Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 23STCV22976, Date: 2025-02-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV22976 Hearing Date: February 21, 2025 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: February 21, 2025 TRIAL DATE:
July 8, 2025
CASE: Franklin A Paulino Jr. v. General
Motors, LLC
CASE NO.: 23STCV22976 
MOTION
TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION (SET ONE)
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Franklin A. Paulino Jr.
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant General
Motors, LLC
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is a lemon law action filed on September 21, 2023. Plaintiff
purchased a 2022 Chevrolet Silverado which manifested transmission defects.
Plaintiff moves to compel further
responses to requests for production propounded to Defendant.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel
Further Responses to Requests for Production is GRANTED.
Defendant
is ordered to provide verified, code-compliant supplemental responses without
objections within 30 days of this order.
DISCUSSION:
Plaintiff
moves to compel further responses to requests for production propounded to
Defendant.
Legal Standard
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (a), a court
may order a party to serve a further response to a demand for inspection when
the court finds that: “(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is
incomplete[;] (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate,
incomplete, or evasive[; or] (3) An objection in the response is without merit
or too general.”
The burden is on the moving party to “set forth specific facts showing
good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) These facts must also be set forth in a separate
statement filed by the moving party. (Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1345(c).) This
burden “is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (TBG Ins.
Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)
Timeliness
A motion to compel further
responses to requests for production must be served “within 45 days of the
service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on
or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding
party have agreed in writing.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(c).) The 45-day
requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional. (Sexton v. Superior Court¿(1997)
58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)
Plaintiff propounded the discovery
at issue in this motion on September 17, 2024. (Declaration of Chris Grigoryan
ISO Mot. ¶ 12; Exh. 2). Defendant provided responses on January 3, 2025, with
verification on January 6, 2025. (Id. ¶ 13; Exh. 3.) Plaintiff filed and
served the motion on January 28, 2025, 22 days later. This motion is therefore
timely.
Meet and Confer
A party making a motion to compel further responses must also include a
declaration stating facts showing a “reasonable and good faith attempt” to
resolve informally the issues presented by the motion before filing the motion.
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).)
The Declaration of Chris Grigoryan
filed in support of this motion states that Plaintiff sent a single meet and
confer letter on January 18, 2025, to which Defendant never responded. (Grigoryan
Decl. ¶ 15; Exh. 4.) The Court is not persuaded that a single letter outlining
Plaintiff’s position is a reasonable and good-faith attempt to informally
resolve this dispute. Nevertheless, the Court will address the merits of the
motion in the interest of expeditiously resolving this matter.
Good Cause
Plaintiff
moves to compel further responses to Request for Production (Set One) Nos. 3-7,
10, 12-18, 20-23, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 37-51, and 53-70. These requests fall
into three broad categories: (1) materials relating directly to the vehicle
that is the subject of this action (Nos. 4, 5, 8,
28-30, and 70); (2) Defendant’s policies and procedures relating to warranties
and Song-Beverly claims (Nos. 6, 7, 9, 39-44, 47, 51-54, and 67); and (3)
materials relating to similar issues in vehicles of the same year, make and
model as the subject vehicle (Nos. 11-25, 33, 45, 46, 48, 55, 56, 59, 60.)
1.
Materials Relating to the Subject Vehicle
(Requests Nos. 4, 5, 8, 28-30, 67 and 70)
The category of requests seeks repair
orders, warranty repair history, and repair documents relating to the subject
vehicle (Plaintiff’s Exh. 2 Nos. 4, 5, 8), documents reflecting warranty
extensions for concerns for which the vehicle was presented (No. 28), documents
setting forth Defendant’s document retention policy (No. 29), audio and video
recordings containing any communication concerning the vehicle (No. 30),
communications with repair facilities regarding the vehicle (No. 67), and call
logs regarding Plaintiff or the vehicle. (No. 70.) The bulk of these requests
are facially relevant as they expressly concern the vehicle itself or
Defendant’s interactions with Plaintiff. As to request No. 29, Defendant’s
document retention policy is facially relevant to establish the outer perimeter
of the universe of potentially discoverable documents. The Court therefore
finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for these requests.
2.
Policies and Procedures Relating to Song-Beverly
Claims and Warranty Claims (Requests Nos. 6, 7, 9, 39-44, 47, 51-54)
The second category of requests
seeks policy documents for warranty and Song Beverly Claims (Plaintiff’s Exh.
2. Nos. 6-7, 39-44, 54), the diagnosis and repair procedure manual for vehicles
of the same year, make, and model (No. 9), written agreements for management of
third-party customer service call centers (No. 47), reports regarding
Song-Beverly repurchases (No. 51), and documents pertaining to dispute
resolution programs pursuant to Civil Code section 1793.22 (Nos. 52-53).
Contrary to Defendant’s assertions in opposition, materials concerning
corporate policies and practices relating to reacquisition of vehicles are
admissible. (E.g., Johnson v. Ford Motor Co. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1191,
1198-99; Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th
1094, 1104-1105.) Admissible evidence is discoverable. Admissible evidence is
discoverable. (Glenfed Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53
Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117-18.) Plaintiff has therefore demonstrated good cause for
these requests.
3.
Similar Issues in Similar Vehicles (Requests Nos.
11-25, 33, 45, 46, 48, 55, 56, 59, 60)
The remaining requests seek various
documents pertaining to similar defects as those experienced by Plaintiff in
vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle. (See, e.g.,
Exh. 2. Nos. 11-25.)
Evidence of similar defects in
other vehicles are both relevant and admissible. (Donlen v. Ford Motor Co.
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 153.) Admissible evidence is discoverable. (Glenfed
Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117-18.)
Documents regarding warranty complaints, service histories, and employee
records concerning a defect in all affected vehicles, as well as documents
regarding the manufacturer’s responses and instructions to cure that defect are
discoverable. (See Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th
967, 971 [holding that the trial court’s approval of a discovery referee’s
report and recommendation of sanctions for failure to produce documents of this
nature relating to the subject defect in all affected vehicles was not an abuse
of discretion].)
Defendant asserts that these
requests are overbroad because they do not pertain specifically to Plaintiff’s
vehicle, and that Donlen and Doppes are both distinguishable from
the present case: Donlen because the issue was whether the plaintiff’s
expert testimony regarding defects in and special service bulletins relating to
other vehicles was inadmissible, rather than production of documents relating
to these issues, (Donlen, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at 138), and Doppes
because that case was also an action for fraud, and the manufacturer did not
challenge the discovery referee’s findings. (Doppes, supra, 174
Cal.App.4th at 973-74, 993.) Defendant is correct that these cases are
factually distinguishable, but the Court disagrees with Defendant that these
cases do not support the position that the documents sought are relevant and
admissible. In Doppes, the Court of Appeal expressly stated that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the discovery referee’s
report and recommendation. (Doppes, supra, at 971.) Further, expert
testimony as in Donlen regarding documentary evidence must necessarily
have a foundation in that evidence to be admissible. (Cooper v. Takeda
Pharmaceuticals America, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 555, 577.) Documentary evidence on which an expert is
testifying must therefore be discoverable. (Glenfed, supra, 53
Cal.App.4th at 1117-18.)
As Plaintiff seeks materials which
are discoverable pursuant to Donlen and Doppes, the Court finds
that Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for these requests.
Defendant’s Responses
In response
to each request, Defendant asserted the same series of objections that the
requests are vague, ambiguous, overbroad, fail to describe with reasonably
particularity the documents begin sought, invade attorney-client privilege or
seek protected work product, seek confidential, sensitive, or proprietary
information, or ask Defendant to respond on behalf of any other entity, before
either making a limited document production (e.g., Grigoryan Decl. Exh. 3 No.
3) or no production at all (No. 6.)
With
respect to Defendant’s assertion that the requests are vague, ambiguous, and
not reasonably particularized, the Court is unpersuaded. Contrary to
Defendant’s contention, the requests are not so broadly phrased that Defendant
could not be expected to understand what materials are being sought. That the
Court was able to determine the relevance of these materials supports this
conclusion. Further, as to Defendant’s relevance objection, that contention is
without merit for the reasons stated above.
As to
Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff seeks documents which have already been
produced or are equally available, Defendant’s bare assertion is not evidence
of that contention. Defendant also claims, without explanation or evidence,
that the disclosure of these materials would cause Defendant “competitive harm”
by disclosing trade secrets. The Court finds this unsupported assertion wholly
unconvincing.
The Court
therefore finds that Plaintiff is entitled to an order compelling further
responses to all the requests at issue.
CONCLUSION:
Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production is
GRANTED.
Defendant
is ordered to provide verified, code-compliant supplemental responses without
objections within 30 days of this order.
Moving
Party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 21,
2025 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It
should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still
conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you
have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you
should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an
order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.