutory meet-and-confer obligations.
Good Cause
Plaintiff moves to compel further
responses to Requests for Production Nos. 73, 94, and 96 through 99 propounded
to Defendant.
Request No. 73 seeks documents pertaining to any claims of disability
discrimination, harassment, or discipline asserted by any employees of
Defendant in the past five years. (Separate Statement p. 2:5-9.) “Me-too”
evidence of other individuals who have been subjected to sufficiently similar
discrimination or harassment is discoverable as evidence of the intent of the
decision-maker. (See Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, 89; see
also McCoy v. Pacific Maritime Assn. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 283, 296-98.)
The request, as framed, sweeps too broadly in that it encompasses claims
involving decision-makers other than those responsible for Plaintiff’s
termination and the other adverse employment actions she claims to have
suffered. Me-too evidence may be relevant because it tends to prove
discriminatory intent or that a claimed legitimate basis for the adverse
employment action was pretextual, but evidence of actions taken by other
decision-makers who ae not involved in the challenged employment decisions may
not be at all relevant. (See Pantoja, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at 114; see
also Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children’s Found. Of Los
Angeles & Ventura Counties (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 740, 760.) Here,
Plaintiff has failed to show the broad scope of documents sought reflects the
scope of decisionmaker whose intent may be relevant. The Court therefore narrows the scope of
these requests to claims involving Defendants Lee and MacArthur, but otherwise
finds good cause for this request.
Request No. 94 seeks documents
relating to the identity and contact information of employees terminated
between March 2020 and March 2021. (SS p. 4:4-6.) Similarly, Request No. 96
seeks documents indicating the date of birth, hiring, end of employment, and
contact information of employees hired by Defendant between January 1, 2020,
and March 31, 2021. (SS p. 5:24-28.) Plaintiff offers no explanation for such
broad discovery requests. While contact information of potential witnesses or
“me-too” victims is facially relevant, that does not establish that every
document bearing that information has relevance to Plaintiff’s claims. The
Court therefore does not find good cause for requests nos. 94 and 96.
Requests No 97 seeks all documents
demonstrating Defendant’s financial condition between 2018 through 2022 and
during 2024. (SS p. 7:18-23.) This request is prohibited by Civil Code section
3924 subdivision (c), which disallows discovery into a defendant’s financial
condition without first establishing the likelihood of success on a claim for
punitive damages. There is no good cause shown for this request.
Request No. 98 seeks documents
reflecting the “monthly business” done by Defendant at all locations between
January 2018 and December 31, 2022. (SS p.8:19-23.) This request also appears
to be prohibited by Civil Code section 3924 subdivision (c). Plaintiff has
demonstrated no good cause for this request other than to inquire into
Defendants’ financial condition.
Request No. 99 seeks documents
indicating any potential aliases or d/b/a designations for this Defendant. (SS
p.9:19-21.) Plaintiff contends that these materials are necessary to establish
that the two corporate Defendants are interconnected entities such that both may
be considered Plaintiff’s employer, as alleged in the Complaint. (See Complaint
¶¶ 6-8.) While the information of Defendant’s aliases and d/b/a’s may be
relevant, such discovery is more properly pursued via an interrogatory, as the
range of potential documents which could be encompassed by this request is
significantly overbroad, with no readily apparent method of narrowing the scope
by a reasonable degree. The Court therefore finds that there is no good cause
for this request.
Defendant’s Response
Defendant
asserted boilerplate objections to each request, claiming the requests were
vague, ambiguous, overbroad, unduly burdensome, not reasonably calculated to
lead to admissible evidence, invading privacy of third parties, and seeking
confidential financial or trade secret information. As Defendant has failed to
address any of its objections regarding Request No. 73 except the third-party
privacy objection, Defendant has failed to justify those objections.
As to Defendant’s privacy contention, Defendant
claims, without explanation, that a discovery request seeking “me-too” evidence
would invade the privacy of the employee claimants. In ruling on a
privacy objection in the context of discovery, the party asserting a privacy
right must establish a legally protected privacy interest. (Williams v.
Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.) The party asserting a privacy
right must also establish an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in
the given circumstances. (Id.) Further, the party asserting a privacy
right must establish a threatened intrusion that is serious. (Id.) The
Court need not proceed to the fourth step of balancing competing interests if
all three of the above are not satisfied. (Id. at 555.)
If the Court reaches the fourth step, the
Court must balance these competing considerations: The party seeking
information may raise whatever legitimate and important countervailing
interests disclosure may serve. (Id. at 552.) The party seeking
protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or
protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. (Id.)
Courts may not require the party seeking discovery to demonstrate a “compelling
need” simply because discovery of any facially private information is sought. (Id.
at 556-557.) When a privacy interest is asserted, the party seeking production
must show that the information sought is directly relevant to a cause of action
or a defense. (Harris v. Superior Court (Smets) (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th
661, 665, citing Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859-62.)
Certainly, well-settled
precedent holds that individuals have a substantial interest in the privacy of
basic contact information such as addresses and telephone numbers. (See Planned
Parenthood Golden Gate v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 347, 357.)
However, Defendant offers nothing to demonstrate that those employees would
hold a reasonable expectation of privacy in the context of an employment
discrimination lawsuit, or, indeed, that these employees would wish for their
information to be concealed from Plaintiff at all. Separately, Defendant
entirely fails to address the seriousness of the threatened intrusion in its
opposition. Therefore, even if Defendant had demonstrated a reasonable
expectation of privacy in these circumstances, it has not shown a threatened
intrusion that is serious. As Defendant has shown neither a reasonable expectation
of privacy in these circumstances nor a threatened intrusion which is serious,
the Court need not proceed to the balancing of interests. Defendant’s privacy
objection is without merit.
Plaintiff is therefore
entitled to an order compelling a further response to Request No. 73 as
narrowed herein.
Sanctions
Both parties request
sanctions against the other. As neither side has wholly prevailed on this
motion the Court declines to award sanctions to either party.
CONCLUSION:
Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses is GRANTED IN PART with respect
to Request No. 73 as described herein.
Both
parties’ requests for sanctions are DENIED.
Moving
Party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 2, 2025 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
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