Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 24STCV12554, Date: 2025-01-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV12554    Hearing Date: January 2, 2025    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE:     January 2, 2024                     TRIAL DATE: October 7, 2025

CASE:                         Jose Ramos v. 4 Over, LLC, et al.

CASE NO.:                 24STCV12554           

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A CROSS-COMPLAINT

MOVING PARTY:               Defendants 4 Over LLC and 4 Over International Holdings, LLC

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Jose Ramos

CASE HISTORY:

·         05/17/24: Complaint filed.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

            This is an action for employment discrimination and wrongful termination. Plaintiff alleges that he took an extended medical leave in August 2023 to recover from joint replacement surgery. According to Plaintiff, Defendants falsely claimed he had exhausted his medical leave and summarily terminated him in March 2024 in retaliation for taking that leave.

Defendants move for leave to file a cross-complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File a Cross-Complaint is GRANTED.

            Defendants are ordered to file a clean, standalone copy of the proposed Cross-Complaint within 10 days of this order.

DISCUSSION:

Defendants move for leave to file a cross-complaint.

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Legal Standard

Parties generally must file a cross-complaint against the party who filed the complaint before or at the same time as the answer to the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.50(a).) Parties seeking to file untimely compulsory cross-complaints may seek leave to do so from the Court, even though the failure to timely file resulted from oversight, inadvertence, mistake, neglect, or other cause. (Code Civ. Proc. § 426.50.) In such a case, after notice to the adverse party, the Court must grant leave to file the cross-complaint if the party acted in good faith. (Id.) This section is liberally construed to avoid forfeiture of causes of action. (Id.)

The purpose of the compulsory cross-complaint statute is to prevent piecemeal litigation. (Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 949, 959.) Compulsory cross-complaints consist of those causes of action existing at the time of service of the answer that the defendant must bring against the plaintiff, or else forfeit the right to bring them in any other action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30(a).) Specifically, compulsory cross-complaints consist of the causes of action that “arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 426.10(c).) To avoid piecemeal litigation, courts liberally construe the term “transaction”—it is “‘not confined to a single, isolated act or occurrence . . . but may embrace a series of acts or occurrences logically interrelated.’” (Align Technology, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at 960.)

A motion to file a compulsory cross-complaint at any time during the course of the action must be granted where forfeiture would otherwise result, unless the moving party engaged in bad faith conduct. (Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 99.) The determination that the moving party acted in bad faith must be supported by substantial evidence. (Ibid.; Foot’s Transfer & Storage Co. v. Superior Court (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 897, 902 [“We conclude that this principle of liberality requires that a strong showing of bad faith be made in order to support a denial of the right to file a cross-complaint under this section”].) “Factors such as oversight, inadvertence, neglect, mistake or other cause, are insufficient grounds to deny the motion unless accompanied by bad faith.” (Silver Organizations Ltd, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at 99) Rather, bad faith is “defined as ‘[t]he opposite of “good faith,” generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake . . . , but by some interested or sinister motive[,] . . . not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather . . . the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; . . . it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.’” (Id. at 100.) 

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections

            Plaintiff asserts numerous objections to the declarations submitted by Defendants in support of this motion. However, none of the statements to which Plaintiff objects are material to the issues before the Court on this motion. For that reason, the Court declines to rule on Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections.

Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections

            Defendants assert numerous objections to the Declarations submitted by Plaintiff in support of his opposition to this motion. Defendants do not consecutively number their 23-page-long list of objections to Plaintiff’s evidence. California Rule of Court 3.1354(b) requires “[e]ach written objection must be numbered consecutively . . ..”  (Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1354(b), emphasis added.) Defendants have not complied with this requirement. The Court therefore refuses to consider Defendants’ evidentiary objections to (1) the Declaration of Noriya Bragg and (2) the Declaration of Jose Ramos.

Analysis

            Defendants move for leave to file a cross-complaint against Plaintiff for breach of contract, common counts, and conversion. (See generally Proposed Cross-Complaint.) Defendants’ proposed pleading admits that Plaintiff was sent a termination letter in March 2024, but claims that the letter was sent in error. (Proposed Cross-Complaint ¶¶ 6-7.) Defendants allege that Plaintiff was advised of the mistake and that they corrected Plaintiff’s status on April 8, 2024. (Proposed Cross-Compliant ¶ 8.) According to Defendants, however, Plaintiff refused to return to work while continuing to use his employment benefits. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21.) These claims arise, on their face, from the same series of occurrences that gave rise to the original Complaint, i.e., Plaintiff’s medical leave and the March 2024 notice of termination. Defendants are therefore entitled to leave to file this cross-complaint absent an affirmative showing by Plaintiff that Defendants have acted in bad faith.

            Plaintiff, in opposition to this motion, argues that Defendants’ Cross-Complaint is brought in bad faith because it lacks substantive merit. Plaintiff disputes Defendants’ characterization of events, arguing the March 2024 notice was operative as a termination, and that Defendants’ subsequent communications were an offer of reinstatement which Plaintiff rejected. Plaintiff also denies that he has continued to use his employment benefits, asserts that Defendants’ contrary contentions are a “sham defense,” and argues that the cross-complaint is barred by the doctrines of unclean hands and equitable estoppel because of the underlying conduct by Defendants preceding this lawsuit. None of these contentions are germane to the issues before the Court on this motion. At this juncture, Plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate by substantial evidence that Defendants acted in bad faith—i.e., that Defendants acted with some improper motive in delaying the presentation of these cross-claims. (Silver Organizations Ltd, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at 99-100.) Challenges to the merits of Defendants’ claims are not evidence of an improper motive.

            As Plaintiff has offered no evidence that Defendants acted in bad faith by failing to timely assert their compulsory crossclaims, Defendants are entitled to be granted leave to file the cross-complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 426.50.

CONCLUSION:

            Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File a Cross-Complaint is GRANTED.

            Defendants are ordered to file a clean, standalone copy of the proposed Cross-Complaint within 10 days of this order.

            Moving Parties to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:  January 2, 2025                                  ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.