Judge Theresa M. Traber, Case Number: 24STCV13590, Date: 2024-12-09 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 24STCV13590, Date: 2024-12-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV13590 Hearing Date: December 9, 2024 Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE: December 9, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

CASE: Joseph Cofey v. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles

CASE NO.: 24STCV13590

DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, erroneously sued as Stanley Mosk Courthouse

RESPONDING PARTY(S): No response on eCourt as of 12/04/24

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

This is an action for negligence that was filed on May 31, 2024. Plaintiff alleges that the Superior Court clerk improperly rejected his request for entry of default in a separate action.

Defendant demurs to the Complaint in its entirety.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s Demurrer to the Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

DISCUSSION:

Defendant demurs to the Complaint in its entirety.

Legal Standard

A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) The ultimate facts alleged in the complaint must be deemed true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. (Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403; see also Shields v. County of San Diego (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 103, 133 [stating, “[o]n demurrer, pleadings are read liberally and allegations contained therein are assumed to be true”].) “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.” (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)

Meet and Confer

Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who has filed the pleading subject to the demurrer and file a declaration detailing their meet-and-confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a).) However, an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a)(4).)

The Declaration of Sarah Overton in support of the Demurrer state that the declarant attempted to contact Plaintiff via his mailing address, but received no response. (Declaration of Sarah L. Overton ISO Dem. ¶¶ 2; 6.) Attorney Overton also attempted to contact Plaintiff by his listed telephone number, to no avail. (Id. ¶¶ 3-6.) Defendant has satisfied its statutory meet-and-confer obligations.

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the register of actions in the matter entitled Cofey v. Metropolitan Transit Authority, Superior Court Case No. 23STCV01422. Defendant’s request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d) (court records).

Analysis

Defendant demurs to the Complaint in its entirety for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Defendant contends that the Complaint is fatally defective because it is barred by quasi-judicial immunity, because Plaintiff has not alleged compliance with the Government Claims Act, and because it does not set forth facts supporting a negligence claim.

Well-settled authority holds that judges enjoy absolute immunity from civil suits arising out of the exercise of their judicial functions. (Mireles v. Waco (1991) 502 U.S. 9, 11; Tagliavia v. County of Los Angeles (198) 112 Cal.App.3d 759, 761.) This absolute immunity has been extended, under the doctrine of “quasi-judicial immunity” to persons other than judges who “act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.” (Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 843, 852-53.) This immunity has been extended to arbitrators, grand jurors, prosecutors, and State Bar officials. (Id. at 853.) Quasi-judicial immunity also applies to court clerks. (Acres v. Marston (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 417, 442.) Moreover, under Government Code section 815.2(b), the Superior Court, as a public entity, “is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee [. . . ] where that employee is immune from liability.” (Gov. Code § 815.2(b).)

Defendant argues that it cannot be liable in this action because the thrust of Plaintiff’s claim is that the rejection of his requests for entry of default in a separate action constituted actionable negligence. As Defendant forcefully argues, such conduct, on its face, is an integral part of the judicial process, and so the clerks who rejected Plaintiff’s requests are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for those acts. Consequently, Defendant itself is not liable as a matter of law pursuant to Government Code section 815.2(b).

Defendant’s Demurrer to the Complaint is therefore SUSTAINED.

Leave to Amend

When a demurrer is sustained, the Court determines whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318). When a plaintiff “has pleaded the general set of facts upon which his cause of action is based,” the court should give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint, since plaintiff should not “be deprived of his right to maintain his action on the ground that his pleadings were defective for lack of particulars.” (Reed v. Norman (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 892, 900.) Accordingly, California law imposes the burden on the plaintiffs to demonstrate the manner in which they can amend their pleadings to state their claims against a defendant. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) “Denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion unless the complaint shows on its face it is incapable of amendment. [Citation.] Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given." (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.)

Plaintiff has not demonstrated how the Complaint might be cured of its deficiencies, and, moreover, amendment is not possible in light of the Court’s finding that Plaintiff’s complaint is barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity. The Court therefore does not grant leave to amend.

CONCLUSION:

Accordingly, Defendant’s Demurrer to the Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 9, 2024 ___________________________________

Theresa M. Traber

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.