Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: 25STCP00170, Date: 2025-06-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCP00170    Hearing Date: June 9, 2025    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE:     June 9, 2025                                                   TRIAL DATE: N/A

CASE:                         Carolyn Dillard, et al. v. Pandora Media, LLC

CASE NO.:                 25STCP00170           

PETITION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

MOVING PARTY:               Carolyn Dillard et al. (26,209 Petitioners)

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Pandora Media, LLC

CASE HISTORY:

·         01/17/25: Petition to Compel Arbitration filed.

·         02/14/25: Amended Petition to Compel Arbitration filed.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

            This is a petition to compel mass arbitration. Plaintiffs are users of Respondent’s music streaming service who allege that Respondent illegally targeted advertisements toward them.

TENTATIVE RULING:

The Petition to Compel Arbitration is DENIED.

DISCUSSION:

            Petitioners seek to compel Respondent to arbitration for each of their 26,209 disputes.

Under California law, arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (Blake v. Ecker (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 728, 741 (overruled on other grounds by Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094).) A party petitioning to compel arbitration has the burden of persuasion to establish the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, and the party opposing the petition has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to its defense. (Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 356-57.) A party seeking to compel arbitration must establish both the existence of an arbitration agreement and the responding party’s refusal to arbitrate the dispute. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2; Spear v. California State Auto Association (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 1035, 1042-43.)

Petitioners are a group of 26,209 individuals who allegedly maintained accounts on Respondent’s music streaming service. (Amended Petition ¶ 11.) Petitioners allege that Respondent gathered demographic information about the Petitioners to deploy targeted advertisements based on their age, gender, and sexuality in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. (Id.) Petitioners seek to arbitrate their claims under the 2019 and 2024 versions of Respondent’s Terms and Conditions. (Amended Petition ¶¶ 12-15.) Petitioners allege that Respondent has refused to arbitrate their claims, relying upon a November 4, 2024 letter from Respondent’s counsel. (Amended Petition Exh. I.) That letter asserts that the Petitioners’ notices of claims are insufficiently detailed to place Respondent on fair notice of the disputes. (See Id.) Respondent stated its unwillingness to arbitrate the claims without further information being provided, before expressing skepticism that such information would be forthcoming. (Id.) Respondent argues in opposition to this petition that this letter cannot be considered a categorical refusal to arbitrate such that a claim to enforce an arbitration agreement has accrued. Respondent analogizes this dispute to Teamsters Loc. Union 783 v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., a 2010 Sixth Circuit opinion concerning a failure to arbitrate under the National Labor Relations Act. In that case, a panel of judges on the 6th Circuit concluded that a claim to compel arbitration did not accrue (and, thus, the statute of limitations had not run) because, although the employer denied arbitrability of the dispute, the employer also requested further information regarding the claim. (Teamsters Loc. Union 783 v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (6th Cir. 2010) 626 F.3d 256, 260.) In reply, Petitioners argue that Respondent’s letter was a categorical refusal to arbitrate by maintaining that no arbitrable controversy exists. (See Loscalzo v. Federal Mut. Ins. Co. (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 391, 395.) The Court concurs with Respondent’s analysis. Petitioners’ focus on the Respondent’s unwillingness to arbitrate neglects that Respondent’s principal objection was the absence of sufficient information regarding the nature of the claims, which would deprive Respondent of fair notice and, as a practical matter, render arbitration infeasible. In that context, the Court finds Respondent’s reasoning to be of greater persuasive force.

Petitioners have not established to the Court’s satisfaction that Respondent has unequivocally refused arbitration, even assuming, arguendo, that an agreement to arbitrate exists. Petitioners are therefore not entitled to compel arbitration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2.

CONCLUSION:

            Accordingly, the Petition to Compel Arbitration is DENIED.

            Moving Parties to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:  June 9, 2025                           ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.