Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 24STCV14236, Date: 2025-04-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV14236    Hearing Date: April 25, 2025    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE:     April 25, 2025                        TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

CASE:                         David Lahijaniha v. Jaguar Land Rover North America LLC

CASE NO.:                 24STCV14236           

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

MOVING PARTY:               Plaintiff David Lahijaniha

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America LLC

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

            This is a lemon law action filed on June 6, 2024. Plaintiff purchased a 2022 Land Rover Defender on October 6, 2021, which subsequently manifested engine, crankcase, and electrical problems.

Plaintiff moves for an award of attorney’s fees and costs following a settlement.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff is awarded $35,070 in attorney’s fees plus $682.45 in costs.

DISCUSSION:

            Plaintiff moves for an award of attorney’s fees in the total amount of $76,854.00 plus $682.45 in costs.

Entitlement to Fees

            Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to a settlement agreement reached by the parties. Plaintiffs brought claims for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. (Civ. Code § 1790 et seq.). Civil Code section 1794(d) states:

If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.

            On December 20, 2024, the parties executed a settlement in which Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff $156,915.83 in exchange for a return of the vehicle and a release of claims. (Declaration of Eli Bananyan ISO Mot. Exh. A. §§ 2-3.) The settlement provided for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to Plaintiff by noticed motion pursuant to Civil Code section 1794(d), with the award to be paid by Defendant. (Id. § 2.) The parties agree that Plaintiff is the prevailing party for the purposes of this motion. (Id.)

Reasonableness of Fees

            Plaintiff requests a total fee award of $76,854.00, based on a total of $33,570 in fees accrued by Plaintiff’s counsel before the instant motion, plus a 120% increase (mislabeled as a “1.2x multiplier” rather than the proper value of 2.2x) accounting for $40,284, plus $3,000 in fees on this motion and anticipated fees to review the opposition, draft a reply brief, and attend the hearing, plus $682.45 in costs. (See Notice of Motion.)

            Reasonable attorney’s fees are allowable costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc § 1033.5(a)(10), (c)(5)(B).) In actions that are based on a contract, “where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract… shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.” (Civil Code § 1717(a) [emphasis added].) A recovery of attorney’s fees is authorized even in noncontractual or tort actions if the contractual provision for fee recovery is worded broadly enough. (See Code Civ. Proc § 10211; Maynard v. BTI Group, Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 984, 993 [agreement to award fees based on outcome of “any dispute” encompasses all claims, “whether in contract, tort or otherwise]; Lockton v. O'Rourke (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1076; Lerner v. Ward (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 155, 160.)

Reasonable attorney’s fees shall be fixed by the Court and shall be an element of the costs of suit. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(c)(5)(B).) Reasonable attorney’s fees are ordinarily determined by the Court pursuant to the “lodestar” method, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (See PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096; Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004 [“California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys' fee award.”].) “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award….”  (Ibid.) In setting the hourly rate for a fee award, courts are entitled to consider the “fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community for similar work.” (Bihun v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 976, 997 [affirming rate of $450 per hour], overruled on other grounds by Lakin v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 664.)  The burden is on the party seeking attorney’s fees to prove the reasonableness of the fees. (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 615.) 

The Court has broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee award, which will not be overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1393-1394.)  The Court need not explain its calculation of the amount of attorney’s fees awarded in detail; identifying the factors considered in arriving at the amount will suffice. (Ventura v. ABM Indus. Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 274-275.)

1.      Base Fee Requests

Plaintiff has provided an itemized list of the attorney time billed in connection with this case. (Bananyan Decl. Exh. B.) Plaintiffs’ counsel billed a total of 51.7 hours in connection with this case at hourly rates ranging from $600 to $900 per hour. (Id.) Attorney Bananyan attests to his own skills, training, and hourly rates, and that of his senior partner, Koroosh Bananyan. (Bananyan Decl. ¶¶ 10-19.) The records show that research and drafting tasks were generally assigned to the more junior attorney charging lower rates, while reserving strategic and editing pursuits and client communication to senior attorney. (Id.) That said, the Court rejects the bulk of Plaintiff’s request for fees in connection with the instant motion, some $2,400, as counsel has only accounted for one hour at $600 actually incurred. (Bananyan Decl. ¶ 31.) The Court will grant that one hour of work, plus 1.5 hours for preparation of the reply brief and appearance at the hearing.

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff’s fee demand is unreasonable because the rates of Plaintiff’s counsel are inflated based on a “Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report.” The Court refuses to consider this inadmissible hearsay document, and the Court does not share Defendant’s otherwise-unsupported view that the hourly rates are unreasonable based on the experience of Plaintiff’s counsel. 

Defendant also identifies instances of what it contends are excessive billing records for preparation of template filings, including the instant motion. However, Defendant offers no evidence that this is so: the arguments of Defendant’s counsel are not evidence. Nor is the Court persuaded by Defendant’s assertion that the billing records are inappropriately granular—the say-so of Defendant’s counsel is not sufficient to establish the unreasonableness of these fees.

            The Court therefore finds that the base fee request and fees on this motion should be reduced to should be reduced to a total of $35,070, including the $33,570 base fees plus $1,500 for the fee motion.

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2.      Fee Multiplier

            Plaintiff requests that the lodestar be enhanced by a multiplier of 120% or 2.2x, mislabeled as a “1.2x multiplier”, which would result in an additional award of $40,284. Plaintiff contends that this multiplier is reasonable considering the contingent nature of this action, Plaintiff’s counsel’s experience and knowledge, the difficulty of this litigation, and the favorable result achieved for Plaintiff.

Multipliers for successful representation on a contingency basis have frequently been awarded. (See, e.g., Santana v. FCA US LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 352.) Here, however, there is little in the record demonstrating that such a multiplier is warranted, let alone one as substantial as what is sought here. Plaintiff has not proven any substantial risks undertaken. Prosecuting a case through discovery disputes, motions practice, and preparations for trial shows legal representation that embraces risk despite the contingent character of receiving fees. A Song-Beverly action where the case largely sat idle on the Court’s docket for a mere ten months before resolution—notwithstanding negotiations and mediation to which the Court was not privy—and where there was no substantive motion practice before settlement and no trial preparation does not demonstrate risk. Nor were there any novel, difficult, or complicated issues confronted in this case. The level of expertise exhibited by Plaintiff’s counsel in securing this favorable settlement is amply accounted for in the substantial hourly rates sought as their market rates. The Court cannot conclude that a multiplier should be applied to the sue-and-settle approach adopted here.

Costs

            Plaintiff also seeks an award of costs in the amount of $682.45.

            A prevailing party on a Song-Beverly claim may also seek to recover costs reasonably incurred, as well as attorney’s fees. (Civ. Code § 1794(d).) Once a request for costs is properly challenged, the burden shifts to the propounding party to demonstrate why such costs are recoverable and proper. (Whatley-Miller v. Cooper (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1103, 1113.) Costs are normally sought by way of a memorandum of costs pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1700(a). However, as Defendant does not object to determination of costs via this motion, the Court will exercise its discretion to do so.

            Plaintiffs included an itemized list of costs their counsel’s itemized billing records reflecting the amount requested. (Bananyan Decl. Exh. D.)  Defendant does not object to the costs claimed. The Court will therefore award the full amount of costs. 

CONCLUSION:

            Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff is awarded $35,070 in attorney’s fees plus $682.45 in costs.

            Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:  April 25, 2025                                    ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.