Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 24STCV31041, Date: 2025-03-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV31041    Hearing Date: March 20, 2025    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

 

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

 

 

HEARING DATE:     March 20, 2025                      TRIAL DATE: NOT SET

                                                          

CASE:                         Dartz Autos Inc., et al. v. Atlantic Casualty Ins. Co.

 

CASE NO.:                 24STCV31041           

 

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF COMPLAINT

 

MOVING PARTY:               Defendant Atlantic Casualty Ins. Co.

 

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Dartz Autos, Inc. & Temitope Lawal.

 

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

           

            This is a bad faith insurance action that was filed on November 22, 2024. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant refused to cover the theft of several vehicles from Plaintiffs’ premises.

 

Defendant moves to strike allegations in the Complaint pertaining to punitive damages.

           

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Defendant’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.

 

DISCUSSION:

 

Defendant moves to strike allegations in the Complaint pertaining to punitive damages.

 

Legal Standard

 

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a). The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. Id., § 436(b). The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. Id.§ 436. The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. Id.§ 437. “When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.” Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768. A motion to strike can be used where the complaint or other pleading has not been drawn or filed in conformity with applicable rules or court orders.  Code Civ. Proc., § 436(b). This provision is for "the striking of a pleading due to improprieties in its form or in the procedures pursuant to which it was filed."  Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528 (emphasis in original).

 

Meet and Confer

 

 Before filing a motion to strike, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who has filed the pleading subject to the motion to strike and file a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a).) However, an insufficient meet-and-confer process is not grounds to grant or deny a motion to strike.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a)(4).)

 

The Declaration of Defendant’s counsel states that the parties met and conferred by telephone “at least five days” before the date the responsive pleading was due but were not able to resolve this dispute. (Declaration of Moving Party Regarding Meet and Confer ¶ 2.)  Defendant has therefore complied with its statutory meet-and-confer obligations.

 

 

Punitive Damages

 

            Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not properly set forth facts supporting a claim for punitive damages.

Generally, punitive damages may be awarded only when the trier of fact finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant acted with malice, fraud, or oppression. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) As nonintentional torts support punitive damages when the defendant's conduct “involves conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others,” our focus is on malice and oppression. (Gawara v. United States Brass Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1361 [74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663].) As defined in the punitive damages statute, “[m]alice” encompasses “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others,” and “[o]ppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1), (2).) The term “‘despicable,’” though not defined in the statute, is applicable to “circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725 [34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 898, 882 P.2d 894], quoting 4 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 529.)

 

Under the statute, “malice does not require actual intent to harm. [Citation.] Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences. [Citation.] Malice may be proved either expressly through direct evidence or by implication through indirect evidence from which the jury draws inferences. [Citation.]” (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228 [44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197].)

 

(Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc., (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299 (bold emphasis added).)

 

Civil Code § 3294(a) provides:

 

In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”

 

Civil Code § 3294(c) defines malice, oppression and fraud:

 

(1) ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

 

(2) ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.

 

(3) ‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

 

(Bold emphasis added.)

 

To withstand a motion to strike punitive damages allegations, the complaint must set forth facts supporting a claim for punitive damages:

 

The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. (Citation omitted.) Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.

 

(Grieves v. Superior Court (Fox) (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 (emphasis added).)

 

            Defendant asserts that the Complaint does not adequately set forth facts showing malice, oppression, or fraud based solely on paragraph 12, which alleges Defendant’s failure to act on Plaintiffs’ insurance contract, and paragraph 43, which alleges an intentional and malicious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Complaint ¶¶ 12, 43.) In so arguing, Defendant entirely fails to reckon with the third cause of action, which purports to assert intentional misrepresentation, i.e., fraud, with respect to a key representation in the policy, alleging that Defendant never intended to pay  the policy limit amount in settlement of a claim under the policy but falsely represented to Plaintiff that it would . (Complaint ¶¶ 26-32.) Defendant’s motion therefore does not demonstrate that the allegation are insufficient to support a prayer for punitive damages.

CONCLUSION:

 

            Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Strike is DENIED.

 

            Moving Parties to give notice.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated:  March 20, 2025                                  ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

 


            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.