Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 23STCV30335, Date: 2025-05-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV30335 Hearing Date: May 8, 2025 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: May 8, 2025 TRIAL DATE: June 10, 2025
CASE: Marcus Terry v. Integrated Treatment
Services
CASE NO.: 23STCV30335 
MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Integrated Treatment Services.
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Marcus
Terry.
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is an employment discrimination and wrongful termination action that
was filed on December 12, 2023. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a
behavior therapist at Defendant’s adult residential substance abuse treatment
facility. Plaintiff alleges that, after reporting what he believed to be
physical abuse of a patient, he was targeted for retaliation. Plaintiff further
alleges that he was terminated both in retaliation for his complaint and
because he had been arrested following a suicide attempt.
Defendant moves for summary
judgment, or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of all causes of action
and of Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is DENIED.
Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED.
DISCUSSION:
Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant
moves for summary judgment. As Defendant has not demonstrated that it is
entitled to summary adjudication as to all causes of action for the reasons
stated below, Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment.
Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Motion for Summary Adjudication
Defendant
moves in the alternative for summary adjudication of each cause of action and
of Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.
Legal Standard
The function of a motion for
summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an
opposing party can show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and, if
not, to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil
Procedure Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment
if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from
the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that
there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
(Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110,
1119.) “The function of the pleadings in
a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the
function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any
triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge
v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI
Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-82.)
As to each claim as framed by the
complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial
burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to
establish a defense. (Code Civ Proc. § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes,
Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the
evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts
concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide,
Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) The lack of opposition by a plaintiff is
not grounds to grant a motion for summary judgment if a defendant cannot meet
their initial burden of proof. (See Thatcher v. Lucy Stores, Inc. (2000)
79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1087.)
Once the
defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that
a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action
or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party
opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster
v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections
As part of
his opposition papers, Plaintiff served and filed a document entitled
“Plaintiff’s Written Objections to Defendant’s Evidence.” Although this
document purports to object to specific evidence, close examination reveals
that Plaintiff is not objecting to the evidence itself but rather to
Defendant’s characterization of that evidence in portions of Defendant’s
Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Fact. Pursuant to Rule of Court
3.1354, objections must be made to evidence, not to the Separate Statement, and
must specify the evidence or portion thereof which is objectionable.
(Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1354(b).) As Plaintiff’s purported objections are
not targeted at evidence, they are not proper objections and must therefore be
OVERRULED.
Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections
Defendant
objects to portions of the Declaration of Marcus Terry in support of the
opposition to the motion. The Court rules on these objections as follows.
Objection
No. 1: OVERRULED. The statements are not speculative and foundation is laid
through the rest of the declaration.
Objection
Nos. 2-3: OVERRULED. The statements are not vague, a legal conclusion, or
speculation. The statements are not hearsay.
Objection
No. 4: SUSTAINED as to Plaintiff’s characterization of his belief as
“reasonable” as an improper legal conclusion. (Hayman v. Block (1986)
176 Cal.App.3d 629, 638-39.) Otherwise, OVERRULED. The remaining statements are
not speculative nor lacking in foundation.
Objection
No. 5: SUSTAINED as improper speculation. (Evid. Code §§ 400, 403, 410,
803.)
First Cause of Action: Violation of Labor Code Section
432.7
Defendant moves
for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s first cause of action for violation of
Labor Code section 432.7.
Labor Code section 432.7
subdivision (a) states that an employer “shall not ask an applicant for
employment to disclose […] information concerning an arrest or detention that
did not result in conviction” and “shall not seek from any source whatsoever,
or utilize, as a factor in determining any condition of employment including
[…] termination […] any record of arrest or detention that did not result in
conviction.” (Labor Code § 432.7 (a)(1).) Defendant offers two arguments against
this cause of action: first, that Plaintiff’s termination was the result of his
missing consecutive shifts without calling in and had nothing to do with his
arrest and, second, Defendant is exempted from section 432.7 as a health
facility pursuant to subdivision (f)(1) of section 432.7.
1.
Basis for Termination
Turning to Defendant’s first
argument, Defendant attempts to offer evidence purporting to show that
Plaintiff was terminated for an “independent lawful reason.” According to the
undisputed record, Defendant Integrated Treatment Services operates three
community-based residential group homes for adults with intellectual,
developmental, and/or mental health needs. (Separate Statement of Undisputed
Material Fact No. 1.2; Response to Separate Statement No. 1.2.) Plaintiff was
hired as a “Registered Behavior Technician” by Defendant sometime in December
2021. (See Complaint ¶ 6.) On December 24 and 25, 2022, Plaintiff failed to report
to work for his assigned shifts, without notifying Defendant in advance. (SSUMF
No. 1.49; RSS No. 1.49.) Defendant has a written policy that two unannounced
failures to report to work can result in termination. (SSUMF No. 1.19; RSS 1.19.)
Thus, Defendant argues, its owner and Executive Director, Dr. Ingrid Wilson,
decided to terminate Plaintiff’s employment based on his violation of that
no-call/no-show policy. (SSUMF Nos. 1.53-54.)
Defendant’s position does not bear
up under scrutiny of its own evidence. Defendant’s Facility Administrator,
Aubri Griffis, testified in deposition that she discovered that Plaintiff was
in jail and reported this information via text message to Dr. Wilson
immediately before Dr. Wilson decided that Plaintiff should be terminated. (See
Declaration of Dawn T. Collins Exh. F [Deposition of Aubri Griffis] pp. 131:6-10.)
This admission, at minimum, establishes that Defendant was aware of Plaintiff’s
arrest as the reason for his absence. Construed in the light most favorably to
Plaintiff, as required on a motion for summary adjudication, this evidence also
supports the inference that Plaintiff was terminated for being arrested. More
damningly, Defendant’s own termination letter, also offered by Defendants as
evidence, expressly cites Plaintiff’s arrest charge as a basis for termination.
(See Collins Decl. Exh. M.) Dr. Wilson’s categorical statement that Plaintiff’s
absence was the sole reason for his termination merely creates a conflict in
the evidence—i.e., a triable issue of material fact—which cannot be resolved by
summary adjudication. (See SSUMF No. 1.54.) Defendant has thus failed to carry
its burden to demonstrate that Plaintiff cannot prevail on this basis since
portions of its own evidence tend to support Plaintiff’s contention.
2.
Exemption from Section 432.7
Defendant argues in the alternative
that, even if Plaintiff was terminated based on his arrest, Labor Code section
432.7 is not applicable because Defendant is subject to the subdivision (f)(1)
exception for health facilities. This subsection states:
Except as provided
in paragraph (2) [concerning juvenile court proceedings], this section does not
prohibit an employer at a health facility, as defined in Section 1250 of the
Health and Safety Code, from asking an applicant for employment either
of the following:
(A)
With regard to an applicant for a position with regular
access to patients, to disclose an arrest under any section
specified in Section 290 of the Penal Code.
(B)
With regard to an applicant for a position with access
to drugs and medication, to disclose an arrest under any section
specified in former Section 11590 of the Health and Safety Code, as it read on
January 1, 2019.
(Labor Code § 437.2(f)(1) [emphasis added].) It is
undisputed that Defendant is a “health facility” within the meaning of section
1250 of the Health and Safety Code. (SSUMF No. 2.4; RSS No. 2.4.) However,
nothing in the plain language of this code section creates an exception to
section 437.2’s categorical prohibition against termination based on an arrest,
only an exception to the prohibition against seeking disclosure of
arrest information. Defendant’s citation to Health and Safety Code section
1522, which sets forth the procedures to be employed by the Department of
Social Services in licensing an Adult Residential Facility and its employees,
is of little utility, as this section is not germane to the firing of employees
and certainly does not authorize unilateral termination. (See generally Health
& Safety Code § 1522.) Defendant has failed to demonstrate that Plaintiff’s
claim is deficient on this basis.
As neither
of Defendant’s arguments concerning the first cause of action are meritorious,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the first cause of action is
DENIED.
Second Cause of Action: Employment Discrimination
Defendant
moves for summary adjudication of the second cause of action for employment
discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act. Plaintiff’s
complaint asserts two theories of liability under FEHA: (1) discrimination on
the basis of a disability (Gov. Code § 12940(a)); and (2) discrimination based
on Plaintiff’s criminal history (Gov Code § 12952; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2 §
11017.1.) (See Complaint ¶¶ 26-27.) Defendant attacks each of these theories of
liability separately.
1.
Discrimination Based on Arrest History
Defendant first attacks Plaintiff’s
putative claim for discrimination based on criminal history as inapplicable to
the facts of the case. Government Code section 12952, on which this claim is
partially premised, prohibits an employer from seeking disclosure of arrest
information before making a conditional offer of employment and from
considering any such information in connection with an application. (Gov. Code
§ 12952.) This statute, on its face, has no bearing on the matters at issue in
this action. Moreover, although Plaintiff’s opposition correctly states that California
Code of Regulations Title 2 section 11017.1 subsection (b)(1) prohibits
consideration of arrests not resulting in conviction in making a termination
decision, that regulation expressly cites—and is enacted pursuant to—section
432.7 of the Labor Code, not section 12952 of the Government Code. (Cal. Code
Regs. tit. 2 § 11017.1(b)(1).) No other portion of that regulation addresses
termination. The Court therefore finds that Defendant has established that Plaintiff’s
claim of discrimination based on criminal history is deficient as a matter of
law and that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a triable issue of fact with respect
to this claim.
//
2.
Disability Discrimination
Defendant also seeks summary
adjudication arguing that Plaintiff’s theory of disability discrimination is
defective because Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant was aware that
Plaintiff had a disability at the time of his termination.
To establish a prima facie case of
disability discrimination, a Plaintiff must demonstrate that he “(1) suffered
from a disability, or was regarded as suffering from a disability; (2) could
perform the essential duties of the job with or without reasonable
accommodations; and (3) was subjected to an adverse employment action because
of the disability or perceived disability.” (Wills v. Superior Court
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 159-60.) A condition is a “disability” under the
Fair Employment and Housing Act if it “limits a major life activity,” including
“physical, mental, and social activities and working.” (Gov. Code § 12926(m).)
Defendant states that Plaintiff did
not inform any of Defendant’s personnel during the hiring process or his
regular employment that he suffered from any disability. (SSUMF No 4.31.)
According to Defendant, the first time Plaintiff informed Defendant of his
suffering from a mental health condition was after Defendant had already
decided to terminate him. (SSUMF No. 4.33.) Thus, Defendant argues, Plaintiff’s
termination could not have been based upon his disability because Defendant had
no awareness of it. (E.g. Scotch v. Art Inst. of Cal. (2009) 173
Cal.App.4th 986, 1008.) Defendant has offered evidence tending to prove that
Plaintiff cannot prevail on a disability discrimination cause of action for
lack of a causal connection. The burden therefore shifts to Plaintiff to
demonstrate a triable issue of fact.
In response, Plaintiff offers
evidence that Ms. Griffis, while attempting to investigate Plaintiff’s
disappearance, was told by former employees of Defendant that Plaintiff had
previously attempted suicide. (RSS No.4.31; Plaintiff’s Exh. B [Griffis Depo
pp. 116:21-117:13.) Ms. Griffis had also learned that Plaintiff had, two weeks
earlier, spent more than an hour while on shift speaking to a therapist. (Id.
Plaintiff’s Exh. B. pp. 11: 8-22; 147:13-24.) Defendant’s reply attempts to
brush this evidence aside, arguing that this information was not sufficient to
place Defendant on notice that Plaintiff suffered from a disability. The Court
disagrees. It is true that statements revealing an unspecified incapacity do
not establish a disability within the meaning of the statute (see Avila v.
Continental Airlines Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1248.) However, evidence
of a suicide attempt supports few interpretations other than the
existence of a mental health condition which limits major life activities. (See
Brundage v. Hahn (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 228, 237 [knowledge of disability
imputed to employer when fact of disability is only reasonable interpretation
of the known facts].) The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has offered
sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendant
knew that Plaintiff suffered from a disability prior to his termination.
While Defendant offers other
arguments in its reply papers, only Defendant’s purported lack of knowledge was
asserted as a basis for summary adjudication in the moving papers. The Court
therefore refuses to consider Defendant’s belated reply arguments.
As Plaintiff has created a triable
issue of fact with respect to a disability discrimination claim, Defendant is
not entitled to summary adjudication of the second cause of action. Accordingly,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the second cause of action is
DENIED.
Third Cause of Action: Failure to Provide Reasonable
Accommodations
Defendant
moves for summary adjudication of the third cause of action for failure to
provide reasonable accommodations.
Under Government Code section 12940(m), an
employer has a duty to make “reasonable accommodation for the known physical or
mental disability of an . . . employee.” (Gov. Code § 12940(m).) To prevail on
this cause of action, a plaintiff must prove that “‘(1) the plaintiff has a
disability covered by the FEHA; (2) the plaintiff is a qualified individual
(i.e., he or she can perform the essential functions of the position); and (3)
the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff’s disability.[Citation.]’
” (Hernandez v. Rancho Santiago Cmty. College Dist. (2018) 22Cal.App.5th
1187, 1193-1194.) Where there is no disability nor perception of disability,
there is no duty to accommodate. (Hodges, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at 913.)
Defendant first argues that
Plaintiff cannot prevail on this cause of action because Defendant was not
aware that Plaintiff had a disability. As Plaintiff has demonstrated a triable
issue of fact with respect to this argument, Defendant cannot obtain summary
adjudication on this basis. In the alternative, Defendant argues that Plaintiff
admitted that he never requested an accommodation, and, therefore, his claim is
defective. (SSUMF No. 5.31.) This contention is specious. The gravamen of
Plaintiff’s complaint is that he was summarily terminated for missing work due
to an arrest precipitated by his suicide attempt and thus was deprived of an
opportunity to request accommodation or to engage in the interactive process.
(See Complaint ¶¶ 11-13.) Defendant’s evidence does not suffice to carry its
burden with respect to this cause of action. Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Adjudication of the third cause of action is DENIED.
Fourth Cause of Action: Failure to Engage in Interactive
Process
Defendant
moves for summary adjudication of the fourth cause of action for failure to
engage in the interactive process on the same basis as the third cause of
action. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Adjudication of the fourth cause of action is DENIED.
Fifth Cause of Action: Failure to Prevent Discrimination
Defendant
moves for summary adjudication of the fifth cause of action for failure to
prevent discrimination on the same basis as the second cause of action.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Adjudication of the fifth cause of action is DENIED.
Sixth Cause of Action: Whistleblower Retaliation
Defendant moves for summary
adjudication of the sixth cause of action for whistleblower retaliation under
Labor Code section 1102.5(b).
Labor Code section 1102.5(b)
states:
An employer, or any
person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate against an
employee for disclosing information, or because the employer believes that the
employee disclosed or may disclose information, to a government or law
enforcement agency, to a person with authority over the employee or another
employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the
violation or noncompliance, or for providing information to, or testifying
before, any public body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry, if
the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a
violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with
a local, state, or federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing
the information is part of the employee’s job duties.
(Labor Code § 1102.5(b).) Defendant argues that Plaintiff
cannot prevail on this cause of action on two grounds: first, that Plaintiff
cannot demonstrate that he disclosed information which he had reasonable cause
to believe disclosed a violation of law; and second, that Plaintiff cannot
demonstrate that his alleged whistleblowing was a contributing factor to his
termination. The Court addresses these arguments separately.
1.
Reasonable Cause to Believe Information
Disclosed Violation of Law
Defendant first asserts that
Plaintiff cannot establish that he disclosed information which he had
reasonable cause to believe disclosed a violation of law.
To establish this element, a
plaintiff need only demonstrate that he, as an employee, disclosed information,
and that he reasonably believed that the information discloses unlawful
activity. (Ross v. County of Riverside (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 580,
592-93.)
Defendant’s contention is
principally based on a December 10, 2022 text message to Ms. Griffis in which
Plaintiff reported that a patient named “Max” had been repeatedly sent to his
room without breakfast, leading the patient to become aggressive toward staff.
(SSUMF No. 8.36.) Defendant asserts that Plaintiff did not have reasonable
cause to believe this conduct constituted a violation of law because Plaintiff
was not familiar with the patient’s treatment plan. Defendant’s argument
assumes, without justification or citation to authority, that mere adherence to
a treatment plan is per se not a violation of law and cannot reasonably
support an inference of abuse. The Court is not persuaded by Defendant’s bare
conclusion. Nor is the Court moved by Defendant’s irrelevant assertions
regarding its purported incentives or its past history of taking action in
response to reports of patient abuse. Similarly, Defendant’s argument that
Plaintiff failed to follow Defendant’s internal reporting procedures for
disclosing a violation is immaterial, as is the contention that Ms. Griffis did
not consider Plaintiff’s text to be a report of patient abuse. Defendant has
not carried its burden to demonstrate that Plaintiff cannot prevail with
respect to the disclosure element.
2.
Causation
Defendant also contends that
Plaintiff cannot prevail on this cause of action because he cannot establish a
causal relationship between any protected activity and being denied a shift the
following Saturday. This argument, as asserted in the papers, fails to engage
with the Complaint’s allegation that Plaintiff’s eventual termination was also
in retaliation for this disclosure. (See Complaint ¶¶ 13; 58.) “The function of
the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the
issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether
there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the
pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67,
citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367,
381-82.) Because Defendant’s argument does not address the full scope of the
relevant allegations, its narrower showing is insufficient to carry Defendant’s
burden to show that Plaintiff cannot prevail for want of causation.
As Defendant has failed to carry
its burden to show that Plaintiff cannot prevail with respect to either of the
proffered arguments, the burden does not shift to Plaintiff to demonstrate a
triable issue of fact. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Adjudication
of the sixth cause of action is DENIED.
Seventh Cause of Action: Violation of Labor Code Section
98.6
Defendant
moves for summary adjudication of the seventh cause of action for violation of
Labor Code section 98.6. The parties agree that this cause of action is
derivative of the preceding claims. As Defendant is not entitled to summary
adjudication of the first six causes of action, Defendant’s motion for summary
adjudication of the seventh cause of action is DENIED.
Eighth Cause of Action: Wrongful Termination
Defendant
moves for summary adjudication of the seventh cause of action for wrongful
termination. The parties agree that this cause of action is derivative of the
preceding claims. As Defendant is not entitled to summary adjudication of the
first seven causes of action, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication of
the eighth cause of action is DENIED.
//
Ninth Cause of Action: Violation of Labor Code Section
226
Defendant
moves for summary adjudication of the ninth cause of action for violation of
Labor Code section 226. This statute requires employers to maintain accurate
payroll records and to furnish an employee with those records within 21 days of
receipt of a request for inspection. (Labor Code § 226(a)-(c).)
Defendant
contends that Plaintiff cannot prevail on this cause of action because
Defendant never received a request for pay records. (SSUMF No. 12.62.) In
response, Plaintiff offers evidence that two certified letters were sent to
Defendant’s address requesting those records, with proof of delivery. (RSS No.
12.62.) The Court therefore finds that although Defendant produced evidence
tending to show that Plaintiff could not prevail on this claim, Plaintiff has
demonstrated a triable issue of fact by offering evidence tending to show that
Defendant did receive his request.
Accordingly,
Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication of the ninth cause of action is
DENIED.
Tenth Cause of Action: Violation of Labor Code Section
1198.5
Defendant moves for summary
adjudication of the tenth cause of action for violation of Labor Code section
1198.5. This statute requires employers to maintain personnel records and to
furnish an employee with those records within 30 days of receipt of a request
for inspection. (Labor Code § 1198.5(b).)
Defendant
contends that Plaintiff cannot prevail on this cause of action because
Defendant never received a request for his personnel file. (SSUMF No. 13.62.)
In response, Plaintiff offers evidence that two certified letters were sent to
Defendant’s address requesting those records, with proof of delivery. (RSS No.
13.62.) The Court therefore finds that although Defendant produced evidence
tending to show that Plaintiff could not prevail on this claim, Plaintiff has
demonstrated a triable issue of fact by offering evidence tending to show that
Defendant did receive his request.
Accordingly,
Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication of the tenth cause of action is
DENIED.
Punitive Damages
Defendant
also moves for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages
on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate malice, oppression, or fraud.
To maintain a claim for punitive
damages, a plaintiff must establish by clear and convincing evidence that a
defendant acted with fraud, malice, or oppression. (Code Civ. Proc. § 3294.)
Punitive damages may arise against an employer for the conduct of an employee
when it is established that an officer, director, or managing agent either
commit the act themselves, or ratify the act. (White v. Ultramar, Inc.
(199) 21 Cal.4th 563, 572; College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 726.)
Defendant
asserts that Plaintiff cannot prevail on his prayer for punitive damages
because “there is no evidence” that Plaintiff’s termination was done with
malice, oppression, or fraud. First, Defendant’s burden is not merely to
declare the absence of evidence, but to prove that Plaintiff cannot reasonably
obtain evidence supporting his claims. Second, a retaliatory motive, as
asserted by the sixth cause of action which has survived summary adjudication,
constitutes malice by definition. (See Perkins v. Superior Court (General Telephone
Directory Co. (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7 [refusing to strike punitive
damages claim because allegation of retaliation, if proven, would sustain
finding of malice].) Defendant has not carried its burden to demonstrate that
Plaintiff cannot prevail on this prayer.
Accordingly,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the prayer for punitive damages
is DENIED.
CONCLUSION:
Accordingly,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED.
Moving
Party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 8, 2025 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It
should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still
conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you
have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you
should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an
order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.