Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 24STCV28482, Date: 2025-06-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV28482    Hearing Date: June 3, 2025    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE:     June 3, 2025               TRIAL DATE: April 7, 2026

CASE:                         Humberto Ramos v. General Motors LLC, et al.

CASE NO.:                 24STCV28482           

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

MOVING PARTY:               Plaintiff Humberto Ramos (“Plaintiff”).

RESPONDING PARTY:     Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”).

CASE HISTORY:

·         10/30/24: Complaint filed.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

            This is lemon law action pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.

Plaintiff moves to compel responses to Requests for Production (“RFPs”) propounded to Defendant.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses is GRANTED IN PART with respect to RFPs Nos. 6, 21, 28-29, 37-44, 48-51, and 53-54.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses is DENIED, conditional on narrowing the requests as described herein, with respect to RFPs Nos. 7, 9, 12-18, 20, 22-23, 29, 31, 55-58, and 68.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses is DENIED as to RFPs Nos. 45-47.

DISCUSSION:

Plaintiff moves to compel responses to RFPs propounded to Defendant.

Legal Standard

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (a), a court may order a party to serve a further response to a demand for inspection when the court finds that: “(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete[;] (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive[; or] (3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.”

Timeliness

A motion to compel further responses to RFPs must be served “within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(c).) The 45-day requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional. (Sexton v. Superior Court¿(1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)

Plaintiff’s counsel attests Defendant served its responses to Plaintiff’s RFPs on March 7, 2025, and served its verification on March 14, 2025. (Grigoryan Decl., ¶ 15.) The instant motion was filed and served on April 28, 2025. Thus, the motion is timely.

Meet and Confer

A party making a motion to compel further responses must also include a declaration stating facts showing a “reasonable and good faith attempt” to resolve informally the issues presented by the motion before filing the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2031.310(b)(2).)

Plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter to Defendant’s counsel on April 8, 2025 to meet and confer regarding Defendant’s discovery responses, outlining the deficiencies and requesting a prompt response. (Grigoryan Decl., ¶¶ 17-18, Exh. 4; Roybal Decl., ¶ 4.) Defendant’s counsel responded to Plaintiff’s counsel’s letter on April 14, 2025, maintaining Defendant’s objections to the RFPs and refusing to provide supplemental responses or responsive documents. (Grigoryan Decl., ¶ 19, Exh. 5; Roybal Decl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff’s counsel responded on April 18, 2025, requesting a telephonic meet-and-confer and, if necessary, an informal discovery conference with the Court prior to filing motions to compel. (Grigoryan Decl., ¶ 20, Exh. 6; Roybal Decl., ¶ 6.) Defendant’s counsel responded on April 25, 2025 restating Defendant’s objections, not responding to the request to meet and confer telephonically but agreeing to participate in an informal discovery conference. (Grigoryan Decl., ¶ 21, Exh. 7; Roybal Decl., ¶ 7.) Both parties’ counsels argued the other failed to meet and confer in good faith. (Grigoryan Decl., ¶¶ 19, 21; Roybal Decl., ¶¶ 6-8.)

It is unclear why the parties did not schedule an informal discovery conference, or why Defendant’s counsel did not respond to Plaintiff’s counsel’s request to meet and confer over the phone. After reviewing the letter correspondences, the Court finds the parties have not satisfied the meet and confer requirement. This finding is not dispositive and the Court, in its discretion, proceeds to the merits of the motion. However, repeated failures to meet and confer in good faith may result in a continuance of future hearings to allow the parties a reasonable chance to informally resolve the issues.

Privilege

“If an objection is based on a claim of privilege or a claim that the information sought is protected work product, the response shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 2031.240(c)(1).)

Plaintiff maintains Defendant failed to provide information regarding its claimed privilege in its objections to several of Plaintiff’s RFPs. (Plaintiff’s Sep. Stmt. p. 8:1-3.) The Court notes Defendant objected on grounds of privilege for RFPs Nos. 7, 12-18, 20-23, 28-29, 31, 37-51, 53-54, 56-58, 65, and 68, but has not provided sufficient information for Plaintiff to evaluate the merits of the claim, nor has Defendant provided a privilege log.

Good Cause

The burden is on the moving party to “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1).) These facts must also be set forth in a separate statement filed by the moving party. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c).) To establish good cause, a discovery proponent must identify a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and explain how the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.¿(Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216, 224 (disapproved on other grounds by Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531).)

            Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to 40 RFPs propounded to Defendant. These requests fall into four broad categories: (1) materials relating directly to the subject vehicle; (2) Defendant’s policies and procedures relating to Song-Beverly Act claims; (3) Defendant’s policies and procedures relating to warranty claims, customer complaints, and document retention; and (4) materials relating to similar issues in similar vehicles.

Plaintiff maintains the documents requested will support Plaintiff’s claim for damages, by tending to prove or leading to evidence that tends to prove Defendant was aware of the defects in the subject vehicle that were not reparable despite a reasonable number of attempts. (Plaintiff’s Sep. Stmt. pp. 4:25-27, 5:23-25.) Plaintiff maintains this requested discovery will help “determine whether Defendant performed its obligations under its written warranty” and pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act. (Plaintiff’s Sep. Stmt. p. 5:28.)

Plaintiff cites several cases in support of these requests, including: Jensen v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 136, which states that, when assessing willfulness of a violation, the jury can consider whether the manufacturer knew the “vehicle had not been repaired within a reasonable period or after a reasonable number of attempts”; Troensegaard v. Silvercrest Indus., Inc. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 218, 226, which notes that “defendant manufacturer’s possession of a report on the defective condition was sufficient to support civil penalty liability”; and Krotin v. Porsche Cars North America (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 294, 303, which states that dealers’ service records are sufficient to determine which vehicles are defective.

Plaintiff also maintains Defendant’s objections are boilerplate and meritless. Plaintiff maintains these requests do not seek public or third-party documents, only those that are in Defendant’s possession. (Plaintiff’s Sep. Stmt. p. 6:26-27.) Plaintiff also maintains that any doubts based on irrelevancy and immateriality should be resolved in favor of allowing discovery since the scope of discovery under state law is broad. (Plaintiff’s Sep. Stmt. p. 7:7-21.) Plaintiff restates the above arguments in his reply. (Reply, pp. 5-10.)

1.      Documents Relating to Subject Vehicle (RFP No. 28)

RFP No. 28 seeks all documents concerning “any warranty extension that has been issued for concerns which Plaintiff presented the subject vehicle to [Defendant] for diagnosis and/or repair.” (Plaintiff’s Sep. Stmt. p. 19:6-8.)

Considering these documents pertain to the subject vehicle, this request is facially relevant to this action and will tend to prove or lead to evidence tending to prove Plaintiff’s claim. Thus, Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for this request.

2.      Policies and Procedures Relating to Song-Beverly Claims (RFPs Nos. 7, 37-51, 53-54, 68)

RFP Nos. 7, 37-44, 48-51, 53-54, and 68 seek the following: (7) all lemon law documents Defendant has published and provided to employees, agents, and representatives; (37) all documents Defendant has used since 2018 to “evaluate consumers’ requests for repurchases” pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act; (38) all documents since 2018 concerning Defendant’s “rules, policies, or procedures concerning issuing a repurchase or replacement to consumers pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act”; (39) all documents since 2018 concerning Defendant’s policies and procedures used to handle consumer complaints about Defendant’s manufactured or distributed vehicles; (40) all documents since 2018 concerning “scripts, job prompts, outlines, or any other tool used by ... customer service agents in response to consumer requests for repurchase or replacement of similar vehicles pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act”; (41) all documents since 2108 that Defendant has issued or has been issued on Defendant’s behalf, concerning policies and procedures for “evaluating a customer request for a repurchase or replacement of a new motor vehicle … pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act”; (42) all documents since 2018 that Defendant has issued or has been issued on Defendant’s behalf, concerning policies and procedures for after a decision to repurchase or replace similar vehicles pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act; (43) all documents since 2018 concerns similar vehicles repurchased or replaced pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act; (44) all Vehicle Warranty History Reports for the similar vehicles identified in RFP No. 43; (48) all documents since 2018 that show Defendant’s “goals to reduce the number of vehicle repurchases or replacements pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act”; (49) all documents since 2018 that show Defendant’s “goals to reduce the costs associated with vehicle repurchases or replacements pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act, including all warranty trend reports”; (50) all documents since 2018 concerning Defendant’s policies to achieve warranty buyback reduction goals; (51) all documents since 2018 “concerning periodic reports received [regarding] the number of vehicle repurchases or replacements pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act authorized by [Defendant’s] agents … and employees”; (53) all documents since 2018 “provided to any qualified third-party dispute resolution program in which [Defendant] participate[s] in, regarding, reflecting, or concerning … [Song-Beverly Act] policies and/or procedures”; (54) training manuals or other documents related to training provided since 2018 concerning “handling consumer repurchase requests pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act”; and (68) all policy and procedure documents Defendant made available to anyone “charged with determining whether a vehicle qualifies for repurchase” under the Song-Beverly Act. (Plaintiff’s Sep. Stmt. pp. 8, 21-33, 38.)

Materials concerning Defendant manufacturer’s policies and practices relating to vehicle repairs and reacquisition of vehicles pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act are admissible. (See Johnson v. Ford Motor Co. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1191, 1198-1199 [referencing Ford’s reacquisition policy]; see also Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1105 (Oregel) [referencing Isuzu’s repair policy].) Admissible evidence is discoverable. (Glenfed Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117-18 (Glenfed).) However, RFP Nos. 7 and 68 are overbroad due to lack of a reasonable timeframe and must be narrowed, using the same temporal limitation from 2018 to the present.  Paintiff has otherwise demonstrated good cause for the remaining requests.

RFP Nos. 45 through 47 seek information specific to customer service call centers and prelitigation departments as follows: (45) and (46) all documents since 2018 of organizational charts of employees and agents in “third-party customer service call center or prelitigation department” used to ensure compliance with the Song-Beverly Act and (47) all written agreements since 2018 “concerning the management, oversight, coordination, and handling of … third-party customer service call centers.” (Plaintiff’s Sep. Stmt. pp. 27-29.) Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause to explain how the organizational charts and written agreements will tend in reason to prove or disprove civil penalties or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove civil penalties. Rather, Plaintiff merely restates the same arguments for the prior RFPs.

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3.      Policies and Procedures Relating to Warranty Claims, Customer Complaints, and Document Retention (RFPs Nos. 6, 21, 29, 65)

            RFPs Nos. 6, 21, 29, and 65 seek documents related to internal policies and procedures as follows: (6) the Warranty Policy and Procedure Manual published by Defendant and provided to Defendant’s authorized repair facilities in California, including all subsequent editions from 2018 to the present; (21) all documents “concerning customer complaints, claims, reported failures, and warranty claims related to the defects, including but not limited to any databases … with information from dealers, service departments, parts departments, or warranty departments”; (29) all documents that outline Defendant’s document retention policy from 2018 to the present; (65) all documents outlining Defendant’s policies and procedures that repair facilities should follow if a consumer complains about defects in a vehicle. (Plaintiff’s Sep. Stmt. pp. 4, 16, 19-20, 37.)

These materials are relevant to whether Defendant had internal policies and procedures that interfered with consumers’ ability to seek remedies pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act, which goes to whether Defendant engaged in willful violation of the Song-Beverly Act. (Oregel, supra, 90 Cal. App.4th at 1104-1105.) Plaintiff has therefore demonstrated good cause for these requests.

4.      Similar Issues in Similar Vehicles (RFPs Nos. 9, 12-18, 20, 22-23, 31, 55-58)

             RFP Nos. 9, 12-18, 20, 22-23, 31, and 55-58 seek documents related to similar issues in similar vehicles, defined as “same make, model, and year” as follows: (9) the Workshop Manual or a comparable document that specifies diagnosis and repair procedures for similar vehicles; (12) all documents concerning “field technical reports from [Defendant’s] agents, representations, or employees” about “common parts failures in similar vehicles”; (13) all documents concerning “field technical reports from [Defendant’s] agents, representations, or employees” about “in-warranty component part replacement trends in similar vehicles”; (14) all documents concerning “field technical reports from [Defendant’s] agents, representations, or employees” about “suggested repair procedures for concerns presented by owners/lessors of similar vehicles”; (15) all documents concerning “field technical reports from [Defendant’s] agents, representations, or employees” about “repeat repair presentations in similar vehicles”; (16) all documents “concerning any internal analysis or investigation” by Defendant or on Defendant’s behalf  “regarding defects in similar vehicles”; (17) all documents “concerning any non-confidential, non-privileged communications” Defendant has had with anyone “regarding defects in similar vehicles”; (18) all documents “concerning any communications [Defendant has] had regarding customer concerns surrounding the defects in similar vehicles”; (20) all documents concerning decisions “to modify the engine and electrical systems defects, and/or any of its component parts, in response to the defects in similar vehicles”; (22) all documents “concerning failure rates of component parts and/or systems in similar vehicles surrounding the defects”; (23) all documents concerning any fixes for the defects in similar vehicles”; (31) all documents “created by technical advisors which [Defendant has] used or received with respect to defects in similar vehicles”; (55) all Early Warning Reports Defendant sent to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration regarding similar vehicles; (56) all Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation reports Defendant submitted regarding similar vehicles; (57) all documents of electronic mail relating to defects in similar vehicles; and (58) all documents concerning “any customer relation data base records from … agents, representatives, or employees” that give Defendant “information relating to repairs performed on all similar vehicles for the defects.” (Plaintiff’s Sep. Stmt., ¶ 6, pp. 9-18, 20, 34-37.)

Evidence of similar defects in other vehicles are both relevant and admissible. (See Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 154 (Donlen) [noting similar problems with the same transmission model in similar vehicles].) Admissible evidence is discoverable. (Glenfed, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at 1117-18.) Documents concerning the same defect in all affected vehicles and documents regarding the manufacturer’s responses and instructions to cure that defect are discoverable. (See Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 971, 973, 978 (Doppes) [noting that documents produced showed Bentley was aware of odor issues in all four-door cars for model year 2001 and had instructions on how to fix the odor issue].) Defendant contends that Donlen does not address discovery at all and Doppes does not address the scope of discovery. (Defendant’s Sep. Stmt. p. 12:4-10.)

The Court finds these cases are persuasive in allowing for discovery of the requested documents, albeit to a limited degree. Donlen allowed discovery based on expert testimony of documents that showed similar problems with the same defective part in similar vehicles. (Donlen, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at 154.) Thus, RFPs Nos. 9, 13-18, 20, 22-23, 31, and 55-58 must be narrowed to the same alleged defective parts or systems in the subject vehicle and similar vehicles. Additionally, Doppes allowed discovery of documents indicating the same defects in similar vehicles. (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at 971, 973, 978.) Thus, RFPs Nos. 9, 13-18, 20, 22-23, 31, and 55-58 must also be narrowed accordingly. Additionally, all the requests related to similar vehicles are overbroad with respect to timeframe and must be limited accordingly.

Defendant’s Responses

            Defendant objects on nearly the same grounds for each of the requests, arguing that they are “overbroad, unduly burdensome, oppressive, and seek[] documents that are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Defendant’s Sep. Stmt. p. 2:9-11.) Defendant argues several terms are vague and ambiguous within RFP Nos. 7, 12-18, 20-23, 28, 31, 38-43, 45-51, 53-58, 65, and 68. As to RFPs Nos. 9, 12-18, 20, 22-23, 31, and 55-58, regarding similar vehicles, Defendant argues irrelevancy. (Defendant’s Sep. Stmt. p. 2:24-26.) Defendant argues it would be prejudicial and burdensome to produce nearly all the requested documents. Defendant also argues the requests violate Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216 (Calcor) explaining “whether Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is entirely unrelated and incommensurate to the scope and breadth of” these requests. (Defendant’s Sep. Stmt. p. 2:14-15.) Plaintiff does not address this case in reply. The appeals court in Calcor held that discovery must be used “to facilitate litigation rather than … wage litigation.” (Calcor, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at 219.) Despite Defendant’s implication that Plaintiff has improperly used discovery here, the Court finds Plaintiff is indeed using the instant motion to facilitate litigation by seeking relevant documents.

Sanctions

            Plaintiff mentions that use of boilerplate objections are sanctionable but does not request sanctions against Defendant. (Motion, p. 7:1; Reply, p. 9:13, 22.)

CONCLUSION:

            Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses is GRANTED IN PART with respect to RFPs Nos. 6, 21, 28-29, 37-44, 48-51, and 53-54. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses is DENIED, conditional on narrowing the requests as described herein, with respect to RFPs Nos. 7, 9, 12-18, 20, 22-23, 29, 31, 55-58, and 68. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses is DENIED as to RFPs Nos. 45-47.

            Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 3, 2025                                        ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.