Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 24STCV18506, Date: 2025-04-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV18506    Hearing Date: April 28, 2025    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE:     April 28, 2025                        TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

CASE:                         Rowland Convalescent Hospital, Inc., v. Jon Freeman

CASE NO.:                 24STCV18506           

DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT

MOVING PARTY:               Defendant Jon Freeman, as the personal representative of the Estate of Frieda Huard

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Rowland Convalescent Hospital, Inc.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

            This is an action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment that was filed on July 25, 2024. Plaintiff alleges that, while the decedent was residing in Plaintiff’s nursing home, Plaintiff agreed to advance funds for mortgage payments on a property owned by the decedent, which the decedent promised to repay.

Defendant Freeman, as the personal representative of the decedent’s estate, demurs to the Complaint in its entirety.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to the first cause of action for breach of contract and otherwise OVERRULED.

DISCUSSION:

Defendant Freeman, as the personal representative of the decedent’s estate, demurs to the Complaint in its entirety.

Legal Standard

A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) The ultimate facts alleged in the complaint must be deemed true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. (Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403; see also Shields v. County of San Diego (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 103, 133 [stating, “[o]n demurrer, pleadings are read liberally and allegations contained therein are assumed to be true”].) “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.” (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)

Meet and Confer

Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who has filed the pleading subject to the demurrer and file a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a).) However, an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a)(4).)

The Declaration of Megan Waugh in support of the Demurrer states that counsel for the parties met and conferred telephonically on November 7, 2024, with a follow-up letter on November 26, 2024. (Declaration of Megan Waugh ISO Dem. ¶¶ 3-4; Exh. A.) The parties were unable to resolve this dispute. (See Id.) Defendant has satisfied the statutory meet-and-confer requirements.

Request for Judicial Notice

            Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of (1) Plaintiff’s Creditor’s Claim filed on March 7, 2024 in the action In Re: Estate of Frieda Huard, Case NO. 23STPB04742; (2) the May 1, 2023 Petition for Letters of Administration in that action filed by Defendant; (3) the Court’s October 2, 2023 order granting that petition; (4) the November 8, 2024 Letters of Administration, and (5) Defendant’s rejection of Plaintiff’s Creditor’s Claim filed April 18, 2024. Defendant’s requests are GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d) (court records).

Deficient Statement of Grounds for Demurrer

            A demurrer “shall distinctly specify the grounds upon which any of the objections to the complaint . . . are taken. Unless it does so, it may be disregarded.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.60.) Pursuant to this statute, the Rules of Court require that each grounds for a demurrer be stated in a separate paragraph. (Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1320(a).)

            Here, Defendant’s Notice of Motion does not include a separate Statement of Grounds for the Demurrer. However, the Notice of Motion states that the demurrer is brought as to the entire Complaint, with specific reference to both causes of action, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(e)—i.e., for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action—on the grounds that the entire Complaint is barred by the statute of limitations. (Notice of Motion pp. 1:22-2:2.) While not strictly compliant with the Rules of Court, given the absence of any objection by Plaintiff to the Demurrer on this ground, the Court will address the merits of the Demurrer with respect to the Statute of Limitations.

First Cause of Action: Breach of Contract

            Defendant demurs to the first cause of action for breach of contract for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Plaintiff has agreed to withdraw this cause of action. The Court so orders by sustaining the demurrer to this cause of action without leave to amend.

Second Cause of Action: Unjust Enrichment

            Defendant demurs to the second cause of action for unjust enrichment for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action on the grounds that the claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

            As alleged in the Complaint, the decedent owned a parcel of real property at 20358 E. Calora Street, Covina, CA 91723. (Complaint ¶ 8.) At some unknown date, the decedent became a resident at Plaintiff’s nursing home. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff’s president, Anthony Kalomas, allegedly agreed to advance funds to the decedent to assist her in paying off the mortgage on her property, conditioned on the decedent reimbursing Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶¶ 10-11.) The decedent passed away on September 29, 2015. (Id. ¶ 12.) According to Plaintiff’s Creditor’s Claim filed in a probate proceeding regarding the decedent’s estate, Plaintiff made payments beginning April 21, 2010 and continuing through June 28, 2017. (Defendant’s RJN Exh. 1, Exh. A.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot recover on an unjust enrichment theory for any of the payments made because this action, filed nine years after the decedent’s death and seven years after the last payment, is outside any applicable statute of limitations.

            With respect to the payments preceding the decedent’s death, Defendant states that the applicable statute of limitations is set by Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2. Subdivision (a) of this statute provides:

If a person against whom an action may be brought on a liability of the person, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, and whether accrued or not accrued, dies before the expiration of the applicable limitations period, and the cause of action survives, an action may be commenced within one year after the date of death, and the limitations period that would have been applicable does not apply.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 366.2(a).) Subdivision (b) further states:

The limitations period provided in this section for commencement of an action shall not be tolled or extended for any reason except as provided in any of the following, where applicable:

(1) Sections 12, 12a, and 12b of this code.

(2) Part 4 (commencing with Section 9000) of Division 7 of the Probate Code (creditor claims in administration of estates of decedents).

(3) Part 8 (commencing with Section 19000) of Division 9 of the Probate Code (payment of claims, debts, and expenses from revocable trust of deceased settlor).

(4) Former Part 3 (commencing with Section 21300) of Division 11 of the Probate Code (no contest clauses), as that part read prior to its repeal by Chapter 174 of the Statutes of 2008.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 366.2(b).) Of these enumerated exceptions, only the second, pertaining to creditor claims in administration of estates of decedents, bears any relevance to this action. Moreover, while the filing of a creditor claim serves to toll the statute of limitations on a corresponding cause of action until the administrator’s determination of the claim is rendered (Probate Code § 9352), that provision is only relevant if the statute of limitations has not already run. Although Plaintiff, in opposition, argues that it could not present any claim regarding the pre-death expenses until a personal representative was appointed, Plaintiff fails to engage with the plain language of section 366.2 subdivision (b), categorically rejecting any tolling of the statute except on enumerated grounds. The Court therefore concludes that any payments made before the decedent’s death were subject to a one-year statute of limitations which expired on September 29, 2016.

            As to the post-death payments, however, controlling authority commands a different outcome. Defendant contends that the payments made after the decedent’s death were subject to either a two-year statute of limitations if brought under a quasi-contract theory (Civ. Code § 339(1),) or three years if under a theory of conversion, fraud, or mistake (Civ. Code § 338(d)) as the statute of limitations for unjust enrichment is based on the underlying wrong. (See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Dintino (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 333, 348.) While true, Defendant neglects long-standing authority which holds that, for claims against a defendant which do not accrue until after that defendant’s death, the applicable statute of limitations is tolled until probate proceedings commence and letters of administration issue. (In Re Bullard’s Estate (1897) 116 Cal. 355, 357.) Here, the judicially-noticed documents indicate that probate proceedings commenced on May 1, 2023, with the Petition for Letters of Administration. (RJN Exh. 2.) Letters of Administration did not issue until November 8, 2023, at which time, under Bullard’s Estate, the statute of limitations began to run as to the post-death payments. (RJN Exh. 4.) Plaintiff’s claim was filed on March 7, 2024, exactly four months later and precisely on the deadline established by Probate Code section 9100. (RJN Exh. 1.) During the pendency of that claim, the statute of limitations was tolled. (Probate Code § 9352.) After the claim was rejected on April 18, 2024 (RJN Exh. 5), Plaintiff commenced this action on July 25, 2025, just over three months after the rejection. (See Complaint.) Based on the above authorities and the factual record provided, only seven months of, at minimum, a two-year statute of limitations had elapsed before this action was filed. Thus, Plaintiff’s post-death payments are not barred by the statute of limitations. Consequently, the second cause of action does not fail to state a claim on this basis.

            Defendant offers an alternative argument in its reply papers that the second cause of action is inadequately pled on the merits. As this argument was not raised in the moving papers, the Court refuses to consider it.

            For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s demurrer to the second cause of action is OVERRULED.

CONCLUSION:

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to the first cause of action for breach of contract and otherwise OVERRULED.

Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:  April 28, 2025.                                   ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.