Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 23STCV23364, Date: 2024-02-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV23364    Hearing Date: February 21, 2024    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE:     February 21, 2024                 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

CASE:                         111 W7 Owner LLC et al. v. 1200 Management LLC

CASE NO.:                 23STCV23364           

MOTION FOR TRIAL PREFERENCE

MOVING PARTY:               Plaintiffs 111 W 7 Owner, LLC, 600 S Spring Owner LLC and 650 S Spring Owner LLC

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant 1200 Management LLC

CASE HISTORY:

·         09/26/23: Complaint filed.

·         12/04/23: Cross-Complaint filed.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

            This is an action for declaratory relief. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant entered into a series of purchase and sale agreements and lease agreements concerning several mixed-use buildings. These agreements allegedly required Defendant to pay a portion of operating, management, and maintenance costs, except those costs that solely affect the residential portions of the property. Plaintiffs also allege that the agreements obligated Defendant to cover costs for subdivision of the commercial portions of the properties from the residential portions. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants have refused to pay these costs, and seek a declaration from the Court that they are required to do so under the lease agreements.  

Plaintiffs move for trial preference pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1062.3.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Trial Preference is DENIED.

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DISCUSSION:

Plaintiffs move for trial preference pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1062.3.

Notice of Motion

            Plaintiffs’ Amended Notice of Motion states that it was filed and served on January 30, 2024 via electronic service. (See Amended Notice of Motion POS.) Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1005(b), notice of any motion must be given at least 16 court days in advance of the scheduled hearing, plus two court days for electronic service. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1010.6.) Thus, for a hearing date of February 21, 2024, notice of motion must have been given no later than January 24, 2024. Although the Court is in possession of a Declaration by Charles D. Jarell in support of the motion which was filed and served on that date, there is no Notice of Motion or Memorandum of Points & Authorities in the Court’s records showing notice was given on that date. However, as Defendant responded to this motion and did not object for inadequate notice, the Court will overlook this issue and consider the motion on its merits.

Analysis

Plaintiffs move for trial preference pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1062.3.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1062.3 states:

(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), actions brought under the provisions of this chapter [seeking declaratory relief] shall be set for trial at the earliest possible date and shall take precedence over all other cases, except older matters of the same character and matters to which special precedence may be given by law.

(b) Any action brought under the provisions of this chapter in which the plaintiff seeks any relief, in addition to a declaration of rights and duties, shall take such precedence only upon noticed motion and a showing that the action requires a speedy trial.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 1062.3)

            Plaintiffs contend that this case must be granted preference because the Complaint on its face presents itself as exclusively seeking a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties, and is therefore subject to subdivision (a).

            Defendant argues in opposition that the Complaint should not be subject to subdivision (a) because the Complaint is more properly construed as a claim for breach of contract, not declaratory relief. Defendant contends that the Complaint is seeking a determination that it breached its obligations under the agreements, relying on Plaintiffs’ request for a determination that Defendant is obligated to reimburse Plaintiffs for the costs and expenses which are alleged to be within the scope of the reimbursement provisions. (See Complaint ¶ 67.) According to Defendant, a claim for declaratory relief only lies as a prophylactic measure to declare the rights and obligations of the parties in advance of a breach. However, the cases on which Defendant relies do not state that declaratory relief is unavailable after a breach has occurred. To the contrary, Travers v. Louden expressly states that declaratory relief is available after a breach has occurred. (Travers v. Louden (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 926, 931.) Similarly, our Supreme Court’s statement that “[t]he code sections provide for declaratory relief in advance of breach” did not preclude pursuing declaratory relief where the allegations also set forth a potential breach of contract. (Kessloff v. Pearson (1951) 37 Cal.2d 609, 613.) Indeed, the California Supreme Court has since stated in plain language that “a declaratory judgment action may be brought to establish rights once a conflict has arisen.” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 898.) Defendant has thus failed to offer any authority justifying its position that Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief is improper because the Complaint sets forth facts showing that a potential breach has already occurred.

            That said, Plaintiffs’ claim that the Complaint exclusively seeks a declaration of rights and duties is not entirely borne out by the pleadings. Close examination of the Complaint does show that Plaintiffs seek to establish rights and duties under the agreements, such as the right to reimbursements for maintenance and operating costs (Complaint ¶¶ 34-50), the right—or absence thereof—to pursue subdivision of the properties (Complaint ¶¶ 56-57), and the right to reimbursement for subdivision costs (¶¶ 59-61.) However, Plaintiffs are seeking more than a bare declaration of rights and duties; they also are seeking an order that Defendant pay certain disputed costs. (See Complaint ¶¶ 65-67.) Put differently, Plaintiffs are requesting that the Court decide not merely the meaning of the agreements and whether Defendant must make reimbursements in general, but the factual questions of whether the disputed costs should be reimbursed. As the Court of Appeal has stated:

[g]enerally, an action in declaratory relief will not lie to determine an issue which can be determined in the underlying tort action. The relief statute should not be used for the purpose of anticipating and determining an issue which can be determined in the main action. The object of the statute is to afford a new form of relief where needed and not to furnish a litigant with a second cause of action for the determination of identical issues. [citation] Under section 1061 of the Code of Civil Procedure the court may refuse to exercise the power to grant declaratory relief where such relief is not necessary or proper at the time under all of the circumstances. The availability of another form of relief that is adequate will usually justify refusal to grant declaratory relief. The refusal to exercise the power is within the court's legal discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal except for abuse of discretion. [citation]

(California Ins. Guarantee Assn. v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1617, 1623-24 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) Plaintiffs’ request for relief appears, in part, to run afoul of this standard by requesting relief that ordinarily can be determined in the underlying contractual claim. Even if the Court were to separate the issues and conduct a bench trial on the legal impact of the agreements, the Court would likely be compelled to refrain from issuing a ruling pending a determination of the underlying factual issues, pursuant to the Court’s broad discretion under section 1061. Thus, the Court is not persuaded that this action is strictly a declaratory relief claim within the purview of subdivision (a).

            As to subdivision (b), none of Plaintiffs’ papers, including the reply brief, set forth any facts indicating that there is some urgency requiring a speedy trial. Plaintiffs have thus failed to demonstrate that trial preference is appropriate under this subdivision.

CONCLUSION:

            Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Trial Preference is DENIED.

            Moving Parties to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:  February 21, 2024                              ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.