Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 24STCV13108, Date: 2025-06-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV13108 Hearing Date: June 3, 2025 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department
47
HEARING DATE: June 3, 2025 TRIAL DATE: September
18, 2025
CASE: Lissa v. Ghodsian, et al.
CASE NO.: 24STCV13108
MOTION
TO QUASH SUBPOENAS TO FORMER EMPLOYERS AND FOR SANCTIONS
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff
Clarisa Lissa
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendants Shahrouz Ghodisan, MD, CRT Programs Inc., Bel
Air Health Services Inc., Bel Air Health Services II Inc., Bel Air Health
Services III Inc. and Beverly Hills Health Services Inc.
CASE
HISTORY:
·
5/22/25: Complaint filed.
STATEMENT OF
MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
Plaintiff was employed as the administrator of Defendant CRT
Programs Inc. (“CRT Programs”), a residential treatment program. Plaintiff was recruited by Defendant Shahrouz
Ghodsian, MD. Plaintiff alleges Ghodsian
required her to perform services for his other entities, Defendants Bel Air
Health Services Inc., Bel Air Health Services II Inc., Bel Air Health Services
III Inc. and Beverly Hills Health Services Inc.
Plaintiff alleges each of the entities were agents and principals of one
another, as well as alter egos.
Plaintiff alleges she discovered Defendants were committing multiple
legal violations in operating their facilities.
Plaintiff alleges these violations regularly endangered patients and
that she reported these violations to the authorities.
In addition, Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to pay her
salary as promised and reduced her wages without notice or explanation. Plaintiff alleges Defendants also
misclassified her as an independent contractor when she was an employee.
On January 31, 2024, Plaintiff alleges Defendants informed
her she would be terminated and her last day of work would be February 14,
2024. It is alleged Defendants
terminated Plaintiff in retaliation for reporting their violations to the
authorities. After termination,
Plaintiff demanded her employment records, and Defendants refused to provide
her with her employment records when she demanded them.
On May 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging (1)
Whistleblower Retaliation (Labor Code §§98.6, 1102.5, 1278.5, 6310); (2)
wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (3) breach of contract; (4)
misclassification of independent contractor (Labor Code §226.8); (5) failure to
pay wages due (Labor Code §204); (6) failure to pay wages upon termination
(Labor Code §201); (7) failure to indemnify for necessary expenditures (Labor
Code §2802); (8) failure to provide pay statements (Labor Code §226); (9)
failure to provide employment records (Labor Code §1198.5); (10) unfair
competition (Bus. & Prof. Code, §17200).
On April
21, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Quash Subpoenas to Former
Employers and for Sanctions. Pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, Plaintiff moves to quash seven
subpoenas that Defendants served on the following former employers of
Plaintiff: (1) Alba Care Services; (2)
Childhelp Merv Griffin Village and Childhelp School; (3) LAC CRTC—Stars
Behavioral Health; (4) Maryvale; (5) McKinley Children’s Center; (6) Qualified
Intellectual Disabilities; and (7) Silver Lining Behavorial Health. Plaintiff moves to quash these subpoenas on
grounds that they implicate her right to privacy and they seek irrelevant
documents to this action. Plaintiff
requests sanctions in the amount of $8,500.
Defendants
filed an opposition on May 20, 2025. Defendants
claim Plaintiff’s prior employment records are relevant and necessary to
establish several defenses, including good cause termination. Defendants argue Plaintiff placed her resume
and qualifications at issue by filing this action and claiming wrongful
termination.
Plaintiff
filed a reply on May 28, 2025. Plaintiff
maintains Defendants fail to satisfy the requirements to overcome her assertion
of her right to privacy over the records.
Plaintiff argues Defendants cannot rely simply on relevance to overcome
her privacy objection.
TENTATIVE
RULING:
Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoenas and Request
for Sanctions are DENIED.
Defendant’s Request for Sanctions is GRANTED IN PART. Defendant is awarded sanctions against
Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel, Russel Gomm, jointly and severally, in the
amount of $975 to be paid to Defendants’ counsel within 30 days of this
Order.
DISCUSSION:
Motion
to Quash Subpoenas to Former Employers and for Sanctions
Defendants’
initial set of deposition subpoenas is irrelevant
Plaintiff spends an inordinate amount of time discussing
Defendants’ prior seven deposition subpoenas on these same seven prior
employers. Plaintiff states Defendants
failed to adhere to the consumer notice requirement under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1985.6 prior to serving the subpoenas on the deponents. As Plaintiff acknowledges, however, Defendants
conceded their error and re-issued the seven subpoenas in compliance with the
requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.6. The prior deposition subpoenas are
irrelevant. As to the current subpoenas,
Plaintiff fails to identify any procedural irregularities.
Privacy rights are not absolute and Plaintiff waived them by
placing the validity of her termination at issue
The right of privacy is not absolute and may be waived. “In determining whether one has waived the
right of privacy by bringing suit, our Supreme Court has noted that although
there may be an implicit partial waiver, the scope of such waiver must be
narrowly, rather than expansively construed, so that plaintiffs will not be
unduly deterred from instituting lawsuits by fear of exposure of private
activities. An implicit waiver of a
party's constitutional rights encompasses only discovery directly relevant to
the plaintiff's claim and essential to the fair resolution of the
lawsuit.” (Davis v. Superior Court
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1014 (citing Vinson v. Supr. Ct. (1987) 43
Cal.3d 833, 842 (quoting Britt v. Supr. Ct. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859).)
In addition, even where a right of privacy is shown,
discovery may still be compelled under the test set forth in Hill v.
National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35. “In Hill, we established a framework
for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting a privacy
right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened
intrusion that is serious. The party
seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important
countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection
may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective
measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance
these competing considerations.” (Williams
v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 (citing Hill, supra, 7
Cal.4th at 35).)
“In general, the court should not proceed to balancing
unless a satisfactory threshold showing is made. A defendant is entitled to
prevail if it negates any of the three required elements. A defendant can also
prevail at the balancing stage. An otherwise actionable invasion of privacy may
be legally justified if it substantively furthers one or more legitimate
competing interests. (Hill, supra,
7 Cal. 4th at 40.) Conversely, the invasion may be
unjustified if the claimant can point to “feasible and effective alternatives”
with “a lesser impact on privacy interests.”
(County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Com.
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 905, 926.)
Plaintiff argues the information sought from her prior
employers is irrelevant. However, Defendants
state they hired Plaintiff based on representations she made in her resume
regarding her work experience and her performance at prior jobs. Plaintiff is alleging wrongful termination
and retaliatory termination. Plaintiff
therefore placed Defendants’ motivation for terminating her at issue, waiving
any right to assert privacy objections to records relevant to that issue. Plaintiff does not argue that any third party
privacy interests are involved.
Defendants assert good cause termination as defense to
Plaintiff’s claims. Defendants maintain
they terminated Plaintiff in part based on her falsification of her employment
history, relevant experience at her prior employment and overall
qualifications. If Defendants are not
allowed to conduct discovery into these issues, they will be unable to properly
assert this defense. Plaintiff fails to
offer any less intrusive source of this information. Defendants have limited their subpoenas to
seven categories of documents related to Plaintiff’s prior employment,
excluding any medical records.
(Plaintiff’s Separate Statement.)
Defendants therefore establish the relevance of the requested documents.
Plaintiff incorrectly states that Defendants must also
demonstrate a compelling need for the information in order to overcome her
privacy objection. The Supreme Court in Williams
expressly rejected that contention:
“A threatened invasion of privacy can, to be sure, be
extremely grave, and to the extent it is, to conclude in a given case that only
a compelling countervailing interest and an absence of alternatives will
suffice to justify the intrusion may be right.
But the flaw in the Court of Appeal's legal analysis, and in the cases
it relied upon, is the de facto starting assumption that such an egregious
invasion is involved in every request for discovery of private information. Courts
must instead place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to
establish its extent and the seriousness of the prospective invasion, and
against that showing must weigh the countervailing interests the opposing party
identifies, as Hill requires. What suffices to justify an invasion will…vary
according to the context. Only obvious invasions of interests fundamental to
personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest. To the extent
prior cases require a party seeking discovery of private information to always
establish a compelling interest or compelling need, without regard to the other
considerations articulated in [Hill], they are disapproved.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th
at 557 [emphasis added and citations omitted])
In order to require Defendants to demonstrate a compelling
interest or need in the information requested, Plaintiff must establish a
threatened intrusion that is serious in order to require Defendants to show a
compelling need or interest in the discovery, e.g. invasion of an interest
fundamental to personal autonomy such as “freedom from involuntary
sterilization or the freedom to pursue consensual familial relationships.” (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th
at 34.) Plaintiff does not claim a
potential invasion of an interest fundamental to her personal autonomy.
Thus, Plaintiff must satisfy the three requirements under Hill
and Williams before the Court is required to balance Plaintiff’s privacy
objection against Defendants’ right to discovery. Under Hill and Williams, Plaintiff
was required to demonstrate (1) a legally protected privacy interest, (2) an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and (3)
a threatened intrusion that is serious. While
it is well recognized that an employee has a privacy interest in employment
records, that right is waivable and as discussed above, Plaintiff waived her
right of privacy over her prior employment files by filing this action. Plaintiff also fails to establish either an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances or a
threatened intrusion that is serious.
When Plaintiff applied for work with Defendants, Plaintiff submitted
her resume, which listed the seven deponents as prior or present employers. (Defendants’ Opposition, Ex. B.) Plaintiff did so with the knowledge that
Defendants could contact those employers to verify the information on the
resume and consult them on her work performance. Plaintiff is now claiming that she was
terminated in retaliation for reporting Defendants’ legal violations to
authorities. Defendants are asserting
good cause termination as a defense.
Under these circumstances, Plaintiff cannot claim an objective reasonable
expectation of privacy in the given circumstances.
Plaintiff also fails to identify a threatened intrusion that
is serious. To the extent there are any
concerns about disclosure, a protective order would address those
concerns.
Both Plaintiff and Defendants request sanctions. “Except as specified in subdivision (c), in
making an order pursuant to motion made under subdivision (c) of Section 1987
or under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of
the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including
reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed
in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the
requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code of Civ. Proc., §1987.2,
subdv. (a).)
Plaintiff did not prevail on this motion. The Court finds the motion was not made with
substantial justification. Defendants
also deny that they ever agreed to withdraw six of the seven deposition
subpoenas. Defendants request sanctions
in the amount of $5,200, stating that their attorney spent 13 hours meeting and
conferring with Plaintiff’s counsel and “preparation of this Motion,” and
anticipate another 3 hours preparing for and attending the hearing, at the rate
of $325 per hour. Defendants are not entitled
to recover fees for time the first set of subpoenas that had to be cancelled
and reissued nor any time on pre-motion meet-and-confer efforts. Further, putting aside the voluminous records
attached to it, the opposition amounts to a nine-page brief and a short
declaration. Having provided no billing records and little information about
the work completed, the Court finds it must trim the fee request substantially
granting fees of $975 for 3 hours of work at $325 per hour. Defendants’ request for sanction against
Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel is GRANTED in the amount of $975.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Deposition
Subpoenas and Request for Sanctions is DENIED.
Defendant is awarded sanctions against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel,
Russel Gomm, jointly and severally, in the amount of $975 to be paid to
Defendants’ counsel within 30 days of this Order.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoenas and Request
for Sanctions are DENIED.
Defendant’s Request for Sanctions is GRANTED IN PART. Defendant is awarded sanctions against
Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel, Russel Gomm, jointly and severally, in the
amount of $975 to be paid to Defendants’ counsel within 30 days of this
Order.
Moving party to give notice, unless waived.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 3, 2025 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by
no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested
parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you
submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any
party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your
right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may
not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative
ruling in whole or in part.