Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 24STCV11895, Date: 2025-01-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV11895    Hearing Date: January 22, 2025    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE:     January 22, 2025                   TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

CASE:                         Academy of Media Arts, et al. v. City of Los Angeles

CASE NO.:                 24STCV11895           

DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT; MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF COMPLAINT

MOVING PARTY:               Defendant City of Los Angeles.

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Academy of Media Arts and D’Camp Hospitality Group, LLC.

CASE HISTORY:

·         05/10/24: Complaint filed.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

            This is a tort action for intentional interference with contract and prospective economic advantage and related claims. Plaintiffs are former tenants at the L.A. Grand Hotel who allege that Defendant induced the owner of the Hotel to breach their lease agreements and impede their respective business ventures by converting a portion of the hotel into temporary housing for persons experiencing homelessness during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Defendant demurs to the Complaint in its entirety and moves to strike portions of the Complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s Demurrer to the Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to the causes of action already pled, but with leave to amend as to any claims for statutory violations grounded in the same set of facts, and as to compliance with the claim presentation requirement.

Plaintiffs shall have 30 days leave to file a First Amended Complaint.

Defendant’s Motion to Strike is MOOT.

DISCUSSION:

Demurrer to Complaint

            Defendant demurs to the Complaint in its entirety.

Legal Standard

A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) The ultimate facts alleged in the complaint must be deemed true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. (Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403; see also Shields v. County of San Diego (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 103, 133 [stating, “[o]n demurrer, pleadings are read liberally and allegations contained therein are assumed to be true”].) “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.” (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)

Meet and Confer

Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who has filed the pleading subject to the demurrer and file a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a).) However, an insufficient meet-and-confer process is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a)(4).)

            Defendant filed a Declaration of Demurring Party Regarding Meet and Confer on Judicial Council Form CIV-140 stating that counsel for the parties were not able to agree on a date for the partes to meet and confer in person or via telephone before the expiration of Defendant’s time to respond to the Complaint. (Declaration of Demurring Party Attachment ¶¶ 2-6.) Defendant has therefore satisfied its statutory meet and confer obligations.

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Analysis

            Defendant demurs to the Complaint in its entirety on the grounds that (1) all of Plaintiffs’ claims are common-law tort claims for which Defendant, as a municipal entity, is immune; and (2) Plaintiffs have failed to allege compliance with the claim presentation requirement of the Government Tort Claims Act.

            Plaintiffs have alleged two causes of action for “Inducing Breach of Contract,” two causes of action for intentional interference with contractual relations; two causes of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; one cause of action for aiding and abetting fraud, and one cause of action for aiding and abetting intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. (See generally Complaint.)

            Inducement of breach of contract, intentional interference with contract, and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage are judicially-created common-law torts. (Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A. Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 376, 381.) Similarly, “aiding and abetting” is the commission of an independent tort grounded “on the common law rule for subjecting a defendant for liability for aiding and abetting a tort.” (E.g. Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 879.) Under Government Code section 815 subdivision (a), public entities are not liable for an injury except as provided by statute. (Gov. Code § 815(a).) Thus, section 815 “abolishes all common law or judicially declared forms of liability for public entities, except for such liability as may be required by the state or federal constitution.” (Miklosy v. Regents of Univ. of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899 [emphasis in original].) As all eight of Plaintiffs’ causes of action are judicially-created common-law torts, they are expressly precluded by Government Code section 815.

Plaintiffs argue in opposition that the facts alleged in the Complaint set forth breaches of Defendant’s mandatory statutory duties. Statutory claims must be pled with particularity, including identification of the applicable statutes. (Sullivan v. City of Sacramento (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1070, 1080.) Although Plaintiffs’ opposition identifies Civil Code section 3479 and Government Code section 815.6 as a basis for Defendant’s liability, no corresponding allegations are present in the Complaint. This contention therefore fails to rescue Plaintiffs’ common-law tort claims.

            Defendants also argue that nothing in the Complaint offers any indication, even under the most favorable interpretation, that Plaintiffs presented a written claim for damages to Defendant in accordance with the Government Tort Claims Act before bringing this action, or that they were relieved from that obligation. (Gov. Code § 905; see generally Complaint.) Although Plaintiffs assert that their claims were presented, they offer no citation to the pleadings demonstrating such an allegation, and no allegation to that effect is readily apparent. The Court therefore concurs with Defendant that the Complaint is deficient on this separate basis.

            As the Complaint is founded on impermissible common-law tort claims against a public entity and has failed to allege compliance with the claim presentation requirement, Defendant’s demurrer to the Complaint must be SUSTAINED in its entirety.

Leave to Amend

When a demurrer is sustained, the Court determines whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318).  When a plaintiff “has pleaded the general set of facts upon which his cause of action is based,” the court should give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint, since plaintiff should not “be deprived of his right to maintain his action on the ground that his pleadings were defective for lack of particulars.” (Reed v. Norman (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 892, 900.) Accordingly, California law imposes the burden on the plaintiffs to demonstrate the manner in which they can amend their pleadings to state their claims against a defendant.  (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) “Denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion unless the complaint shows on its face it is incapable of amendment.  [Citation.]  Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given." (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.)

            Here, Plaintiffs have not expressly demonstrated how the Complaint might be amended to cure the deficiencies raised on this Demurrer. Indeed, with respect to the common-law claims alleged in the instant Complaint, amendment is impossible in the face of Defendant’s immunity from common-law tort claims. That said, Plaintiffs’ opposition sets forth alternative theories of liability in the form of claimed violations of statutory duties premised on the same facts. (See Opposition p.4:8-15.) Thus, precedent commands that the Court permit Plaintiffs an opportunity to assert those theories. (Reed v. Norman (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 892, 900.) Further, with respect to the claim presentation requirement, the failure of the Complaint is rooted entirely in the absence of information, rather than a fatal concession. Plaintiffs must therefore be granted an opportunity to set forth specific facts showing compliance with the claim presentation requirement. (Id.)

Conclusion

Accordingly, Defendant’s Demurrer to the Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to the causes of action already pled, but with leave to amend as to any claims for statutory violations grounded in the same set of facts, and as to compliance with the claim presentation requirement.

Plaintiffs shall have 30 days leave to file a First Amended Complaint.

Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint

            Defendant also moves to strike portions of the Complaint. As the Court has sustained Defendant’s demurrer in its entirety, the Motion to Strike is MOOT.

CONCLUSION:

Accordingly, Defendant’s Demurrer to the Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to the causes of action already pled, but with leave to amend as to any claims for statutory violations grounded in the same set of facts, and as to compliance with the claim presentation requirement.

Plaintiffs shall have 30 days leave to file a First Amended Complaint.

Defendant’s Motion to Strike is MOOT.

Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:  January 22, 2025                                ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.