Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 23STCV22207, Date: 2024-08-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV22207    Hearing Date: August 1, 2024    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE:     August 1, 2024                       TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

CASE:                         Mohammad Akbari, et al. v. Essex Warner Center, L.P., et al.

CASE NO.:                 23STCV22207           

MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA FOR BUSINESS RECORDS

MOVING PARTY:               Defendants Essex Warner Center, L.P. and Essex Management Corporation

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Mohammad Akbari, et al. (21 Plaintiffs)

CASE HISTORY:

·         09/14/23: Complaint filed.

·         04/25/24: First Amended Complaint filed.

·         05/22/24: Second Amended Complaint filed.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

            This is a habitability defect action on behalf of 21 Plaintiffs alleging that the apartment building owned and operated by Defendants in which the Plaintiffs reside contains extensive deficiencies. Plaintiffs allege that these deficiencies include widespread leaks, chronic mold, vermin infestations, physical dilapidation, inadequate sanitation and accumulation of garbage, inadequate security, and incessant fire alarms.

Defendants move to quash a subpoena for records propounded to non-party Orkin – United Agent Group, Inc.

TENTATIVE RULING:

            Defendants’ Motion to Quash Third-Party Subpoena is DENIED.

DISCUSSION:

Defendants move to quash a subpoena for records propounded to non-party Orkin – United Agent Group, Inc.

Legal Standard

            Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 provides:

If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1(a).) There is no meet and confer requirement in section 1987.1. There is no requirement for a showing of good cause for production of documents in connection with a deposition subpoena. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2020.510(b); Terry v. SLICO (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 352, 358.)

Analysis

Defendants move to quash a subpoena for records propounded to non-party Orkin – United Agent Group, Inc. Plaintiffs served a subpoena on Orkin – United Agent Group, Inc. on May 21, 2024, seeking any documents from January 1, 2014 to the present related to Orkin Services of California, Inc.’s services at 21201 Kittridge Street, Woodland Hills, CA 90303-5000, the property which is the subject of this dispute. (Defendants’ Exh. A.) Plaintiffs also requested any documents related to Account Number 27344632, and any documents related to the subject property in the custody or control of Orkin. (Id.) Defendants objected to the subpoena on May 30, 2024, contending that the subpoena was vague and ambiguous, not reasonably particularized, overbroad, “equally available,” “outside the scope of the litigation,” seeking information that is irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and an impermissible invasion of the right to privacy of third parties. (Defendants’ Exh. B.)

Defendants contend that the subpoena is improper because it seeks records concerning Orkin’s services for the entirety of the subject property, and not merely the eighteen residential units identified in the operative complaint. (See SAC ¶¶ 7-27.) According to Defendants, the subpoena invades third-party privacy rights and is overbroad, unduly burdensome, vague and ambiguous, and seeks irrelevant information.

1. Third-Party Privacy

In ruling on a privacy objection in the context of discovery, the party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.) The party asserting a privacy right must also establish an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances. (Id.) Further, the party asserting a privacy right must establish a threatened intrusion that is serious. (Id.) The Court need not proceed to the fourth step of balancing competing interests if all three of the above are not satisfied. (Id. at 555.)

If the Court reaches the fourth step, the Court must balance these competing considerations: The party seeking information may raise whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure may serve. (Id. at 552.) The party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. (Id.) Courts may not require the party seeking discovery to demonstrate a “compelling need” simply because discovery of any facially private information is sought. (Id. at 556-557.) When a privacy interest is asserted, the party seeking production must show that the information sought is directly relevant to a cause of action or a defense. (Harris v. Superior Court (Smets) (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 665, citing Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859-62.)

Defendants assert that the subpoena is invading a legally protected privacy interest because it requests all records pertaining to the subject property, including letters, emails, text messages, complaints, and requests for service. (See Defendants’ Exh. A.) Defendants cite no authority standing for the position that the records sought are subject to any legally protected privacy interest beyond the general right to privacy, nor do they explain how there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in these circumstances. Moreover, Defendants do not articulate how the threatened intrusion from the production of these records is serious. Defendants have therefore failed to justify their third-party privacy objection.

2. Relevance

Defendants also assert that the subpoena seeks records which are irrelevant or not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence because it is seeking records related to the entire property for a 10-year period. This contention is belied by the operative pleadings and Defendants’ own evidence. As the Second Amended Complaint plainly states, this action is brought on behalf of various Plaintiffs, some of whom have been residing on the premises since 2015. (SAC ¶¶ 7-27; Declaration of Jennifer M. Porche ISO Mot. ¶ 2.) The map of the property produced by Defendants’ counsel demonstrates that the Plaintiffs’ units are distributed across the property, rather than being clustered in one location. (Defendants’ Exh. D.) Moreover, the Second Amended Complaint does not merely allege that the individual units have had vermin infestations, but that the entire property is infested. (SAC ¶ 42.) The documents sought are therefore facially related to Plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants have failed to justify their objection on this basis.

//

//

3. Overbreadth, Ambiguity, Undue Burden

Defendants also assert that the subpoena is overbroad, vague and ambiguous, not reasonably particularized, and unduly burdensome. Defendants’ unsupported assertions are not sufficient to demonstrate the deficiency of the subpoena in this respect.

            As Defendants have failed to demonstrate the validity of their objections, their motion to quash this subpoena must be denied.

CONCLUSION:

            Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Quash Third-Party Subpoena is DENIED.

            Moving Parties to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:  August 1, 2024                                   ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.