Judge Theresa M. Traber, Case Number: 25STCV04000, Date: 2025-06-09 Tentative Ruling

This is a sexual harassment action that was filed on February 13, 2025. Plaintiff is a tenant at a residential property owned by the LLC Defendant. Plaintiff alleges that she was harassed by the individual Defendant, who is employed as the property manager for the premises. Plaintiff further alleges that the individual Defendant commenced an unlawful detainer action against her in retaliation for complaining about his conduct.

Defendant Pomona Garden Development, LLC’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s prayers for punitive damages in connection with the third, fourth, fifth, seventh, and eighth causes of action are stricken with respect to the moving Defendant. Plaintiff is granted 20 days’ leave to amend its allegations in support of the prayer for punitive damages against this Defendant.

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a). The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. Id., § 436(b). The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. Id.§ 436. The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. Id.§ 437. “When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.” Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768. A motion to strike can be used where the complaint or other pleading has not been drawn or filed in conformity with applicable rules or court orders. Code Civ. Proc., § 436(b). This provision is for "the striking of a pleading due to improprieties in its form or in the procedures pursuant to which it was filed." Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528 (emphasis in original).

Before filing a motion to strike, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who has filed the pleading subject to the motion to strike and file a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a).) However, an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to grant or deny a motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a)(4).)

The Declaration of Defendant’s counsel states that counsel for the parties conferred telephonically on April 9, 2025, but were unable to resolve this dispute. (Declaration of Kristine A. Tijam ISO Mot. ¶ 4.) Defendant has complied with its statutory meet and confer obligations.

Generally, punitive damages may be awarded only when the trier of fact finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant acted with malice, fraud, or oppression. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) As nonintentional torts support punitive damages when the defendant's conduct “involves conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others,” our focus is on malice and oppression. (Gawara v. United States Brass Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1361 [74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663].) As defined in the punitive damages statute, “[m]alice” encompasses “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others,” and “[o]ppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1), (2).) The term “‘despicable,’” though not defined in the statute, is applicable to “circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’ ” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725 [34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 898, 882 P.2d 894], quoting 4 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 529.)

Under the statute, “malice does not require actual intent to harm. [Citation.] Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences. [Citation.] Malice may be proved either expressly through direct evidence or by implication through indirect evidence from which the jury draws inferences. [Citation.]” (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228 [44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197].)

In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”

An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.

(3) ‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. (Citation omitted.) Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.

Defendant argues—with considerable force—that the Complaint does not properly allege a basis for punitive damages as to the LLC Defendant because it does not set forth any facts showing advance knowledge, authorization, or ratification by an officer, director, or managing agent. The Court concurs. The Complaint is entirely silent as to whether any officer, director, or managing agent of the LLC had any awareness of Defendant Villasenor’s conduct, and allegations pertaining to vicarious liability do not go to ratification for punitive damages purposes. (See Complaint ¶ 8.) Plaintiff’s contention in opposition that Defendant Villasenor was himself a “managing agent” does not withstand scrutiny, as there are no allegations establishing that Defendant Villasenor exercised “substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy.” (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 577-78.) The mere fact that the individual Defendant is a property manager does not establish his control over corporate policy, but only, at best, over the premises themselves. Plaintiff’s punitive damages prayers are not proper as to the moving Defendant and must be stricken.

Accordingly, Defendant Pomona Garden Development, LLC’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s prayers for punitive damages in connection with the third, fourth, fifth, seventh, and eighth causes of action are stricken with respect to the moving Defendant. Plaintiff is granted 20 days’ leave to amend its allegations in support of the prayer for punitive damages against this Defendant.

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.