Judge Theresa M. Traber, Case Number: 24STCV19227, Date: 2025-01-13 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 24STCV19227, Date: 2025-01-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV19227 Hearing Date: January 13, 2025 Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE: January 13, 2025 TRIAL DATE: March 3, 2026

CASE: Monica Garcia Garcia v. American Honda Motor Co.

CASE NO.: 24STCV19227

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION (SET ONE); REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Monica Garcia Garcia

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant American Honda Motor Co.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

This is a lemon law action filed on August 1, 2024. Plaintiff purchased a 2022 Honda HR-V on June 1, 2022, which subsequently manifested electrical, engine, and transmission defects.

Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to requests for production propounded to Defendant, and for sanctions.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production is GRANTED.

Defendant is ordered to provide verified, code-compliant supplemental responses without objections within 30 days of this order.

Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is GRANTED in the amount of $2,153.50 against Defendant and its counsel, jointly and severally. Payment is to be made from Defendant or its counsel to Plaintiff’s counsel within 20 days of this order.

DISCUSSION:

Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to requests for production propounded to Defendant.

Legal Standard

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (a), a court may order a party to serve a further response to a demand for inspection when the court finds that: “(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete[;] (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive[; or] (3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.”

The burden is on the moving party to “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) These facts must also be set forth in a separate statement filed by the moving party. (Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1345(c).) This burden “is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

Timeliness

A motion to compel further responses to requests for production must be served “within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(c).) The 45-day requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional. (Sexton v. Superior Court¿(1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)

Plaintiff propounded the discovery at issue in this motion on September 17, 2024. (Declaration of Roy Enav ISO Mot. ¶ 14; Exh. 3). Defendant provided responses on November 4, 2024, pursuant to an agreed-upon extension of time to respond to that date. (Enav Decl. Exh. 4; Declaration of Ariane A. Sadanaga ¶ 6; Exh. C.) The deadline to bring a motion to compel further responses was therefore December 19, 2024. Plaintiff filed and served the motion on December 13, 2024, one week before the deadline. This motion is timely.

Meet and Confer

A party making a motion to compel further responses must also include a declaration stating facts showing a “reasonable and good faith attempt” to resolve informally the issues presented by the motion before filing the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).)

The Declaration of Roy Enav filed in support of this motion states that the parties exchanged meet and confer letters between November 12, 2024 and November 18, 2024, followed by a telephone conference on November 22, 2024. (Enav Decl. ¶¶ 17-19; Exhs. 5-7.) The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the statutory meet-and-confer process.

Good Cause

Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to 31 requests for production propounded to Defendant. These requests fall into four broad categories: (1) materials relating directly to the vehicle that is the subject of this action; (2) Defendant’s policies and procedures relating to Song-Beverly claims; (3) Defendant’s policies and procedures relating to warranty claims; and (4) materials relating to similar issues in vehicles of the same year, make and model as the subject vehicle.

1. Materials Relating to the Subject Vehicle (Requests Nos. 1-14)

Requests Nos. 1 through 14 seek (1) documents relating to the subject vehicle within Defendant’s Customer Relations Center; (2) documents relating to Defendant’s Answer to the Complaint; (3-4) documents relating to inspections or repair orders pertaining to the subject vehicle; (5-6) documents relating to the lease or purchase of the vehicle; (7) documents relating to diagnostic trouble codes stored by Defendant or its repair facility as a result of any inspections or repairs conducted on the subject vehicle; (8) documents issued for subject vehicle, including recalls, TSBs, and dealer advisories; (9) documents relating to communications between Defendant and its repair facility relating to the vehicle; (10-11) documents relating to summaries of warranty repairs and amounts paid for those repairs on the vehicle; (12) photos or video of the vehicle; (13) documents relating to communications between Defendant and Plaintiff; and (14) documents relating to any communications with third parties regarding the vehicle. (See Enav Decl. Exh. 3 Nos. 1-14.)

These materials are facially relevant to this action, as they pertain to the vehicle itself, as in Requests Nos. 1, 3-6, 8 through 12, and 14; to the pleadings themselves, as in Request No. 2, or to communications between the parties, as in Request No. 13. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for these requests.

2. Policies and Procedures Relating to Song-Beverly Claims (Requests Nos. 15-22)

Requests Nos. 15 through 22 seek: (15) documents relating to Defendant’s rules, policies, or procedures since 2020 regarding refunds or replacements under the Song-Beverly Act; (16-17) documents relating to call center policies for escalating customer complaints and creating Service Activities; (18) documents relating to policies and procedures for determining whether vehicles should be repurchased or replaced; (19-20) documents relating to flow charts for escalating complaints or evaluating whether vehicles qualify for repurchase or replacement; (21) documents relating to training materials for calculation of repurchases, and (22) documents relating to policies or procedures to advise customers to deliver vehicles for further diagnosis or repair, rather than offering repurchase or replacement. (Enav Decl. Exh. 3 Nos. 15-22.) Materials concerning corporate policies and practices relating to reacquisition of vehicles are admissible. (E.g., Johnson v. Ford Motor Co. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1191, 1198-99; Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1104-1105.) Admissible evidence is discoverable. (Glenfed Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117-18.) Plaintiff has therefore demonstrated good cause for these requests.

3. Policies and Procedures Relating to Warranty Claims (Requests Nos. 23-29)

Requests Nos. 23 through 29 seek documents relating to Defendant’s policies and procedures regarding coverage requirements and limitations under warranty, including coverage of repairs (Enav Decl. Exh. 3 Nos. 23-26; 28), length of test drives required for coverage (No. 27) and procedures where customer concerns are not duplicated at the time of the repair visit (No. 29.) These materials are relevant to whether Defendant’s internal policies erected obstacles to obtaining redress under the Song-Beverly Act, which goes to whether Defendant acted in good faith. (Oregel, supra, 90 Cal. App.4th 1094, 1104-1105.) Plaintiff has therefore demonstrated good cause for these requests.

4. Similar Issues in Similar Vehicles

Request No. 30 seeks documents relating to other customer complaints, including reported system, malfunction, trouble code, TSB, indicators, or other failure, matching those described in any warranty summary or repair order for the subject vehicle in other 2022 Honda HR-V vehicles. (Enav Decl. Exh. 3 No. 30.) Request No. 31 seeks any documents relating to any “Field Service Action” that has been or is being issued in response to complaints experienced by Plaintiff. (No. 31.)

Evidence of similar defects in other vehicles are both relevant and admissible. (Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 153.) Admissible evidence is discoverable. (Glenfed Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117-18.) Documents regarding warranty complaints, service histories, and employee records concerning a defect in all affected vehicles, as well as documents regarding the manufacturer’s responses and instructions to cure that defect are discoverable. (See Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 971 [holding that the trial court’s approval of a discovery referee’s report and recommendation of sanctions for failure to produce documents of this nature relating to the subject defect in all affected vehicles was not an abuse of discretion].)

Defendant asserts that Request No. 30 is overbroad because, by its terms, the request inquires into alleged conditions which were presented to Defendant for repair at least once. Under the Song-Beverly Act, a plaintiff must have provided the manufacturer with more than one opportunity to repair the vehicle. (Silvio v. Ford Motor Co. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1207.) Thus, Defendant argues, documents relating to issues for which the vehicle was only presented one time are not relevant, because those defects could not support a Song-Beverly claim as a matter of law. Defendant’s argument is self-defeating, as discoverable information is any information “relevant to the subject matter,” in that it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Super Ct. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.) Materials which relate to the potential universe of claims necessarily are of use in evaluating a party’s case. The Court is therefore not persuaded that this request is overbroad.

Defendant also contends that Donlen and Doppes are both distinguishable from the present case: Donlen because the issue was whether the plaintiff’s expert testimony regarding defects in and special service bulletins relating to other vehicles was inadmissible, rather than production of documents relating to these issues (Donlen, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at 138), and Doppes because that case was also an action for fraud, and the manufacturer did not challenge the discovery referee’s findings. (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at 973-74, 993.) Defendant is correct that these cases are factually distinguishable, but the Court disagrees with Defendant that these cases do not support the position that the documents sought are relevant and admissible. In Doppes, the Court of Appeal expressly held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the discovery referee’s report and recommendation. (Doppes, supra, at 971.) Further, expert testimony as in Donlen regarding documentary evidence must necessarily have a foundation in that evidence to be admissible. (Cooper v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 555, 577.) Documentary evidence on which an expert is testifying must therefore be discoverable. (Glenfed, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at 1117-18.)

As Plaintiff seeks materials which are discoverable pursuant to Donlen and Doppes, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for these requests.

Defendant’s Responses

In response to each request, Defendant asserted the same series of objections that the requests are vague, ambiguous, overbroad, fail to describe with reasonably particularity the documents begin sought, invade attorney-client privilege or seek protected work product, seek confidential, sensitive, or proprietary information, or ask Defendant to respond on behalf of any other entity. (See, e.g., Enav Decl. Exh. 4. No. 1.) With respect to Requests Nos. 1 through 6, 9 through 14, and 16, Defendant agreed to produce any documents in its possession, custody, or control “to which no objection was being made.” (E.g. Enav Decl. Exh. 4. No. 1.) With respect to Requests Nos. 7, 8, 12, 15, 17 through 22, 27, 29, and 31, Defendant stated that subject to the objections, it was unable to comply with each request because no responsive documents were in its possession, custody, or control. (E.g. Enav Decl. Exh. 4. No. 7.) With respect to Requests Nos. 23 through 26, Defendant stated, again subject to objections, that Defendant had no responsive documents, but also agreed to produce confidential materials which it contends were not responsive subject to a protective order. (E.g. No. 23.) With respect to Request No. 30, however, Defendant made no production.

At the outset, Defendant fails to address any of its objections beyond its general contention that the requests are vague, ambiguous, and not reasonably particularized and its specific contention that Request No. 30 is not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence because it does not seek relevant information. The Court therefore finds that Defendant has not justified its unaddressed objections.

With respect to Defendant’s assertion that the requests are vague, ambiguous, and not reasonably particularized, the Court is unpersuaded. Contrary to Defendant’s contention, the requests are not so broadly phrased that Defendant could not be expected to understand what materials are being sought. That the Court was able to determine the relevance of these materials supports this conclusion. Further, as to Defendant’s relevance objection, that contention is without merit for the reasons stated above.

Finally, Defendant claims that its responses are code-compliant because Defendant identified and produced responsive documents or stated when no documents were available. That contention is specious. Defendant responded subject to its objections, and only identified and produced documents to which no objection was made. As Defendant’s objections are without merit, Defendant’s production is necessarily incomplete.

The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff is entitled to an order compelling further responses to all the requests at issue.

Sanctions

Plaintiff also requests sanctions against Defendant and its counsel, jointly and severally, in the amount of $4,029.75.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 authorizes the Court to impose monetary sanctions on any attorney engaging in the misuse of the discovery process by requiring that attorney to pay the reasonable expenses incurred by anyone because of that conduct. Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310(h) requires the Court to impose sanctions against any party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.

Here, Plaintiff requests sanctions of $4,029.75, accounting for 7.05 hours of attorney time actually incurred at $395 per hour, plus 3 hours of anticipated in preparing a reply and attending the hearing on this matter, plus $60 in filing fees. (Enav Decl. ¶¶ 24-25.) The Court declines to award attorney’s fees based on anticipated hours not actually incurred. Moreover, Plaintiff is seeking to recover 1.75 hours for reviewing the responses and preparing meet-and-confer correspondence. (Enav Decl. ¶ 24.) Time reviewing the responses was required whether the responses were sufficient or not, and therefore was not incurred “as a result” of any misuse of discovery by Defendant. Similarly, time spent preparing meet-and-confer correspondence was not incurred “as a result” of Defendant’s conduct because that time would have been incurred even if the parties informally resolved any disagreement. The Court therefore awards reduced attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,153.50, representing 5.3 hours of attorney time incurred in preparing this motion at $395 per hour, plus $60 in filing fees, against Defendant and its counsel, jointly and severally.

CONCLUSION:

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production is GRANTED.

Defendant is ordered to provide verified, code-compliant supplemental responses without objections within 30 days of this order.

Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 13, 2025 ___________________________________

Theresa M. Traber

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.