Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 24STCV08551, Date: 2025-02-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV08551 Hearing Date: February 26, 2025 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: February 26, 2025 TRIAL DATE:
NOT SET
CASE: Sima Taghi Zadeh v. WCE CA Fertility,
Inc. d/b/a Southern California Reproductive Center, et al.
CASE NO.: 24STCV08551 
MOTION
TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
MOVING PARTY: Defendants WCE CA Fertility, Inc., d/b/a Southern
California Reproductive Center, and Sterling McHorney
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Sima
Taghi Zadeh
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is an employment discrimination action that was filed on April 4,
2024. Plaintiff alleges that she was targeted for discrimination and
termination for speaking Farsi, and for advocating on behalf of female
employees and prospective employees.
Defendants WCE CA Fertility, Inc.,
d/b/a Southern California Reproductive Center, and Sterling McHorney move to
compel this matter to arbitration.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendants’ Motion to Compel
Arbitration is DENIED.
DISCUSSION:
Defendants WCE CA Fertility, Inc.,
d/b/a Southern California Reproductive Center, and Sterling McHorney move to
compel this matter to arbitration.
Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections
Plaintiff
raises evidentiary objections to the Declarations of Kim Fenton in support of
this motion. The Court rules on these objections as follows:
Objection
No. 1: SUSTAINED IN PART. Plaintiff’s description of her title and job
duties are sufficient to establish an adequate foundation for her knowledge of
Defendant’s procedures for creating and maintaining personnel records during
the period from January 2, 2023 to the present, when she has held that job, but
does not suffice to establish her knowledge of Defendant’s practices before
that time.
Objection Nos. 2-5: SUSTAINED
for lack of foundation and personal knowledge. According to the declarant’s
declaration, she has held her position as Direct of Employee Experience for
Physician Business Services, LLC, since January 2, 2023, but she attempts to
state that Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement on May 30, 2021 and on
June 20, 2021 and to describe Defendant’s “normal business practice” for
obtaining employee signatures electronically, but fails to establish any basis
for making any statements about Defendants’ practices or Plaintiff’s actions
nearly two years before she started in her position. Ms. Fenton’s bare
statement of personal knowledge is not sufficient. (Snider v. Snider
(1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 741, 754.)
Analysis
Under California law, arbitration
agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (Blake v. Ecker (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th
728, 741 (overruled on other grounds by
Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094).) A party petitioning to compel
arbitration has the burden of establishing the existence of a valid agreement
to arbitrate, and the party opposing the petition has the burden of proving, by
a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to its defense. (Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 356-57.)
Defendants seeks to compel
arbitration based on a purported arbitration agreement electronically signed by
Plaintiff on May 30, 2021. However, Defendants attempted to introduce this
agreement via the Declaration of Kim Fenton in support of this motion, and the
relevant portions of that declaration are not admissible for the reasons stated
above in connection with Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections.
Even if the Court were to consider
the declaration of Kim Fenton and its contents, Defendants have not adequately
demonstrated that Plaintiff signed the arbitration agreement. An electronic
record or signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the
person. (Civ. Code § 1633.9(a).) The act of the person may be shown in any
manner. (Id.) As described by the Court of Appeal, “the burden of
authenticating an electronic signature is not great.” (Ruiz v. Moss Bros.
Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 844.)
Here, the arbitration agreement
provided by Defendants in both declarations is a three-page document entitled
“Arbitration Agreement,” which bears Plaintiff’s name in cursive font and printed
text, dated May 30, 2021. (Fenton Decl. Exh. A.) Defendants have also produced
an “Arbitration Acknowledgment” which references an unspecified “Arbitration
Agreement” and states that the Employee and Company “are waiving all rights to
a trial or hearing before a court or jury of any and all disputes and claims
subject to arbitration under this Agreement.” (Id. Exh. B.) The
“Acknowledgment,” unlike the putative “Arbitration Agreement,” bears a
handwritten signature in Plaintiff’s name with the handwritten date of June 20,
2021. (Id.) Ms. Fenton’s declaration offers no explanation for why the
Agreement was purportedly signed on May 30, 2021, while the Acknowledgment was
not signed until June 20. Further, the only evidence which Defendant offers to
establish the authenticity of the electronic signature on the agreement is the contention
that the document was sent to Plaintiff’s personal email account. (See Fenton
Decl. ¶ 6.) Leaving aside the lack of foundation for that statement, Plaintiff states
that she searched that email account for the document and categorically denies
receiving or signing it. (Declaration of Sima Taghi Zadeh ISO Opp. ¶¶ 3-4.)
Taken as a whole, the Court finds
that the Declaration of Kim Fenton is not credible nor admissible for the
purpose of establishing that Plaintiff received or signed the arbitration
agreement on which this motion is premised. Defendants have failed to submit
admissible evidence, such as the email purportedly sent to Plaintiff, that an
arbitration agreement was sent to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff has searched for such an email but has not found anything like
what Ms. Fenton describes. Further, she
denies any recollection of having received it and denies ever signing such a
document. (Zadeh Decl., ¶¶ 3-5.) As to the electronic signature relied on by
Defendants, they have offered no information about any security protocols used
to ensure that an electronic signature secured by Defendants was in fact
received and signed by the targeted employee.
(Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 844
[motion to compel arbitration denied because of inadequate showing that
electronic signature was the act of the employee].) Defendants’ reliance on the
Arbitration Acknowledgement is similarly flawed, not only because Defendants
have not shown that Plaintiff was provided with an arbitration agreement before
the date of the Acknowledgment but also because there is nothing in the
Acknowledgement that identifies what specific agreement is referenced. offer no explanation for the facially
apparent differences in the form of signature from Plaintiff’s other employment
documents. Defendants have therefore failed to carry their burden of production
on this motion and are consequently not entitled to compel arbitration.
CONCLUSION:
Accordingly,
Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration is DENIED.
Moving
Parties to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 26,
2025 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It
should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still
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have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you
should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an
order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.