Judge Theresa M. Traber, Case Number: 24STCV06090, Date: 2024-12-10 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 24STCV06090, Date: 2024-12-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV06090 Hearing Date: December 10, 2024 Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE: December 10, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

CASE: Raul Arellano v. Tawa Supermarket, Inc.

CASE NO.: 24STCV06090

MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Tawa Supermarket, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Raul Arellano

CASE HISTORY:

· 03/12/24: Complaint filed.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

This is an action for discrimination and retaliation that was filed on March 12, 2024. Plaintiff alleges that he was denied accommodations for his medical issues and was ultimately terminated because of his disability and his race.

Defendant moves to compel arbitration of this dispute pursuant to an arbitration agreement.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED.

This action is STAYED pending resolution of the arbitration.

The Court sets a Status Conference Re: Arbitration for Monday, December 8, 2025 at 8:30 AM.

DISCUSSION:

Defendant moves to compel arbitration of this dispute pursuant to an arbitration agreement.

Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections to Declaration of Plaintiff

Defendant objects to the declaration of Plaintiff filed in support of the opposition on the grounds that it is an English document purportedly from a declarant who natively speaks Spanish and does not read or write English with any level of fluency and which is not accompanied by a certified translation by a qualified interpreter. (See Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1110(g).) Defendant also objects that the declaration purports to bear an electronic signature but contains nothing to indicate that the signature is unique to the declarant, as required by Rule 2.257(b)(1).

The Court disagrees that Rule 3.1110(g) governs the translation of declarations and other statements, as opposed to exhibits. In Correa v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal. 4th 444, 458-459, the California Supreme Court held that the trial court is to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a translated statement fairly should be considered the statements of the speaker by considering relevant factors such as “which party supplied the interpreter, whether the interpreter had any motive to mislead or distort, the interpreter's qualifications and language skill, and whether actions taken subsequent to the conversation were consistent with the statements as translated.” Here, Plaintiff has presented a declaration in English and a document in Spanish that is described by Plaintiff’s attorney as a true and correct copy of the Spanish version of the declaration that was presented to Plaintiff for his review and signature. (Contreras Decl., § 3, Exh. A.) Plaintiff initially failed to explain who did the translation or the qualifications or language skill of the interpreter, so the Court could not evaluate whether the translation provided in fact reflects the English words on the declaration submitted. More recently, Plaintiff has submitted a declaration from Salvador G. Ordorica, who purports to be a certified interpreter who translated the declaration for Plaintiff. But this filing is also flawed in that Mr. Ordorica’s declaration is also in Spanish and thus cannot be properly considered by this English-language court. Plaintiff’s supplemental submission does correct the Spanish version of his declaration by providing his signature rather than the “/s/” previously inserted for Plaintiff’s signature, which did not not comply with Rule 2.257(b)(1).

Lacking a proper declaration of translation in English, Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s declaration are SUSTAINED.

Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections to Declaration of Anahi Contreras

Defendant also objects to the Declaration of Anahi Contreras in support of the opposition to the motion. The Court rules on these objections as follows.

Objection No. 1: SUSTAINED as irrelevant. (Evid. Code § 350.)

Objection No. 2: SUSTAINED as lacking foundation. (Evid Code § 403; see also Rule of Court 3.1110(g).)

Existence of Arbitration Agreement

Under California law, arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (Blake v. Ecker (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 728, 741 (overruled on other grounds by Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094).) A party petitioning to compel arbitration has the burden of persuasion to establish the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, and the party opposing the petition has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to its defense. (Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 356-57.)

As to the burden of production, rather than persuasion, courts have articulated a three-step burden shifting process:

First, the moving party bears the burden of producing “prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.” [citation] The moving party “can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party’s] signature.” [citation] Alternatively, the moving party can meet its burden by setting forth the agreement’s provisions in the motion. [citations] For this step, “it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” [citation] If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party does not dispute the existence of the arbitration agreement, then nothing more is required for the moving party to meet its burden of persuasion.

If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement. [citation] The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement. [citations]

If the opposing party meets its burden of producing evidence, then in the third step, the moving party must establish with admissible evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. The burden of proving the agreement by a preponderance of the evidence remains with the moving party. [citation].

(Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165-66.)

Here, Defendant seeks to compel arbitration based on an English “Arbitration Agreement” authorizing binding arbitration of any claims concerning Raul Arellano’s employment with Tawa Supermarket. (Defendant’s Exh. A. p.1.) Defendant has provided a copy of the agreement which appears to bear Plaintiff’s handwritten signature and is dated March 8, 2103. (Id. p.2.) Although Plaintiff challenges the enforceability of this agreement, he does not dispute its veracity.

The Court therefore finds that there is an agreement to arbitrate between Defendant and the Plaintiff.

Applicability of the FAA

Defendant argues that the Federal Arbitration Act governs the arbitration agreement at issue.

An arbitration clause is governed by the FAA if the agreement is a contract “evidencing a transaction involving commerce.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) Courts “broadly construe” this phrase, because the FAA “embodies Congress’ intent to provide for the enforcement of arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce Clause.” (Giuliano v. Inland Empire Pers., Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1286.) “FAA preemption does not require that an agreement has a specific effect on interstate commerce.” (Evenskaas v. California Transit, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 285, 293.)

Defendant contends that the Agreement is governed by the FAA because interstate commerce is implicated by Defendant’s business and by Plaintiff’s role within that business. Specifically, Defendant states that it is a national supermarket chain operating various supermarkets in at least 10 other states, plus California. (Declaration of Patrick Chen ISO Mot. ¶ 3.) Defendant also contends that it regularly purchases groceries from businesses outside of California to sell at its U.S. and California locations. (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff, during his employment, worked as a clerk in the produce department of one of these California retail locations. (Id. ¶ 5.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not demonstrated the involvement of interstate commerce because Plaintiff only worked in Southern California, and because Defendant’s evidentiary showing is insufficient, relying on Lane v. Francis Capital Management, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 676, and Hoover v. American Income Life Insurance Co. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1193. As Defendant argues, however, both cases are distinguishable. In Lane, the record established that the defendant exclusively operated in California and produced no evidence regarding the nature of its business. (Lane v. Francis Capital Management, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 676, 688.) Similarly, in Hoover, the Court of Appeal’s ruling turned on the conclusion that the “only established facts [were] that Hoover was a California resident who sold life insurance policies” and that the corporation was based in Texas. (Hoover v. American Income Life Insurance Co. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207-1208.) Here, however, Defendant has offered evidence tending to establish that it regularly engages in interstate commerce as its business and that Plaintiff’s employment directly relates to that business. Under the broad construction of the phrase “evidencing a transaction involving commerce,” the Court finds that Defendant has offered sufficient evidence that the FAA applies.

Scope of the Arbitration Agreement

“The scope of arbitration is a matter of agreement between the parties.” (See, e.g., Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street (1983) 35 Cal.3d 312, 323.) “A party can be compelled to arbitrate only those issues it has agreed to arbitrate.” (Perez v. U-Haul Co. of California (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 408, 419.)

Defendants contend that the arbitration agreement delegates questions of the scope, validity, and enforceability of the agreement to the arbitrator. “The parties may, by clear and unmistakable agreement, elect to have the arbitrator, rather than the court, decide which grievances are arbitrable.” (Rodriguez v. American Technologies, Inc. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1123.) Paragraph 5 of the Agreement states that “[a]ny controversy over whether a dispute is an arbitrable dispute or as to the interpretation or enforceability of this Agreement shall be determined by the arbitrator.” (Defendant’s Exh. A. ¶ 5.) Defendant argues that this provision is a “clear and unmistakable agreement” to delegate questions of arbitrability and enforceability. Plaintiff does not address the delegation clause in his opposition. The Court concurs with Defendant that the Agreement contains a “clear and unmistakable” delegation clause.

The Court also observes that Plaintiff challenges the enforceability of the entire Agreement as unconscionable, but does not directly address the delegation clause. A delegation clause is enforceable unless it is revocable under the same defenses as any contract, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability. (See, e.g., Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 231, 242.) However, “any claim of unconscionability must be specific to the delegation clause.” (Id. at 244 [emphasis in original].) Because Plaintiff has failed to assert a claim of unconscionability specific to the delegation clause, the Court is bound to enforce the agreement pursuant to the delegation provision that questions of arbitrability or enforceability must themselves be arbitrated.

CONCLUSION:

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED.

This action is STAYED pending resolution of the arbitration.

The Court sets a Status Conference Re: Arbitration for Monday, December 8, 2025 at 8:30 AM.

Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 10, 2024 ___________________________________

Theresa M. Traber

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.