Judge Theresa M. Traber, Case Number: 24STCV33506, Date: 2025-02-20 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 24STCV33506, Date: 2025-02-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV33506 Hearing Date: February 20, 2025 Dept: 47

24STCV33506Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE: February 20, 2025 TRIAL DATE: Not set

CASE: Rex Alexander, et al. v. Travers Thorp Alberga Attorneys at Law

CASE NO.: 24STCV33506

MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OR DISMISS THE ACTION ON THE GROUNDS OF INCONVENIENT FORUM

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Travers Thorp Alberga Attorneys at Law (Defendant)

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiffs Rex Alexander, Mark Alfano, Cecil Kyte, Rand Barton, Jeff Katofsky, Misty Hammer, Samuel 1, Ltd., and Raisha Park (collectively, Plaintiffs)

CASE HISTORY:

12/18/24: Complaint filed.
12/24/24: Plaintiffs served Defendant via personal service on December 20, 2025.
01/21/25: Defendant filed this instant motion.
02/06/25: Plaintiffs filed their opposition to this instant motion.
02/11/25: Defendant filed its reply.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiffs allege they are residents of different states and countries. Rex Alexander alleges he is a resident of Texas. Mark Alfano, Jeff Katofsky, and Raisha Park allege they are residents of California. Cecil Lyte alleges he is a resident of Arizona and Nevada. Rand Barton alleges he is a resident of Idaho. Misty Hammer alleges she is a resident of Utah and Arizona. Alexander Menzel alleges he is a resident of Brazil in South America. Samuel 1, LTC is a Cayman Islands entity. Defendant is an international law firm based in the Cayman Islands. The Complaint alleges two causes of action: (1) professional negligence, and (2) breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs claim as follows.

On April 2023, the Armand Hammer Foundation, Inc. (AHF) brought an action (Action) against Hammer International Foundation (HIF) in the Cayman Islands. HIF hired Defendant to represent them. Plaintiffs were “members, officers, and directors of HIF.” Around May or June 2023, Defendant named Plaintiffs as defendants to the Action without their knowledge or permission. Defendant made HIF the nominal party and Plaintiffs the primary and responsible parties without their permission or knowledge.

Plaintiffs claim that Defendant failed to properly update them about the Action. Defendant did not inform Plaintiffs that primary parties in the Cayman Islands are responsible for attorney fees, costs, and indemnification penalties if they are unsuccessful. Defendant never communicated with Raisha Park, Alexander Menzel, Cecil Kyte, or Rand Barton. Defendant took a month to provide a breakdown of a $150,000 bill after Plaintiffs made three requests.

When Defendant finally provided the breakdown, the bill had increased. The breakdown included $450,000 for outstanding attorney fees, $350,000 for the next three weeks, and $35,000 for expert costs. Defendant told Plaintiffs they would withdraw if Plaintiffs did not pay $500,000 within the next three days. As a result, Plaintiffs had to seek out new counsel and a trial continuance after Plaintiffs paid $250,000 in adjournment fees.

Due to HIF’s legal fees exceeding its liquid assets, Plaintiffs placed HIF into Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in a US Bankruptcy Court in California. Plaintiffs state that the bankruptcy should have placed the case in a stay, but the “judge did not care” and became upset at Plaintiffs. The judge fined Plaintiffs $40,000 and defaulted the Plaintiffs.

Later, trial occurred without Plaintiffs’ involvement. The final ruling found Plaintiffs jointly and severally liable for indemnity and penalty costs and made the judgment retroactive for more than three years. Plaintiffs appealed, but they fear the judge may dismiss the appeal before it can be heard. Plaintiffs allege that the judge may do this to cover up “his egregious behavior … and then … hide his actions from the Appellate Court.” Plaintiffs allege that the judge was once a partner at the firm representing AHF.

Specially Appearing Defendant Travers Thorp Alberga Attorneys at Law moves to quash service of the summons for lack of personal jurisdiction, or alternatively, dismissing the action on the grounds of inconvenient forum.

In their opposition, Plaintiffs moves for a continuance to conduct discovery to determine the nature and extent of Defendant’s contacts in California.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Specially Appearing Defendant Travers Thorp Alberga Attorneys at Law’s Motion to Dismiss the Action on the Ground of Inconvenient Forum as to plaintiffs Jeff Katofsky, Rex Alexander, Mark Alfano, Rand Barton, Misty Hammer, and Raisha Park is GRANTED.

Specially Appearing Defendant Travers Thorp Alberga Attorneys at Law’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Continuance to Conduct Discovery to Determine the Nature and Extent of Defendant’s Contacts in the State of California is DENIED.

DISCUSSION:

Motion to Dismiss the Action on the Grounds of Inconvenient Forum

Timeliness

“A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her[; and] (2) To stay or dismiss the action on the ground of inconvenient forum.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subds. (a)(1)-(2).) A defendant has 30 days after the service of the summons, or 40 days if service was effectuated by substitute service, to file a responsive pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 412.20, subds. (a)(3), (b).)

Analysis

Here, Defendant filed the instant motion on January 21, 2025, after Plaintiffs served it via personal service on December 20, 2024. Thirty days after December 20, 2024 is January 19, 2025. As January 19, 2025 is a Sunday and January 20, 2024 was a court holiday, the last day Defendant could file this instant motion is January 21, 2025. Thus, the motion is timely.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 410.30, subdivision (a) provides: “When a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.30, subd. (a).)

“In determining whether to grant a motion based on forum non conveniens, a court must first determine whether the alternate forum is a ‘suitable’ place for trial. If it is, the next step is to consider the private interests of the litigants and the interests of the public in retaining the action for trial in California.” (Stangvik v. Shiley Incorporated (1991) 54 Cal.3d 744, 751.)

“An alternative forum is suitable if it has jurisdiction and the action in that forum will not be barred by the statute of limitations. It bears emphasis that ‘[i]t is sufficient that the action can be brought, although not necessarily won, in the suitable alternative forum.’ That the law is less favorable to the plaintiffs in the alternative forum, or that recovery would be more difficult if not impossible, is irrelevant to the determination whether the forum is suitable unless ‘the alternative forum provides no remedy at all.’” (Guimei v. General Electric Co. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 689, 696 [citations omitted].) “The ‘no remedy at all’ exception applies ‘only in “rare circumstances,” such as where the alternative forum is a foreign country whose courts are ruled by a dictatorship, so that there is no independent judiciary or due process of law.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 697.)

“The private interest factors are those that make trial and the enforceability of the ensuing judgment expeditious and relatively inexpensive, such as the ease of access to sources of proof, the cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses, and the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses. The public interest factors include avoidance of overburdening local courts with congested calendars, protecting the interests of potential jurors so that they are not called upon to decide cases in which the local community has little concern, and weighing the competing interests of California and the alternate jurisdiction in the litigation.” (Guimei v. General Electric Co., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at 701 [citations omitted].)

“On a motion for forum non conveniens, the defendant, as the moving party, bears the burden of proof. The granting or denial of such a motion is within the trial court’s discretion, and substantial deference is accorded its determination in this regard.” (Stangvik v. Shiley Incorporated, supra, 54 Cal.3d at 751.)

When there is a mandatory forum selection clause, however, the Court will generally not consider the traditional forum non conveniens factors. (Olinick v. BMG Entertainment (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1294.) A mandatory forum selection clause is one that “contains express language of exclusivity of jurisdiction, specifying a mandatory location for litigation.” (Ibid.)

A forum selection clause is valid and should be given effect unless enforcement of the clause would be unreasonable. (Intershop Communications v. Superior Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 191, 196.) For a forum selection clause to be enforceable, the forum must be suitable, meaning that there is jurisdiction over the matter, and the statute of limitations did not expire. (American Online v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1, 12, fn.5.) Forum selection clauses should not be enforced if the agreement was impacted by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power; enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust; or proceedings in the selected forum would be so difficult and inconvenient that a party would be deprived of a day in court. (Alan v. Superior Court (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 217, 230.)

“[A] range of transaction participants, parties and non-parties, should benefit from and be subject to forum selection clauses.” (Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc. (1988) 858 F.2d. 509, 514, fn. 5, citing Clinton v. Janger (1984) 583 F.Supp.284, 294.) “A forum selection clause may also be enforced against a plaintiff who is not a party to the contract in question if the plaintiff is ‘closely related to the contractual relationship.’ The plaintiff challenging the forum selection clause has the burden of showing, in response to a defendant's motion to stay or dismiss, that enforcement of the clause would be unreasonable under the circumstances.” (Net2Phone, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 583, 588, quoting Lu v. Dryclean-U.S.A. of California (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1493.)

Analysis

Defendant argues that the case must be dismissed because the dispute is subject to a mandatory forum selection clause specifying that litigation must occur in the Cayman Islands and shall be governed by Cayman Islands law. (Motion pp. 6, 17-19.)

It is undisputed that the Retainer Agreement contains the following provision:

“Governing Law & Jurisdiction - This letter shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the Cayman Islands. Any person or entity relying on this agreement submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of the Cayman Islands as the sole tribunal for the determination of any matters which relate to the legal advice provided and/or documentation produced by Travers Thorp Alberga.” (Alberga Decl., Ex. 1 at pp. 5, 11.)

Defendant declares the clause “contains express language of exclusivity, specifying a mandatory location for litigation,” making the provision a mandatory forum selection clause. (Motion p. 18.) The Court agrees, because the clause states that the Cayman Islands is the “exclusive jurisdiction” and “sole tribunal” for any matter relating to Defendant’s representation. (Motion p. 9.) Plaintiffs do not oppose this argument.

Plaintiffs have the burden of showing, in response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, that enforcement of the clause would be unreasonable under the circumstances. Plaintiffs do not argue that the forum selection clause does not apply to the Complaint they filed in California. Nor do they contend the statute of limitations has expired. Plaintiffs argue that enforcement would be unreasonable, because three Plaintiffs did not sign the Retainer Agreement with the forum selection clause. (Opp. pp. 4-6.) Plaintiffs claim that there was a lack of mutual consent between Defendant and the three non-signatories as evidenced by the lack of three signatures. (Opp. p. 6.) Plaintiffs also argue Defendant is attempting “to enforce the non-executed agreement against” the non-signatories through subjective intent. (Opp. p. 6.)

Here, plaintiffs Cecil Kyte (Kyte), Samuel 1, Ltd., and Alexander Menzel (Menzel) are the only three parties who did not sign the Retainer Agreement. (Alberga Decl., Ex. 1 at pp. 17, 18.) Plaintiffs do not contest that Jeff Katofsky, Rex Alexander, Mark Alfano, Rand Barton, Misty Hammer, and Raisha Park all signed the Retainer Agreement. Plaintiffs assert that the forum selection clause should not be enforced against any plaintiff due to the three missing signatures, but do not attempt to explain why the missing signatures should affect the signed parties. Therefore, the Court finds the forum selection clause applies to plaintiffs Jeff Katofsky, Rex Alexander, Mark Alfano, Rand Barton, Misty Hammer, and Raisha Park.

Regarding the non-signatories, the Court may only enforce the Retainer Agreement and forum selection clause against Kyte, Samuel 1, Ltd., and Menzel if they are closely related to the contractual relationship. All three state that they never had contact with Defendant, never gave it authority to represent them, never signed any agreements with Defendant, never gave Defendant authority to accept service of process, and never received a bill from Defendant. (Kyte Decl. ¶ 4; Alfano Decl. ¶ 4; Menzel Decl. ¶ 4.) All claim that they did not give Jeff Katofsky the authority “to tell [Defendant] to represent or enter an appearance in any lawsuit on their behalf.” (Kyte Decl. ¶ 5; Alfano Decl. ¶ 5; Menzel Decl. ¶ 5.) Kyte and Menzel claim that they were unaware of the lawsuit. (Kyte Decl. ¶ 6; Menzel Decl. ¶ 6.) Mark Alfano, an officer of Samuel 1, Ltd., claims that Samuel 1, Ltd. “never participated in in the lawsuit or communicated with” Defendant. (Alfano Decl. ¶ 5.) Defendant does not contest these statements but argues the remaining Plaintiffs’ Complaint should be dismissed on another grounds. (Reply pp. 5-10.) The declarations and lack of opposition to these declarations support the assertion that Kyte, Samuel 1, Ltd., and Menzel are not closely related to the contractual relationship. For this reason, the Court does not find that the forum selection clause applies to Kyte, Samuel 1, Ltd., and Menzel.

The Court hereby orders that Plaintiffs’ action as to plaintiffs Jeff Katofsky, Rex Alexander, Mark Alfano, Rand Barton, Misty Hammer, and Raisha Park is DISMISSED on the grounds of inconvenient forum.

Motion to Quash Service of Summons for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

Timeliness

As discussed, the motion is timely, because Defendant filed this instant motion on January 21, 2025, which was the deadline for doing so.

Legal Standard

A defendant may serve and file a notice of motion to quash service of summons on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction of the court over them. (Code Civ. Proc. §418.10(a).) Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10 provides the exclusive procedure for challenging personal jurisdiction at the outset. (Roy v. Sup.Ct. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 337, 342.) The court may dismiss without prejudice the complaint in whole, or as to that defendant, when dismissal is made pursuant to Section 418.10. (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (h).)

“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) “The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’” (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 471-472.) A state court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a party under circumstances that would offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” (Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of California, Solano County (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 113.)

When a defendant moves to quash service of the summons and complaint, the plaintiff has “the burden of proving the facts that did give the court jurisdiction, that is the facts requisite to an effective service.” (Coulston v. Cooper (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 866, 868.) The plaintiff must establish the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. (Aquila, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 568.) “When a nonresident defendant challenges personal jurisdiction the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that all necessary jurisdictional criteria are met. [Citation.] This burden must be met by competent evidence in affidavits and authenticated documentary evidence. An unverified complaint may not be considered as an affidavit supplying necessary facts.” (Jewish Defense Organization, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1054-55.)

“Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific.” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 445.) “A defendant that has substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts with the forum state is subject to general jurisdiction in the state, meaning jurisdiction on any cause of action.” (HealthMarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1167.) “General jurisdiction, as its name implies, extends to any and all claims brought against a defendant. Those claims need not relate to the forum State or the defendant’s activity there; they may concern events and conduct anywhere in the world. But that breadth imposes a correlative limit: Only a select set of affiliations with a forum will expose a defendant to such sweeping jurisdiction. In what [the Supreme Court] ha[s] called the paradigm case, an individual is subject to general jurisdiction in her place of domicile. And the equivalent forums for a corporation are its place of incorporation and principal place of business.” (Preciado v. Freightliner Custom Chassis Corp.¿(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 964, 976 [internal citation omitted].)

A nonresident may be subject to specific jurisdiction if a three-prong test is met. “First, the defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the state’s benefits. Second, the controversy must be related to or arise out of the defendant’s contacts with the state. Third, considering the defendant’s contacts with the state and other factors, California’s exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant must comport with fair play and substantial justice.” (Gilmore Bank v. AsiaTrust New Zealand Ltd. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1558, 1568 [internal citations and emphasis omitted].) “When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction.¿Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, however, it becomes the defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 449 [internal citations omitted].)

Analysis

The Court finds it does not have personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

Defendant argues and the Court agrees that the Court has no general jurisdiction over Defendant. Defendant has offices in the Grand Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, London, Hong Kong, Australia, and New Zealand, and is not registered to do business in California. (Alberga Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.) Defendant has never conducted business in California. (Alberga Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.) Accordingly, the Court will only have personal jurisdiction over Defendant if there is specific jurisdiction.

The remaining Plaintiffs argue that Defendant purposefully established minimum contacts with California. (Opp. pp. 8-12.) Plaintiffs do not directly argue that Defendant meets the three-prong test to establish specific jurisdiction, but the Court will attempt to examine Plaintiffs’ arguments through this lens. Plaintiffs allude to Defendant purposefully availing itself to California, because Defendant “has a worldwide presence,” “purposefully obtained clients in … California” and communicated with several of the signatory Plaintiffs that reside in California. (Opp. pp. 3-4, 9-11.) Plaintiffs believe this communication led to “Defendant developing and utilizing established channels to deliver [its] legal product … within … California.” (Opp. 9.) Plaintiffs indicate that the controversy giving rise to the lawsuit is related to or arises out of the Defendant’s contacts with California, because the communications, including phone call, emails, physical mail, and other “digital means[, that] resulted in the harm complained” occurred in California when Defendant contact the Californian signatories. (Opp. 9.) As for the third prong of comporting with fair play and substantial justice, Plaintiffs state that this prong would be met if the first two prongs are met. (Opp. 10.) Plaintiffs do not explain further.

Defendant argues that the first prong of the specific jurisdiction test is not met. (Motion pp. 13-17.) Defendant relies on Jacqueline B. v. Rawls Law Group, P.C. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 243 (Jacqueline B.). Turning to the first prong, Jacqueline B. states that an out-of-state defendant’s website purposefully avails itself when (1) the “website targets California residents, … and if it does not, (2) … the website falls on a ‘sliding scale’ of interactivity with internet users, with websites allowing the out-of-state defendant to conduct business with California residents at one end of the scale and websites that passively make information available at the other end.” (Id. at p. 289.) The Court of Appeal found that the defendant’s website did not target California residents even through it called itself “nationwide,” and was in the middle of the sliding scale because it allowed the plaintiff to “exchange information with the firm’s website” and plaintiff reached out to defendant directly for representation. (Id. at p. 290.)

Defendant contends and the Court agrees that Defendant’s website did not purposefully avail itself of access to Californian residents. Similar to Jacqueline B., Defendant’s website does not discuss California. (Alberga Decl. Exh. 2.) Although Plaintiffs allege that the website calls its presence “worldwide,” this does not indicate that Defendant targeted California. Defendant’s alleged reference to “worldwide” likely indicates its presence in the Grand Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, London, Hong Kong, Australia, and New Zealand. In addition, nothing in the facts indicates that the website allowed Plaintiffs to exchange information through the firm’s website. Moreover, Defendant alleges that non-party HIF and Plaintiffs contacted them for representation in the Action. (Alberga Decl. ¶ 7.)

Defendant then asserts that the first prong is not met as it “did not purposefully derive any benefit from California by virtue of its Retainer Agreement with the three alleged California-resident Plaintiffs.” (Motion p. 14.) Defendant relies upon Goehring v. Superior Court (Bernier) (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 894 to assert its argument. The Court of Appeal in that case stated, “a court must evaluate the contract terms and the surrounding circumstances to determine whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum[, and] relevant factors include prior negotiations, contemplated future consequences, the parties' course of dealings, and the contract's choice-of-law provision.” (Id. at p. 907.)

The Court agrees Defendant did not purposefully derive any benefit from California through its Retainer Agreement. The Retainer Agreement was prepared in the Grand Cayman Islands by Grand Cayman Island attorneys for the Action occurring in the Grand Cayman Islands and contained a choice-of-law provision for the Grand Cayman Islands. (Motion p. 15; Alberga Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. 1.) Nothing about the Retainer Agreement suggests that Defendant purposefully derived any benefit from California.

Defendant finally asserts the first prong is not met as it “did not purposefully avail itself of California’s benefits by virtue of its legal representation of Plaintiffs.” (Motion p. 15.) Again, Defendant relies upon Jacqueline B. There, the Court of Appeal looked to the totality of several factors including: “(1) whether the malpractice plaintiff/former client lived in the forum state at the time the firm or lawyers were retained, as well as when the allegedly defective legal services were provided …; (2) whether the firm or lawyers were physically located in the forum state, licensed to practice law there, used those licenses to perform the legal services at issue, or were cocounsel with lawyers located in the state …; (3) whether the retainer agreement was executed in the forum state or whether the obligation to pay for legal services under the agreement was enforceable solely through the forum state's legal process …; (4) whether the legal services alleged to be defectively provided were provided in the forum state and, if the services involved litigation, whether the firm or its lawyers acquired evidence in the forum state, filed suit in the forum state, or otherwise invoked the forum state's legal process … and (5) whether the legal services provided or the plaintiff's malpractice lawsuit relied upon application or misapplication — of the laws of the forum state.” (Jacqueline B., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 255-256.)

The Court agrees Defendant did not purposefully avail itself of any benefits from California via its legal representation. Although some of the Plaintiffs allege to live in California, six do not and none of the non-signatory Plaintiffs claim to be California residents. Plaintiffs state Cecil Lyte is a resident of Arizona and Nevada, Samuel 1, LTC is a Cayman Islands entity, and Alexander Menzel is a resident of Brazil. (Alberga Decl. ¶ 7.) In addition, as discussed, the Retainer Agreement was prepared in the Grand Cayman Islands by Grand Cayman Island attorneys for the Action occurring in the Grand Cayman Islands and contained a choice-of-law provision for the Grand Cayman Islands. (Motion p. 15; Alberga Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. 1.) Moreover, the communications made to the alleged Californian Plaintiffs do not show that the legal services were provided in California. Rather the communications were about legal services provided in the Grand Cayman Islands. Plaintiffs’ argument does not convince the Court that the legal representation allowed Defendant to purposefully derive any benefit from California. Because the first prong of the specific jurisdiction test is not met, the Court does not have specific jurisdiction over Defendant.

The Court does not have general or specific jurisdiction over Defendant. Thus, the Court GRANTS Specially Appearing Defendant Travers Thorp Alberga Attorneys at Law’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.

The Court hereby orders that the service of summons is quashed for lack of jurisdiction over Defendant as to all Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ action is therefore DISMISSED.

Motion for Continuance to Conduct Discovery

Legal Standard

“A trial court has the discretion to continue the hearing on a motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction to allow the plaintiff to conduct discovery on jurisdictional issues.” (HealthMarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1173; Beckman v. Thompson (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 481, 487.) A “plaintiff is generally entitled to conduct discovery with regard to a jurisdictional issue before a court rules on a motion to quash[,]” but it lies within the sound discretion of the judge. (Goehring v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 894, 911.)

“In order to prevail on a motion for a continuance for jurisdictional discovery, the plaintiff should demonstrate that discovery is likely to lead to the production of evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction.” (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 127.)

Analysis

Plaintiffs argue that they “are entitled to conduct such discovery to meet their initial burden of establishing that Defendant's contacts are sufficient to establish [specific] jurisdiction.” (Opp. p. 12.) While this may be true in some cases, Plaintiffs here have not demonstrates that discovery is likely to lead to the production of evidence of facts establishing specific jurisdiction as required. For this reason, The Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Continuance to Conduct Discovery to Determine the Nature and Extent of Defendant’s Contacts in the State of California.

Specially Appearing Defendant Travers Thorp Alberga Attorneys at Law to give notice, unless waived.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 14, 2025 ___________________________________

Theresa M. Traber

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.