Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 24STCV25443, Date: 2025-01-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV25443    Hearing Date: January 6, 2025    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE:     January 6, 2025                     TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

CASE:                         Abraham Vargas Manzano, et al. v. Architectural Surfaces Group, LLC, et al.

CASE NO.:                 24STCV25443           

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF COMPLAINT

MOVING PARTY:               Defendant Caesarstone USA, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Abraham Vargas Manzano and Maria Estela Vazquez

CASE HISTORY:

·         10/01/24: Complaint filed.

·         11/04/24: Cross-Complaint filed by Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC.

·         11/05/24: Cross-Complaint filed by Ikea US Retail, LLC.

·         11/07/24: Cross-Complaint filed by Rio Stones, Inc.

·         11/07/24: Cross-Complaint filed by Jacobe Enterprises, Inc.

·         11/08/24: Cross-Complaint filed by C&C North America, Inc.

·         11/12/24: Cross-Complaint filed by Costco Wholesale Corporation.

·         11/12/24: Cross-Complaint filed by Arizona Tile, LLC.

·         11/18/24: Cross-Complaint filed by Ngy Group (Los Angeles) Inc.

·         12/12/24: Cross-Complaint filed by Home Depot USA Inc.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

            This is a toxic tort action alleging that Plaintiff Manzano developed silicosis and consequential injuries by breathing in dust from Defendants’ stone products generated by his work as a fabricator and polisher of stone countertops.

Defendant Caesarstone USA, Inc. moves to strike portions of the Complaint pertaining to punitive damages.

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TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.

DISCUSSION:

Defendant Caesarstone USA, Inc. moves to strike portions of the Complaint pertaining to punitive damages.

Legal Standard

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a). The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. Id., § 436(b). The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. Id.§ 436. The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. Id.§ 437. “When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.” Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768. A motion to strike can be used where the complaint or other pleading has not been drawn or filed in conformity with applicable rules or court orders.  Code Civ. Proc., § 436(b). This provision is for "the striking of a pleading due to improprieties in its form or in the procedures pursuant to which it was filed."  Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528 (emphasis in original).

Meet and Confer

 Before filing a motion to strike, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who has filed the pleading subject to the motion to strike and file a declaration detailing their meet-and-confer efforts.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a).) However, an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to grant or deny a motion to strike.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a)(4).)

The Declaration of Attorney Christine Brice states that the parties met and conferred telephonically on October 14, 2024, but were unable to reach a resolution of this dispute. (Declaration of Christine Brice ISO Mot. ¶ 3.) Defendant has thus satisfied its statutory meet-and-confer obligation.

Punitive Damages

Defendant moves to strike paragraphs 1288, 1306, 1328, and prayer for relief number 4, all of which pertain to punitive damages, as improper on the basis that the Complaint does not allege an adequate basis for punitive damages.

Civil Code section 3294 subdivision (a) provides:

In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”

(Civ. Code § 3294(a).) Subdivision (b) defines liability for an employer for the malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive conduct of its employees:

An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.

(Civ. Code § 3294(b).) Defendant contends that, although the fourth cause of action in the Complaint asserts a claim for fraudulent concealment, the Complaint does not adequately allege a basis for punitive damages because it does not allege malice, oppression, or fraud in sufficient detail as to this Defendant, nor does it allege ratification.

“The elements of a cause of action for fraud based on concealment are: ‘(1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.’”

(Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1198.) Here, Plaintiffs allege that:

(1)   Defendant was aware of the toxic properties of its products (¶¶ 312, 314, 360, 369-77; 390)

(2)   Defendant concealed the toxic properties of its products (¶¶ 361-67), several of which were identified in the Complaint. (¶ 73 p. 29.)

(3)    Defendants had a duty to disclose the toxic properties of their products because of the Hazard Communication Standard, California common law, their “knowledge of material facts, to wit the toxic properties of their products, which were not accessible to Plaintiff,” because they “made representations regarding their stone products, but failed to disclose additional facts which materially qualify the facts disclosed, and/or which rendered the disclosures made likely to mislead Plaintiff,” and because they had a transactional relationship with Defendant, based on their sale of toxic products to Plaintiff’s employers, with whom Plaintiff was in privity (¶¶ 1336-38),

(4)   Defendant “concealed said toxic hazards from Plaintiff . . . so that Plaintiff . . . would use Defendants’ stone products” (¶ 1339),

(5)    Plaintiff “was unaware of the toxic and fibrogenic [hazards] of Defendants’ stone products and would not have acted as he did had he known of said hazards (¶ 1347), and

(6)   As a result of Defendant’s concealment of the toxic hazards of its stone products, Plaintiff was exposed to Defendant’s toxic hazards and has suffered “serious injuries and disease” as a result, including “silicosis, and other conditions.” (¶ 1349), and

(7)   The concealment of these hazards was ratified by Defendant’s corporate officers and managers. (¶¶ 1359-60.)

These allegations are sufficient to allege a fraudulent concealment claim against Defendant. (Jones, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at 1195 [plaintiff’s complaint is not “unacceptably speculative if a plaintiff has not specifically identified which toxin contained in a particular product caused the alleged injury or has sued the manufacturers of multiple products, alleging all of them contained toxins that were substantial factors in causing his injury.”) Moreover, as the California Supreme Court noted in Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co., Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, the remedy for an improperly speculative pleading is provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7(b), which permits the imposition of sanctions on an attorney who is found to have deliberately filed a products liability suit without a well-founded belief in the truth of a particular allegation. (Bockrath, supra, 21 Cal. 4th at p. 82; see also Jones, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at 1196.) Thus, as Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a claim for fraud, they are entitled to seek punitive damages. The Court therefore declines to strike these allegations.

CONCLUSION:

            Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.

            Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:  January 6, 2025                                  ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.