Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 24STCV09467, Date: 2025-01-31 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV09467    Hearing Date: January 31, 2025    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

 

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

 

 

HEARING DATE:     January 31, 2025                   TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

                                                          

CASE:                         Annika Jacobson, et al. v. Warren T. Eich Middle School, et al.

 

CASE NO.:                 24STCV09467           

 

(1)   MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

(2)   MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

 

MOVING PARTY:               (1) Defendant Roseville City School District; (2) Defendant D Hauptman Co., Inc. d/b/a Fold-A-Goal

 

RESPONDING PARTY(S): (1)(2) Plaintiffs Annika and Hannah Jacobson, by and through their guardian ad litem, Richard Jacobson, and Richard Jacobson individually.

 

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

           

            This is an action for negligence and products liability that was filed on April 15, 2024. Plaintiff Annika Jacobson sustained serious injuries when a foldable soccer goal manufactured by the corporate defendant collapsed on her while playing with her twin sister on a soccer field controlled by the Roseville City School District.

 

Defendant Roseville City School District moves to transfer venue to Placer County. Defendant D Hauptman Co. Inc. moves to strike portions of the Complaint pertaining to punitive damages.

           

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Defendant Roseville City School District’s Motion to Transfer Venue is GRANTED.  Defendant’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

 

DISCUSSION:

 

Motion to Transfer Venue

 

            Defendant Roseville City School District moves to transfer venue to Placer County.

Request for Judicial Notice

 

            Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of (1) the fact that the Defendant is located within the City of Roseville in the County of Placer; and (2) the fact that Warren T. Eich Middle School is operated by Defendant and located within the City of Roseville in the County of Placer.

 

            Defendant’s requests are GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(h) as facts and propositions not reasonably subject to dispute and capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.

 

Legal Standard for Mandatory Transfer of Venue

 

Code of Civil Procedure section 396b(a) provides: 

 

(a)¿Except as otherwise provided in Section 396a, if an action or proceeding is commenced in a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof, other than the court designated as the proper court for the trial thereof, under this title, the action may, notwithstanding, be tried in the court where commenced, unless the defendant, at the time he or she answers, demurs, or moves to strike, or, at his or her option, without answering, demurring, or moving to strike and within the time otherwise allowed to respond to the complaint, files with the clerk, a notice of motion for an order transferring the action or proceeding to the proper court, together with proof of service, upon the adverse party, of a copy of those papers. Upon the hearing of the motion the court shall, if it appears that the action or proceeding was not commenced in the proper court, order the action or proceeding transferred to the proper court. 

 

(Code Civ. Proc. § 396b(a), bold emphasis and underlining added.)  Thus, transfer is mandatory under section 396b(a) if the action was not filed in the proper court.

 

With respect to actions against municipal entities, Code of Civil Procedure section 394 provides, in relevant part:

 

Whenever an action or proceeding is brought against a county, city and county, city, or local agency, in any county, or city and county, other than the defendant, if the defendant is a county, or city and county, or, if the defendant is a city, or local agency, other than that in which the defendant is situated, the action or proceeding must be, on motion of that defendant, transferred for trial to a county, or city and county, other than that in which the plaintiff, or any of the plaintiffs, resides, or is doing business, or is situated, and other than the plaintiff county, or city and county, or county in which that plaintiff city or local agency is situated, and other than the defendant county, or city and county, or county in which the defendant city or local agency is situated; provided, however, that any action or proceeding against the city, county, city and county, or local agency for injury occurring within the city, county, or city and county, or within the county in which the local agency is situated, to person or property or person and property caused by the negligence or alleged negligence of the city, county, city and county, local agency, or its agents or employees, shall be tried in that county, or city and county, or if a city is a defendant, in the city or in the county in which the city is situated, or if a local agency is a defendant, in the county in which the local agency is situated. 

 

(Code Civ. Proc. § 394(a).) The burden is on the moving party to establish that the plaintiff’s venue selection is not proper under any statutory grounds. (Fontaine v. Superior Court. (Cashcall, Inc.) (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th, 830, 836.)

 

Analysis

 

            Defendant Roseville City School District moves to transfer venue to Placer County on the grounds that this is, in part, an action for negligence brought against a municipal entity outside the county in which that entity is located. Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges five causes of action, including, as against this Defendant, claims for general negligence (Complaint ¶¶ 35-50), dangerous conditions on public property (¶¶ 51-59), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (¶¶ 76-81). Moreover, it is indisputable that Defendant, as a municipal entity of the City of Roseville, is located in the City of Roseville in Placer County. (See RJN No.1.) Thus, Defendant argues, a straightforward application of section 394(a) requires transferring venue to Placer County.

 

            Plaintiffs argue in opposition that venue is proper in Los Angeles County under section 395 and that section 394 is not applicable to this case. However, that assertion is belied by Plaintiffs’ own Complaint, which alleges negligence theories against a municipal entity. Thus, under the plain language of section 394, Defendant is a municipal entity accused of negligence and is, thus, entitled to seek transfer of this action. That the corporate Defendant D Hauptman Co. is domiciled in Los Angeles is not material, as section 395 states that the proper venue is dictated by, inter alia, the domicile of a defendant “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law and subject to the power of the court to transfer actions or proceedings.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 395(a).) Section 394 falls precisely within that limitation. Moreover, although Plaintiffs cite Tutor-Saliba-Perini Joint Venture v. Superior Ct. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 736 to assert that section 394 does not apply to actions that are not exclusively premised on negligence, that contention is wholly unsupported by the citation. In Tutor-Saliba-Perini Joint Venture, the Court of Appeal concluded that section 394 did not apply to an action where the municipal defendant was not directly sued on a negligence theory, even though other defendants were allegedly negligent and the complaint alleged each defendant was the agent of the other. (Tutor-Saliba-Perini Joint Venture v. Superior Ct. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 736, 843.) In contrast, Plaintiffs in this case have expressly alleged negligence liability directly against the municipal defendant. Plaintiffs’ argument is entirely unpersuasive.

 

            Finally, Plaintiffs contend that allowing transfer to Placer County would defeat the purpose of section 394 because doing so would endanger Plaintiffs’ right to a fair and impartial trial. Plaintiffs offer no support for this argument beyond the bare assertion that a fair trial could not be had against a school district within the county in which it is located. Moreover, the notion that an express statutory directive—not merely an interpretation, but the literal meaning of the plain language used—could be contrary to the spirit of that selfsame statute is absurd on its face. The Court categorically rejects Plaintiffs’ contention.

 

Sanctions

 

            Defendant also requests sanctions against Plaintiffs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 396b subdivision (b). This statute provides:

 

 In its discretion, the court may order the payment to the prevailing party of reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in making or resisting the motion to transfer whether or not that party is otherwise entitled to recover his or her costs of action. In determining whether that order for expenses and fees shall be made, the court shall take into consideration (1) whether an offer to stipulate to change of venue was reasonably made and rejected, and (2) whether the motion or selection of venue was made in good faith given the facts and law the party making the motion or selecting the venue knew or should have known. As between the party and his or her attorney, those expenses and fees shall be the personal liability of the attorney not chargeable to the party. Sanctions shall not be imposed pursuant to this subdivision except on notice contained in a party’s papers, or on the court’s own noticed motion, and after opportunity to be heard.

 

(Code Civ. Proc. § 396b subd. (b).)

 

            Here, although Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities discusses the issue of sanctions, no reference is made to sanctions in the concurrent Notice of Motion filed on November 15, 2024. Moreover, even if the Notice had requested sanctions, Defendant has not furnished the Court with any evidence which would permit the Court to determine what might constitute “reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in making . . . the motion.” The Court therefore declines to award sanctions.

 

Conclusion

 

            Accordingly, Defendant Roseville County School District’s Motion to Transfer Venue to Placer County is GRANTED.

 

            Defendant’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

 

//

 

Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint

 

            Defendant D Hauptman Co. moves to strike portions of the Complaint pertaining to punitive damages. As the Court has granted the motion to transfer, a ruling on the substantive merit of the Motion to Strike is improper at this time.  The Court takes the motion off calendar to be rescheduled for hearing in Placer County. 

 

CONCLUSION:

 

Accordingly, Defendant Roseville City School District’s Motion to Transfer Venue is GRANTED.

 

Defendant’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

 

Moving Party to give notice.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated: January 31, 2025                                 ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

 


            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.