Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 24STCV07227, Date: 2025-03-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV07227    Hearing Date: March 18, 2025    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE:     March 18, 2025                      TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

CASE:                         E on Los Angeles, LLC v. Narinder Pallan

CASE NO.:                 24STCV03123           

MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

MOVING PARTY:               Plaintiff E on Los Angeles, LLC.

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant Narinder Pallan

CASE HISTORY:

·         02/06/24: Complaint filed.

·         06/18/24: First Amended Complaint filed.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

            This is an action for breach of lease. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay rent owed on a commercial lease and, upon relinquishing possession of the premises, left them in disrepair.

Plaintiff moves for summary adjudication of the first cause of action for breach of contract.

TENTATIVE RULING:

            Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED.

DISCUSSION:

Plaintiff moves for summary adjudication of the first cause of action for breach of contract.

Legal Standard

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party can show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and, if not, to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)  “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-82.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the plaintiff moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting proving each element of a cause of action. (Code Civ Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) Once the plaintiff has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Timeliness of Opposition

            Defendant served and filed his opposition on March 5, 2025, 13 days before the scheduled March 18, 2025 hearing date. Plaintiff objects to the opposition as untimely under the recent amendment to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, which requires opposition papers to be served and filed 20 days before the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(b)(2).) The amendment in question, AB 2049, increased the filing deadline by six days for moving, opposition, and reply papers, going from 75 days, 14 days, and 5 days ahead of the hearing to 81, 20, and 11 days, respectively. (Compare Stats. 2015 Ch. 161 § 1.5 subds. (a)(2), (b)(2), (4) with Stats. 2024 Ch. 99 § 1 subds. (a)(2), (b)(2), (4).) As that amendment was not effective until January 1, 2025, Plaintiff’s motion, filed on December 18, 2025, was not subject to the increased notice period. Therefore, applying the amended deadline, as Plaintiff suggests, would shorten the time allotted to Defendant to respond to this motion. Such an approach is contrary to the facially apparent intent of the Legislature to preserve the time to respond to each set of papers.

            That said, Defendant’s opposition, filed and served only 13 days, rather than 14 days before the hearing, is untimely even under the more favorable construction the Court has adopted. However, while the Court, in its discretion, may refuse to consider late-filed papers (Cal. Rule of Court 3.1300(d),) Plaintiff’s reply papers are substantive and demonstrate no prejudice from a single day’s delay. The Court will therefore consider Defendant’s opposition notwithstanding its tardiness.

Analysis

            Plaintiff moves for summary adjudication of the first cause of action for breach of contract.

To prevail on a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must plead and prove the contract, the plaintiff’s performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, Defendant’s breach, and finally the resulting damage. (Otworth v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 452, 458.)

As pled in the operative First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached his lease agreement by (1) failing to pay rent for the period from July 2023 through February 2024 (FAC ¶¶ 14-15); (2) failing to surrender the premises in good condition (¶ ¶ 17-18) and (3) failing to repay the outstanding costs to repair the premises. (¶ 19.)

On October 1, 2019, the parties entered into a commercial lease for the property located at 1201 S. Los Angeles Street Units 3 and 4, Los Angeles, CA 90015. (Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Fact No. 1; Response to Separate Statement No. 1.) Plaintiff asserts that it has complied with its obligations under the lease by providing the leased premises to Defendant (see SSUMF No. 2), and that the allegations in the Cross-Complaint concerning the alleged failure to maintain the roof of the premises is not material to this dispute. (See Cross-Complaint ¶¶ 10-11.) Plaintiff argues that the duty to pay rent is an obligation independent of any obligation to maintain the premises, relying on Schulman v. Vera (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 552 in support of that position. A close reading of Schulman belies Plaintiff’s argument. In that case, the Court of Appeal considered whether a lessor’s breach of a covenant to repair the premises in a commercial lease is a valid defense to an unlawful detainer proceeding on that commercial lease. (Schulman v. Vera (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 552, 558.) The Court of Appeal concluded that Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d. 616, which authorized that defense in an unlawful detainer proceeding on a residential lease, was not applicable to commercial leases, and, therefore, that the defense was not available in an unlawful detainer action on a commercial lease. (Schulman, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at 561.) Nothing in Schulman excuses a lessor from compliance with its contractual obligations in the context of a breach of contract claim for money damages.

Tellingly, our Supreme Court expressly repudiated the notion that all covenants in leases are independent of each other, and, in fact, stated that “covenants which run to the entire consideration of a contract” are mutual and dependent. (Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. of Los Angeles v. Horton & Converse (1942) 21 Cal.2d 411, 419-20.) Plaintiff’s obligation to maintain the exterior of the premises, found in section 7.2 of the lease agreement (see Plaintiff’s Exh. 2 § 7.2) goes directly to the consideration of the contract insofar as it implicates the usefulness and value of the leased premises as a commercial space. The Court is therefore not persuaded that the obligation to maintain the exterior premises is independent of Defendant’s obligations on which the first cause of action is premised. As Plaintiff has not offered any evidence of its compliance with that corresponding provision, nor has it offered a valid excuse from performance, Plaintiff has not established an element of the cause of action for breach of contract and has not carried its burden on summary adjudication. The burden of proof therefore does not shift to Defendant to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact.

Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to summary adjudication of the first cause of action.

CONCLUSION:

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED.

            Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:  March 18, 2025                                  ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.