Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 24STCV08420, Date: 2024-06-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV08420 Hearing Date: June 5, 2024 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: June 5, 2024 TRIAL DATE: June
20, 2024
CASE: Main Co. LLC v. Janna Simon Lewis
CASE NO.: 24STCV08420 
MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Janna Simon Lewis
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Main
Co., LLC
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is an unlawful detainer action for nonpayment of rent that was filed
on April 3, 2024.
Defendant moves for summary
judgment.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED.
DISCUSSION:
Defendant
moves for summary judgment.
Legal Standard
The function of a motion for
summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an
opposing party can show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and, if
not, to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil
Procedure Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment
if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from
the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that
there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
(Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110,
1119.) “The function of the pleadings in
a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the
function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any
triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge
v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI
Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-82.)
As to each claim as framed by the
complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial
burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to
establish a defense. (Code Civ Proc. § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes,
Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the
evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts
concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide,
Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) The lack of opposition by a plaintiff is
not grounds to grant a motion for summary judgment if a defendant cannot meet
their initial burden of proof. (See Thatcher v. Lucy Stores, Inc. (2000)
79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1087.)
Once the
defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that
a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action
or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party
opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster
v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
Timing of Motion
Notice of a
motion for summary judgment must ordinarily be given a minimum of 75 days
before the date of the scheduled hearing. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a)(2).)
Further, a motion for summary judgment must ordinarily be heard no later than
30 days before the date of trial. (Id. subd. (a)(3).) These provisions
do not apply to actions brought pursuant to Chapter 4 of Title 3 of Part 3 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, which includes unlawful detainer actions under
Code of Civil Procedure section 1161. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 437c(s); 1161.) The parties cross-filed and cross-served their
motion and opposition on May 31, 2024 for a hearing on June 5, 2024, with trial
set for June 20, 2024. (See Motion, Proof of Service; Opposition, Proof of
Service.) These filing were based on the parties’ agreement to an abbreviated
briefing schedule and a greatly shortened notice period on May 14, 2024. (See
May 14, 2024 Minute Order.) As this variance in procedure was agreed upon by
the parties, the Court will consider the papers timely filed and served.
Separate Statements
Separate
statements of undisputed or disputed material fact are not required for a
motion for summary judgment in a summary proceeding concerning real property.
(Code Civ. Proc. §§ 437c(s); 1161.)
//
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Analysis
Defendant
moves for summary judgment on the basis that the rental unit in which she
resides is subject to the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance, with which
she contends Plaintiff has not complied.
1. Application of Rent Stabilization Ordinance
The Los
Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance (“LARSO”) was enacted by the City of Los
Angeles in 1979 and codified in Los Angeles Municipal Code section 151.00 et
seq. The provisions of LARSO, inter alia, impose restrictions on
rent and rent increases (L.A.M.C. §§151.04; 151.06), require registration of
covered units and notice to tenants when a unit is covered. (L.A.M.C. § 151.05),
and limit the basis for unlawful detainer actions to regain possession of
covered units. (L.A.M.C. § 151.09.) Section 151.02 defines the term “Rental
Unit,” as it is used to dictate coverage of the Ordinance, to mean “[a]ll
dwelling units, efficiency dwelling units, guest rooms, and suites . . . and
all housing accommodations . . . and duplexes and condominiums in the City of
Los Angeles, rented or offered for rent for living or dwelling purposes,” and
also includes “mobile homes . . . and the land upon which the mobile home is
located” and “recreational vehicles . . . and the land upon which it is
located.” (L.A.M.C. § 151.02.)
LARSO enumerates
13 exemptions from this wide-sweeping definition: (1) single-family residences;
(2) housing accommodations in hotels, motels, inns, tourist homes and boarding
and rooming houses for less than 30 days; (3) dwellings in non-profit stock
cooperatives occupied by a shareholder tenant; (4) housing accommodations in medical
care facilities, convents or monasteries, fraternity or sorority houses, or
housing accommodations owned, operated, or managed by an educational
institution for its students; (5) housing accommodations owned and operated by
a government agency or which are specifically exempted by state or federal law
or administrative regulation; (6) housing whose first certificate of occupancy
post-dates October 1, 1978, subject to certain exceptions; (7) luxury housing;
(8) housing with substantial renovation completed after September 1, 1980,
subject to certain requirements; (9) specially designated affordable housing,
subject to certain requirements; (10) recreational vehicles not occupied by a
tenant who has continually resided in the park for at least 9 months; (11)
housing accommodations in limited equity cooperatives when occupied by a member
tenant; (12) a mobile home park whose permit to operate was issued on or after
February 10, 1986; and (13) Housing Accommodations in an Interim Motel Housing
Project. (L.A.M.C. § 151.02.) Although the Housing Department and the Rent
Stabilization Commission may grant individual rent adjustments, there is
no provision in LARSO for the issuance of any exemption from the
definition of “Rental Unit” except as set forth in the above-listed exemptions.
(L.A.M.C. §§ 151.02; 151.07.)
The
Complaint freely admits that the building which contains the subject premises
is situated within the boundaries of the City of Los Angeles and ostensibly
subject to LARSO. (Complaint ¶3; Attach. 17.) However, the Complaint alleges
that Defendant’s unit is “exempt from LARSO as an Artist – in – Residence
unit.” (Id. Attach. 17.) Defendant argues that there is no such
exemption within the Ordinance. Thus, the first question the Court must address
is whether such an exemption exists, and, if so, whether that exemption applies
in this case. The first is a matter of statutory interpretation and therefore a
question of law. (E.g. California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community
College dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 699.) The second, of course, is a
question of fact on its face.
In her
moving papers, Defendant contends the claimed “Artist-in-Residence” exemption
does not exist in the Ordinance. Indeed, none of the thirteen exemptions
expressly describe an “Artist-in-Residence” exemption, nor is there any term
which would necessarily include such an exemption within its plain meaning even
without an express statement to that effect. (See L.A.M.C. § 151.02.) Plaintiff,
in opposition, does not address the legal aspects of Defendant’s argument.
Instead, Plaintiff merely contends that the Los Angeles Housing Department granted
a permanent exemption for Defendant’s unit, 106 W. Venice Boulevard, Los
Angeles, CA 90015, on June 13, 2012, according to the work logs for the
property obtained from the Department. (Declaration of Kourosh Amirianfar ISO
Opp. Exh. 2.) Plaintiff also produced an email from the RSO Determinations Unit
dated June 7, 2023 which states only that the property “was determined to be a
Residential Hotel with 19 Residential Units and 2 Non-Residential (Artists in
Residence), and “Artist in Residence units are not subject to the Rent
Stabilization Ordinance.” (Id. Exh. 1.) Neither of these documents
provide any basis for the contention that an “Artist-in-Residence” exemption
exists under the Los Angeles Municipal Code. Even if the Court construes these
documents as formal determinations by the Los Angeles Housing Department, the
Department’s conclusions have no import without some connection to a provision
of law authorizing the Department to make that determination. Plaintiff must
demonstrate not merely that the Department made an exemption determination, but
that the determination has some basis in law that authorized the exemption. Plaintiff
has not done so.
Because
Plaintiff has not demonstrated to the Court’s satisfaction that an “Artist-in-Residence”
exemption exists under the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance, the Court
finds, pursuant to Plaintiff’s admission in the Complaint, that the subject
premises is subject to the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance as a matter
of law.
2. Compliance with Rent Stabilization Ordinance
Defendant contends
that Plaintiff has not complied with LARSO by serving Defendant with a copy of
the registration or registration renewal. Section 151.05 subdivision (A)
states, in relevant party, that “[o]n or after April 30, 1983, no landlord
shall demand or accept rent for a rental unit without first serving a copy of a
valid registration or annual registration renewal statement on the tenant of
that rental unit.” (L.A.M.C. § 151.05(A).) Defendant declares under penalty of
perjury that she was never served with either a copy of the registration or an
annual registration renewal statement. (Declaration of Janna Simon Lewis ISO
Mot. ¶ 3.) Thus, Defendant argues that the underlying 3-Day and 30-Day Notices
to Pay Rent or Quit on which the Complaint is premised are invalid because
they—and this action—are demanding rent to which the landlord is not entitled
under section 151.05. (Id.; see also L.A.M.C. § 151.09(A)(1) [authorizing
eviction for nonpayment of rent to which landlord is entitled].) As the Court
has concluded that the property is subject to LARSO, Defendant has carried her
burden to demonstrate that Plaintiff cannot prevail on the grounds stated in
the Complaint. The burden shifts to
Plaintiff to demonstrate a triable issue of fact.
In
opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute that no registration or renewal notice
was served on Defendant, instead arguing that the premises are not subject to
LARSO under the “artist-in-residence” exception. As the Court has rejected this
argument for failure to demonstrate that such an exemption exists in law,
Plaintiff has failed to carry its burden to demonstrate a triable issue of fact
regarding its compliance with the Ordinance. Defendant is therefore entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION:
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED.
Moving Party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 5, 2024 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It
should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still
conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you
have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you
should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an
order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.