Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 24STCV01754, Date: 2024-04-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV01754 Hearing Date: April 23, 2024 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: April 23, 2024 TRIAL
DATE: NOT SET
CASE: Luci-Ellen Chun v. Los Angeles Community
College District
CASE NO.: 24STCV01754 
DEMURRER
AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF COMPLAINT
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Los Angeles Community College District
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff
Luci-Ellen Chun
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is an employment discrimination action filed on January 23, 2024.
Plaintiff alleges that she was denied accommodations for her medical condition
and was terminated because she needed those accommodations.
Defendant demurs to and moves to
strike the eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action in the Complaint.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant’s Demurrer to the
Complaint is OVERRULED.
Defendant’s
Motion to Strike is DENIED.
DISCUSSION:
Demurrer to Complaint
Defendant
demurs to the eighth cause of action for declaratory relief, ninth cause of
action for whistleblower retaliation, and tenth cause of action for failure to
permit inspection of personnel and payroll records, based on the failure to
allege compliance with the Government Tort Claims Act.
//
Legal Standard
A demurrer tests whether the
complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations
liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and
Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the
defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial
notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968,
994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other
extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face
of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court
(1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing
is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters,
states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) The
ultimate facts alleged in the complaint must be deemed true, as well as all
facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. (Marshall
v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403; see also Shields
v. County of San Diego (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 103, 133 [stating, “[o]n
demurrer, pleadings are read liberally and allegations contained therein are
assumed to be true”].) “This rule of liberal construction means that the
reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the
defendant.” (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th
1228, 1238.)
Meet and Confer
Before filing a demurrer, the
demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party
who has filed the pleading subject to the demurrer and file a declaration
detailing their meet-and-confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a).)
However, an insufficient meet-and-confer process is not grounds
to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §
430.41(a)(4).)
The Declaration of Savannah C.
Skelton attached to the moving papers states that she attempted to meet and
confer with Plaintiff’s counsel via email on February 16 and 20, 2024, and via
telephone on the latter date, but were unsuccessful in resolving this dispute.
(Declaration of Savannah C. Skelton ISO Dem. & Mot. ¶¶ 3-5 Exhs. B-C.)
Defendant has thus satisfied its statutory meet-and-confer obligations.
Request for Judicial Notice
Plaintiff
requests that the Court take judicial notice of her Complaint of Employment
Discrimination filed with the State of California Civil Rights Department on
December 7, 2023. Plaintiff states that this request is proper because records,
reports, and orders of administrative agencies are “official acts” within the
meaning of Evidence Code section 452(c) of which the Court may take judicial
notice. (SC Manufactured Homes, Inc. v. Liebert (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th
68, 82, fn.8.)
Defendant
objects to this request on the basis that Plaintiff has not demonstrated why
the Court should accept the truth of the matters asserted in the Complaint. It
is fortunate, then, that this document is not offered for the truth of the
matters asserted within it, but rather to demonstrate that the document exists
and that its contents, true or not, were presented to the Civil Rights
Department.
Plaintiff’s
request for judicial notice is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(c)
(official acts). The Court takes judicial notice only of the existence of the
document and the assertions it contains, not the truth of those assertions.
Eighth Cause of Action: Declaratory Relief
Defendant
demurs to the eighth cause of action for declaratory relief for failure to
allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action via alleging compliance
with the Government Tort Claims Act.
A public entity such as Defendant
can only be held liable when specifically authorized by statute. Government Code section 815 states in
relevant part:
Except as
otherwise provided by statute:
(a) A public entity
is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or
omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.
(b) The liability of
a public entity established by this part (commencing with Section 814) is
subject to any immunity of the public entity provided by statute, including
this part, and is subject to any defenses that would be available to the public
entity if it were a private person.
It is well-settled case law that governmental entities are
immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity unless that immunity
is expressly waived, such as by statute. (See, e.g., Forbes v. County of San
Bernardino (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 48, review denied. [Under Tort Claims
Act, public entities may be held liable only if a statute is found declaring
them to be liable]; Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19
Cal.4th 925 [All government tort liability must be based on statute].)
The California Tort Claims Act
states that no person may sue a public entity or public employee for money or
damages unless a timely written claim has been presented to and denied by the
public entity. (Gov. Code § 945.4.) The filing of a claim against a
governmental agency is an “essential element of a cause of action against a
public entity and failure to allege compliance with the claim statute renders
the complaint subject to general demurrer.” (Wood v. Riverside General
Hospital (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1119.) The claim statute is not an
affirmative defense, but an essential element of the underlying claim. (Id.)
Government Code section 910 requires that the claim include the date, place,
and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction that gave rise to the
claim asserted, a general description of the injury, and the names of the
employees causing the injury. (Gov. Code § 910.)
Under California Supreme Court
standards, a Government Code “claim need not contain the detail and specificity
required of a pleading, but need only fairly describe what the entity is
alleged to have done.” (Stockett v. Association of Cal. Water
Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Auth. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441, 445, 446.) If a plaintiff “relies on more than one
theory of recovery against the [public entity], each cause of action must have
been reflected in a timely claim. In addition, the factual circumstances set forth
in the written claim must correspond with the facts alleged in the complaint.”
(Dixon v. City of Livermore (2005)127
Cal.App.4th 32, 40; see Stockett, 34
Cal.4th at 447.) But as the California
Supreme court has explained:
The claim, however, need not specify
each particular act or omission later proven to have caused the injury. A
complaint's fuller exposition of the factual basis beyond that given in the
claim is not fatal, so long as the complaint is not based on an “entirely
different set of facts.” Only where there has been a “complete shift of
allegations, usually involving an effort to premise civil liability on acts or
omissions committed at different times or by different persons than those
described in the claim” have courts generally found the complaint barred. Where the complaint merely elaborates or adds
further detail to a claim, but is predicated on the same fundamental actions or
failures to act by the defendants, courts have generally found the claim fairly
reflects the facts pled in the complaint.
(Id.) In other words, it is permissible to
plead additional theories where the “additional theories [are] based on the
same factual foundation as those in the claim, and the claim provide[s]
sufficient information to allow the public agency to conduct an investigation
into the merits of the claim.” (Dixon,
127 Cal.App.4th at 42.)
Defendant
contends that Plaintiff has not demonstrated compliance with the Tort Claims
Act with respect to her declaratory relief claim. Claims for declaratory relief
are not generally subject to the Tort Claims Act except when they are “incidental
or ancillary to a prayer for damages.” (Hart v. Alameda County (1999) 76
Cal.App.4th 766, 782.) Here, Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action for declaratory
relief is derivative on its face of the first seven causes of action asserted
under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code §§ 12900 et seq)
and seeks attorney’s fees pursuant to FEHA. (Complaint ¶ 98 [contentions to be
adjudicated]; ¶ 103 [citing Gov. Code § 12965(b).) Claims under FEHA are exempt
from the Tort Claims Act. (Garcia v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.
(1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 701, 710.) The Court therefore finds Defendant’s argument
with respect to this cause of action entirely without merit.
Accordingly,
Defendant’s Demurrer to the eighth cause of action is OVERRULED.
Ninth Cause of Action: Whistleblower Retaliation (Labor
Code § 1102.5)
Defendant demurs to the ninth cause of action
for whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5 for failure to
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Defendant contends that
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate compliance with the Tort Claims Act as to
this cause of action.
Defendant argues
that nothing in the Complaint directly alleges compliance with the Tort Claims
Act as to this cause of action, despite seeking money damages which requires
presentation of a claim. (See Complaint ¶ 110-112.) In opposition, Plaintiff
first argues that a claim under section 1102.5 of the Labor Code is a statutory
claim, not a common law claim “for money,” and therefore is not subject to the
Tort Claims Act. This contention is not correct. Section 945.4 expressly states
that “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a
public entity” without first presenting a claim. (Gov. Code § 945.4.) Plaintiff
is seeking damages under her Labor Code retaliation claim and is therefore
subject to the requirements of the Tort Claims Act.
In the
alternative, Plaintiff argues that she substantially complied with the
requirements of the Act by filing a Complaint under the Fair Employment and
Housing Act with the Civil Rights Division containing the same factual
allegations as those asserted in this cause of action. (See RJN Exh. 1.) In
reply, Defendant asserts that the CRD Complaint was insufficient to place
Defendant on notice of a potential claim under the Labor Code. The Court fails
to see how an administrative complaint asserting identical facts to those pled
in the Complaint would fail to put Defendant on notice of those facts. The
Court is therefore persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that the CRD Complaint was
sufficient to constitute substantial compliance with the Tort Claims Act.
Accordingly,
Defendant’s Demurrer to the ninth cause of action is OVERRULED.
Tenth Cause of Action: Failure to Permit Inspection
Defendant
demurs to the tenth cause of action for failure to permit inspection of
personnel and payroll records on the basis that Plaintiff did not present a
Government Tort Claim for this cause of action. As Plaintiff argues in
opposition, claims which principally seek injunctive relief are exempt from the
Tort Claims Act, and they do not lose their exempt status “solely because
incidental money damages are sought.” (Snipes v. City of Bakersfield
(1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 870.) While the statutory penalties sought in the
Complaint (¶¶ 118-120) constitute money damages, they—as well as the prayer for
attorney’s fees and costs—are merely incidental to the separate demand for
injunctive relief requiring Defendant to provide a copy of Plaintiff’s
personnel and payroll records. (Complaint ¶¶ 117, 120.) Defendant cites no
authority in response to this argument and instead simply reasserts that
Plaintiff was required to present a claim for this cause of action under the
act. The Court is not persuaded. The principal thrust of this cause of action
is injunctive relief for which presentation of a claim is not required.
Accordingly,
Defendant’s Demurrer to the tenth cause of action is OVERRULED.
//
Conclusion
Accordingly,
Defendant’s Demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED in its entirety.
Motion to Strike
Defendant’s
Motion to Strike is integrated with its Demurrer to the Complaint and seeks to
strike the eighth through tenth causes of action on the same grounds. For the
reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.
CONCLUSION:
Accordingly,
Defendant’s Demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED.
Defendant’s
Motion to Strike is DENIED.
Moving
Party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 23, 2024 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It
should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still
conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you
have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you
should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an
order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.