Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 24STCV10627, Date: 2024-09-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV10627 Hearing Date: September 16, 2024 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: September 16, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT
SET
CASE: Marian Mansi v. Jaguar Land Rover North
America, LLC, et al.
CASE NO.: 24STCV10627 
MOTINO
TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Marian Mansi
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant Jaguar
Land Rover North America, LLC
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is a lemon law action filed on April 29, 2024. Plaintiff leased a
2020 Land Rover Range Rover Velar on January 11, 2021, which had serious
defects in its electrical, suspension, structural, transmission, engine, and
emission systems.
Plaintiff moves to compel further
responses to requests for production propounded to Defendant.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel
Further Responses to Requests for Production is GRANTED.
Defendant
is ordered to provide verified, code-compliant responses without objections
within 30 days of this order.
DISCUSSION:
Plaintiff moves to compel further
responses to requests for production propounded to Defendant.
//
Legal Standard
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (a), a court
may order a party to serve a further response to a demand for inspection when
the court finds that: “(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is
incomplete[;] (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate,
incomplete, or evasive[; or] (3) An objection in the response is without merit
or too general.”
The burden is on the moving party to “set forth specific facts showing
good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) These facts must also be set forth in a separate
statement filed by the moving party. (Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1345(c).) This
burden “is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (TBG Ins.
Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)
Timeliness
A motion to compel further
responses to requests for production must be served “within 45 days of the
service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on
or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding
party have agreed in writing.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(c).) The 45-day
requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional. (Sexton v. Superior Court¿(1997)
58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)
Plaintiff propounded the Requests
for Production at issue on this motion to Defendant on May 31, 2024.
(Declaration of Joshua Kohanoff ISO Mot. Exh. 3.) Defendant provided responses
on July 2, 2024. (Id. Exh. 4.) This motion was filed and served on
August 16, 2024, exactly 45 days later. The motion is therefore timely.
Meet and Confer
A party making a motion to compel further responses must also include a
declaration stating facts showing a “reasonable and good faith attempt” to
resolve informally the issues presented by the motion before filing the motion.
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).)
Plaintiff’s counsel sent two meet-and-confer
letters to Defendant’s counsel on July 10 and July 19, 2024. (Kohanoff Decl.
Exhs. 5-6.) Defendant responded with its own letter on July 26, 2024. (Id.;
Exh. 7.) Plaintiff served a joint stipulation for an informal discovery
conference on August 13, 2024, and followed up on August 15, 2024, with no
response before the deadline to file this motion. (Id. ¶ 26; Exhs. 8-9.)
The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the statutory meet-and-confer
requirements, as Plaintiff endeavored to meet and confer but did not receive a
response regarding an informal conference before the time to bring this motion
would have expired.
//
Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections
Defendant
raises evidentiary objections to the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel in
support of this motion. Defendant’s objections in their entirety contend that
the declaration is argumentative or “misleading.” These objections go to
weight, not admissibility, and, in any event, the statements to which Defendant
objects are not material to the Court’s ruling. The Court therefore declines to
rule on these objections.
Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections
Plaintiff
likewise objects to portions of the declaration of Defendant’s counsel in
opposition to this motion. These objections pertain to material which is
entirely irrelevant to the Court’s ruling. The Court declines to rule on these
objections.
Good Cause
Plaintiff
moves to compel further responses to requests for production propounded to
Defendant.
1.
Requests Pertaining to this Action and the
Subject Vehicle (Nos. 1-14)
Requests Nos. 1 through 14 seek, in
essence, any documents of any kind relating or referring to the vehicle that is
the subject of this action, (Plaintiff’s Exh. 3 Nos 1, 3-12), to Defendant’s
affirmative defenses (No. 2), or to communications with Plaintiff (No. 13) or
to any third party relating to the vehicle. (No. 14.) These requests are
facially relevant to this action, and therefore demonstrate good cause.
2.
Policies and Procedures (Nos. 15-29)
Requests Nos. 15 through 29 seek materials
relating to policies, procedures, and training for handling of customer
complaints, vehicle repurchase requests, and warranty coverage. (Exh. 3 Nos.
15-29.) Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, these materials are directly
relevant to Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly claims, because the impact of whether a
policy or procedure demonstrates a lack of good faith is a question to be
decided by a jury. (See, e.g., Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc.
(1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 186.) As evidence must be relevant to be considered
by a jury (see Evid. Code § 350), those materials must therefore be relevant.
Relevant evidence is discoverable. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) Plaintiff has
therefore shown good cause for these requests.
3.
Defects in Similar Vehicles (Nos. 30-31)
Requests Nos. 30 and 31 seek customer
complaints involving any of the same issues listed in any warranty summary or
repair order as the subject vehicle in any other 2020 Land Rover Range Rover
Velar vehicles (Exh. 3. No. 30) and any Documents relating to any Field Service
Action issued in response to complaints experienced by Plaintiff. (No. 31.)
These materials are records pertaining to similar defects in vehicles of the
same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle.
Evidence of similar defects in
other vehicles are both relevant and admissible. (Donlen v. Ford Motor Co.
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 153.) Admissible evidence is discoverable. (Glenfed
Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117-18.)
Documents regarding warranty complaints, service histories, and employee
records concerning a defect in all affected vehicles, as well as documents
regarding the manufacturer’s responses and instructions to cure that defect are
discoverable. (See Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th
967, 971 [holding that the trial court’s approval of a discovery referee’s
report and recommendation of sanctions for failure to produce documents of this
nature relating to the subject defect in all affected vehicles was not an abuse
of discretion].)
Defendant
contends that Donlen and Doppes are both distinguishable from the
present case: Donlen because the issue was whether the plaintiff’s
expert testimony regarding defects in and special service bulletins relating to
other vehicles was admissible, rather than production of documents relating to
these issues (Donlen, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at 138), and Doppes
because that case was also an action for fraud, and the manufacturer did not
challenge the discovery referee’s findings. (Doppes, supra, 174
Cal.App.4th at 973-74, 993.) Defendant is correct that these cases are
factually distinguishable, but the Court disagrees with Defendant that these
cases do not support the position that the documents sought are relevant and
admissible. In Doppes, the Court of Appeal expressly stated that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the discovery referee’s
report and recommendation. (Doppes, supra, at 971.) Further, expert
testimony as in Donlen regarding documentary evidence must necessarily
have a foundation in that evidence to be admissible. (Cooper v. Takeda
Pharmaceuticals America, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 555, 577.) Documentary evidence on which an expert is
testifying must therefore be discoverable. (Glenfed, supra, 53
Cal.App.4th at 1117-18.)
As Plaintiff seeks materials which
are discoverable pursuant to Donlen and Doppes, the Court finds
that Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for these requests.
Defendant’s Responses
Defendant
responded to each request with a series of substantially similar boilerplate
objections asserting attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine,
overbreadth, undue burden, ambiguity, irrelevance, trade secrets and
proprietary business information, and invasion of third-party privacy rights.
The bulk of
Defendant’s opposition to this motion rests on its contention that the
documents sought are not relevant. As the Court has found good cause for the
production of these records, the Court does not share Defendant’s view in this
respect. As to the remaining objections, Defendant only addresses its third-party
privacy and proprietary information in a cursory manner. Defendant cites no
authority supporting either objection, and, with respect to privacy in
particular, fails to provide any basis to conclude that there is (1) a legally
protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
given circumstances; and (3) a threatened intrusion which is serious. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th
531, 552.) The Court therefore finds that Defendant has failed to justify these
objections.
CONCLUSION:
Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production is
GRANTED.
Defendant
is ordered to provide verified, code-compliant responses without objections
within 30 days of this order.
Moving
Party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 16,
2024 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It
should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still
conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you
have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you
should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an
order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.