Judge Theresa M. Traber, Case Number: 24STCV03544, Date: 2024-06-13 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 24STCV03544, Date: 2024-06-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV03544 Hearing Date: June 13, 2024 Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE: June 13, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

CASE: Anita Carrie Ross v. The Chrysalis Center

CASE NO.: 24STCV03544

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF COMPLAINT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant The Chrysalis Center

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Anita Carrie Ross

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

This is a disability discrimination action that was filed on February 13, 2024. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant terminated her for taking time off from work to recover from a work-related injury.

Defendant moves to strike allegations in the Complaint pertaining to punitive damages.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.

DISCUSSION:

Defendant moves to strike allegations in the Complaint pertaining to punitive damages.

Legal Standard

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a). The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. Id., § 436(b). The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. Id.§ 436. The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. Id.§ 437. “When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.” Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768. A motion to strike can be used where the complaint or other pleading has not been drawn or filed in conformity with applicable rules or court orders. Code Civ. Proc., § 436(b). This provision is for "the striking of a pleading due to improprieties in its form or in the procedures pursuant to which it was filed." Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528 (emphasis in original).

Meet and Confer

Before filing a motion to strike, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who has filed the pleading subject to the motion to strike and file a declaration detailing their meet-and-confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a).) However, an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to grant or deny a motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a)(4).)

The Declaration of Robert Chan in support of the motion states that he sent a meet-and-confer letter to Plaintiff’s counsel on March 25, 2024, called Plaintiff’s counsel on March 29, and sent followup emails that same day and again on April 3. (Declaration of Robert Chan ISO Mot. ¶¶ 2-5.) Attorney Chan states that, as of the date this motion was filed, Plaintiff’s counsel had not responded. (Id. ¶ 6.) The Court therefore finds that Defendant has satisfied its statutory obligations by attempting to meet and confer with Plaintiff’s counsel.

Punitive Damages

Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not properly set forth facts supporting a claim for punitive damages.

Generally, punitive damages may be awarded only when the trier of fact finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant acted with malice, fraud, or oppression. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) As nonintentional torts support punitive damages when the defendant's conduct “involves conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others,” our focus is on malice and oppression. (Gawara v. United States Brass Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1361 [74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663].) As defined in the punitive damages statute, “[m]alice” encompasses “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others,” and “[o]ppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1), (2).) The term “‘despicable,’” though not defined in the statute, is applicable to “circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725 [34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 898, 882 P.2d 894], quoting 4 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 529.)

Civil Code section 3294(a) provides:

In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”

Subdivision (b) defines liability for an employer for the malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive conduct of its employees:

An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.

Civil Code section 3294(c) defines malice, oppression and fraud:

(1) ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

(2) ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.

(3) ‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

(Bold emphasis added.) The term “despicable,” is generally construed to mean “circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)

To withstand a motion to strike punitive damages allegations, the complaint must set forth facts supporting a claim for punitive damages:

The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. (Citation omitted.) Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.

(Grieves v. Superior Court (Fox) (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.)

Defendant contends that the Complaint offers only conclusory allegations of malice and therefore does not meet the requirements to assert punitive damages. The Complaint alleges a cause of action for retaliation on its face. (Complaint ¶¶ 41-53.) As Plaintiff argues in opposition, even conclusory allegations of malice are sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages when retaliation is alleged. (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7.) Defendant argues in reply that Perkins is distinguishable because the complaint in that case offered more detailed allegations of wrongful conduct. (Id. at 4-5.) However, nothing in the language of Perkins imposes a requirement that the Complaint plead “ample” facts, as Defendants argue. Further, even if such a requirement existed, the Court finds the allegations are sufficient to meet that burden. Plaintiff alleges that she suffered a work-related injury on November 2, 2022, informed Defendant promptly, and was off work for the next three days. (Complaint ¶ 18.) Plaintiff alleges that on November 9, 2023, she was unable to work because of her injury, and promptly informed Defendants of that fact. (Id.) On November 29, 2023, less than three weeks later, Plaintiff was terminated by Defendant, who allegedly informed her that she was a liability. (Id.) Defendant argues that these allegations are “misleading,” and that she remains a Chrysalis employee whose temporary assignment with another employer ended. These unsupported assertions are extrinsic to the Complaint and wholly inappropriate for consideration on a motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437 [defect must appear on face of pleading or in matters subject to judicial notice].) Moreover, Defendant’s assertion that the allegations are insufficiently specific is not well-taken under the favorable construction of the pleadings that must be afforded the non-moving party. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 452.) Indeed, the close temporal proximity between Plaintiff taking off of work on November 9, 2023, and her termination on November 29 itself supports an inference of retaliatory animus. (See Flait v. North American Watch Corp. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 479.) The Court is therefore not persuaded that the Complaint is deficient with respect to its claims for punitive damages.

CONCLUSION:

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.

Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 13, 2024 ___________________________________

Theresa M. Traber

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.