Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 23STCV26493, Date: 2024-01-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV26493 Hearing Date: April 5, 2024 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: April 5, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT
SET
CASE: Herbert Capital, LLC, et al. v. Bryce
Egbert, et al.
CASE NO.: 23STCV26493 ![]()
RENEWED
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Herbert Capital, LLC and 1010 Eighty, LLC
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendants Bryce
Egbert and Egbert Enterprises, LLC
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is a shareholder derivative action that was filed on October 31,
2023. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Bryce Egbert and Taisiia Popova
conspired to raid the assets of a pair of LLCs in the business of cannabis oil
manufacture.
Plaintiffs bring a renewed motion
for preliminary injunction seeking the removal of Defendant Egbert from control
of both nominal Defendants and the appointment of David Moss or another
qualified person as receiver to take control of the nominal Defendants.
Plaintiffs also seek monetary sanctions for violation of the Court’s January
26, 2024 order.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for
Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.
DISCUSSION:
Plaintiffs bring a renewed motion
for preliminary injunction seeking the removal of Defendant Egbert from control
of both nominal Defendants and the appointment of David Moss or another
qualified person as receiver to take control of the nominal Defendants.
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Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice
Plaintiffs
request that the Court take judicial notice of (1) the Complaint in this
action; (2) the October 31, 2023 Notice of Ruling filed in this action as to Plaintiffs’
ex parte application for order for removal of managing member and
appointment of receiver; (3) the November 22, 2023 Notice of Ruling filed in
this action as to Plaintiffs’ ex parte application for a Temporary
Restraining Order; (4) the January 19, 2024 Notice of Ruling filed in this action
as to Plaintiffs’ application for a Preliminary Injunction; (5) the Order on
that Preliminary Injunction filed on January 26, 2024; (6) the Court’s January
26, 2024 order correcting the Order on the Preliminary Injunction nunc pro
tunc; and (7) the Declaration of Bryce Egbert filed in opposition to the
Motion for Preliminary injunction heard on January 19, 2024. These requests are
GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d) (court records).
Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice
Defendants
request that the Court take judicial notice of (1) the Declaration of Bryce
Egbert submitted on January 5, 2024 in opposition to the previous Motion for
Preliminary Injunction; and (2) the January 26, 2024 Order for Preliminary
Injunction. Defendants’ requests are GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section
452(d) (court records).
Legal Standard
“A party
who originally made an application for an order which was refused in whole or
part, or granted conditionally or on terms, may make a subsequent application
for the same order upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, in which
case it shall be shown by affidavit what application was made before, when and
to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different
facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” (Code Civ. Proc. §
1008(b).)
A party may request a preliminary injunction “by serving a
noticed motion,” as Plaintiffs have in this case, when the party against whom
the preliminary injunction is sought has appeared in the action. (Cal. Rule of
Court 3.1150(a).)
“An injunction is a writ or order requiring a person to
refrain from a particular act.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 525.) “A preliminary
injunction may be granted at any time before judgment upon a verified
complaint, or upon affidavits if the complaint in the one case, or the
affidavits in the other, show satisfactorily that sufficient grounds exist
therefor.” (Code Civ. Proc.§ 527(a).) An injunction may be granted in the
following cases:
(1) When it
appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded,
and the relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or
perpetually.
(2)¿When it
appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance of
some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable
injury, to a party to the action.
(3)¿¿When
it appears, during the litigation, that a party to the action is doing, or
threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act
in violation of the rights of another party to the action respecting the
subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
(4) When pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate
relief.
(5) Where
it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which
would afford adequate relief.
. . . .
(Code Civ. Proc. § 526(a)(1)-(5).)
In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, two
factors must be considered prior to issuing a preliminary injunction: (1) the
balance of the harm to the applicant should the injunction not issue, compared
to the harm to the enjoined party should the injunction issue; and (2) whether
the applicant is ultimately likely to prevail on the merits. (Common Cause
v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 441442.) A trial court
has broad discretionary powers to grant or deny a request for a preliminary
injunction if it does not act capriciously. The court should exercise its
judgment in favor of the party most likely to be injured. (Robbins v.
Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 205.) In addition, the two
factors are interrelated: the greater the Plaintiff’s showing as to one of the
factors, the less that must be shown as to the other factor. (Butt v. State
of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.)
Analysis
“Irreparable harm” arises when monetary damages would not be sufficient
to remedy the injury. (Wind v. Herbert (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 276, 285;
Code Civ. Proc. § 526(a)(4).) Injuries rising from wrongs of “continuing
character” may also constitute “irreparable harm.” (People ex rel. Gow v.
Mitchell Bros.’ Santa Ana Theater (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 863, 871.) An
injunction preventing disposal of property is proper if disposal would render
the final judgment ineffectual. (Code Civ. Proc. § 526(a)(3); Wilkins v.
Oken (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 603, 606-607.) In the context of a derivative
suit, irreparable harm includes disposal of profits of a transaction by
officers or directors. (See Heckman v. C.L. Ahmanson (1985) 168
Cal.App.3d 119, 127 [affirming preliminary injunction imposing trust on profits
from sale of corporation].) Other examples include circumstances where “the
directors and majority of the stockholders are so managing or disposing of its
business or assets in their own interest that they will probably be lost or
destroyed before a decree can be rendered,” or “where there are such
dissensions within the corporation that its business cannot be honestly or
properly managed.” (Misita v. Distillers Corp. (1942) 54 Cal.App.2d 244,
250-51 [appointment of receiver].)
Plaintiffs argue that if the injunction does not issue, they will
suffer greater harm in that Defendant Egbert will continue to damage the LLCs’ business
and assets by, inter alia, incurring debts against the LLCs while
keeping the loan proceeds for himself, enacting a plan to sell both LLCs to a
third party whom Plaintiffs contend is not licensed to operate a cannabis oil
business, and disposing of equipment belonging to the LLCs without compensation.
Although Plaintiffs offer voluminous evidence in support of their contentions,
most of the conduct identified took place before the entry of the January 26
preliminary injunction. (See, e.g., Declaration of Matthew Novello ISO Mot. ¶¶ 10-13,
15-17; Declaration of Elan Chen ISO Mot. ¶¶ 2-7.) Evidence of activity
predating the original injunction does not suffice to establish that further
injunctive measures are warranted because this evidence does not demonstrate a
continuing risk of harm.
That said, Plaintiffs also offered evidence that, despite the Court’s
order to that effect, Defendant Egbert did not provide Plaintiffs with access
to the facility video cameras. (Novello Decl. ¶¶ 3-5, 14; Exhs. 27, 28, 36,
37.) Before this motion could be heard, Plaintiffs brought an ex parte
application for emergency relief seeking, in essence, the same remedy: removal
of Bryce Egbert as manager, appointing Plaintiffs as temporary managers of the
Nominal Defendants, and requiring Egbert to provide up-to-date records for the
Nominal Defendants. (March 8, 2024 Ex Parte Application.) The Court granted
the application in part, ordering:
Plaintiffs and moving parties will
have access to the facility and financial records during an initial visit on
March 13, 2023, between 10:00 a.m. and 12 Noon, with each visit to last up to
an hour, with up to 5 visits between now and the April 5th, 2024 hearing date.
After the initial March 13 visit, 2
hours’ notice shall be given for an on-site inspection to be conducted during
business hours of 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
There shall be no interference with
the business operations during the visits.
The Court permits cameras and
photographs to be taken during the on-site inspections.
With respect to the METRC issue, to
the extent defendants have administrative access they shall add and GRANT
plaintiffs access within 24 hours.
(March
11, 2024 Minute Order.) Defendants contend in their opposition filed on March
22 they have complied with this order. (Declaration of David Welch ISO Opp. ¶¶
11-13.)
In reply, Plaintiffs concede that they have obtained access to the
METRC system, the facility, and to the cameras. (Declaration of Robert Finkle
ISO Reply ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs claim they still lack access to the Nominal
Defendants’ financial records, but fail to explain whether they attempted to
inspect the records at the facility or whether any documents were made
available during those inspections, only disclosing that they demanded
production of the records pursuant to the Corporations Code on March 22, 2024.
(Finkle Reply Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. C.) Although Plaintiffs may be entitled to these
documents as members of the corporations pursuant to Corporations Code §17704.10,
or as Plaintiffs in this action under the Civil Discovery Act (see Code Civ.
Proc. §§ 2031.010 et seq.), Defendants’ failure to produce these records
is weak evidence of irreparable harm. Moreover, the force of this evidence as
support for new injunctive relief is undermined by the existence of the Court’s
March 11 order which provided Plaintiffs the opportunity to inspect the
relevant records on-site during their inspections. Nothing in the record
suggests that Plaintiffs have availed themselves of that opportunity. This
meager showing is not sufficient to demonstrate that the risk of harm to
Plaintiffs outweighs the substantial disruption of the status quo that
appointment of a receiver would represent.
As Plaintiffs have not demonstrated
that the balance of harms favors appointment of a receiver, the Court does not
address whether Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits
with respect to this motion.
The Court therefore finds that the
injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs is not warranted. It appears, however,
that an extension of the Court’s March 11 order granting Plaintiffs the right to
inspect the facilities and records on a regular basis might serve to balance
the interests of the parties, in that a continuing right to inspection would mitigate
any potential risk of misappropriation or loss of assets, records, and
inventory of the Nominal Defendants without the disruption and expense that
would likely stem from the appointment of a receiver. The Court wishes to hear
arguments from the Parties concerning this proposal at the hearing on this
motion.
CONCLUSION:
Accordingly,
Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.
Moving
Parties to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 5, 2023 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It
should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still
conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you
have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you
should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an
order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.