Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: BC416442, Date: 2023-04-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC416442    Hearing Date: April 5, 2023    Dept: 47

Tentative Ruling

Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47

HEARING DATE:     April 5, 2023                          JUDGMENT: September 6, 2018

CASE:                         Ian Campbell v. Pyle Irrevocable Trust, et al.

CASE NO.:                 BC416442           

MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT

MOVING PARTY:               Plaintiff Mary Casamento as Successor Trustee of the Ian Campbell Revocable Trust dated August 12, 2011, for Plaintiff Ian Campbell (deceased)

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendants Pyle Irrevocable Trust, Glen Pyle

CASE HISTORY:

·         06/24/09: Complaint filed.

·         09/06/18: Default judgment entered.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

            This was a breach of contract action. Plaintiff alleged that he loaned money to the defendant trust that Defendants never paid back.

Plaintiff moves to amend the judgment to add Glen Pyle as Trustee of the Pyle Irrevocable Trust as a judgment debtor.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Judgment is GRANTED.

DISCUSSION:

Plaintiff moves to amend the judgment to add Glen Pyle as Trustee of the Pyle Irrevocable Trust as a judgment debtor.

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Late Opposition

            Defendants filed and served their opposition papers on March 29, 2023. Plaintiff objects to the opposition as untimely. Code of Civil Procedure section 1005(b) requires that any opposition to a regularly noticed motion be filed and served no less than nine court days before the hearing. Defendants’ opposition was filed and served only four court days before the hearing, and is therefore untimely. However, on April 3, 2023, Defendants’ counsel filed a sworn declaration stating that he attempted to electronically serve and file the opposition on March 22, 2023, the date the opposition was due. (Declaration of Louis P. Dell ISO Opp. ¶ 2.) However, the opposition was not filed, whether due to inadvertence or Mr. Dell’s negligence, and Mr. Dell accepts responsibility for the late filing. (Id. ¶¶ 3-5.) Plaintiff does not appear to have been meaningfully prejudiced by the late filing, as evidenced by the reply brief filed on April 3. The Court therefore concludes that the late filing was harmless error, and will consider the opposition on its merits.

Analysis

Plaintiff moves to amend the judgment to add Glen Pyle as Trustee of the Pyle Irrevocable Trust as a judgment debtor.

            Plaintiff moves for amendment under Code of Civil Procedure section 187. This code section is a catch-all provision which states:

When jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or this Code, or by any other statute, conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this Code or the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this Code.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 187.) Plaintiff seeks to add Glen Pyle specifically in his capacity as Trustee of the Pyle Irrevocable Trust to give effect to the default judgment entered against the Trust on September 6, 2018. A trust, by itself, cannot be a judgment debtor because it is not a legal person. (Portico Management Group, LLC v. Harrison (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 464, 473.) “A claim based on a contract entered into by a trustee in the trustee’s representative capacity . . . may be asserted against the trust by proceeding specifically against the trustee in the trustee’s representative capacity.” (Prob. Code § 18004.) Therefore, an enforceable judgment against trust property must be entered “against those who held title to such property—the trustees.” (Portico, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at 474.)

            Plaintiff principally relies on the disposition of Portico to argue that the Court is entitled to amend the judgment to add Defendant Pyle in his capacity as trustee to the judgment. In Portico, the Court of Appeal held that judgment against a trust itself was ineffective to reach trust assets held by the trustees because judgment must be against the trustees themselves. (Poritco, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at 478.) Although the portion of the Portico court’s opinion concerning the propriety of a motion to amend the judgment is unpublished and therefore not controlling, the Portico court remanded one of the several motions to amend judgment to the trial court for further consideration. (Id. at 479.) Thus, it appears that the Court has authority to consider a motion to amend a judgment under section 187.

            Plaintiff contends that it was unaware that the judgment was unenforceable without naming Defendant Pyle in his capacity as trustee until, according to the papers, “less than three months ago.” As Defendants note in opposition, however, the Complaint, filed in 2009, specifically alleges that Defendant Pyle contracted with Plaintiff as trustee of the Pyle Irrevocable Trust. (Complaint ¶ 5.)

            Defendants argue in opposition that amending the judgment to name Defendant Pyle in his capacity as trustee is improper because Plaintiff sat on his rights. Defendants analogize this case to Portico, where the Court of Appeal stated that the plaintiff’s motion to amend a judgment to name the trustees of the Harrison Children’s Trust was properly denied because the plaintiff had sat on its right to amend the underlying arbitration award against the trust only. (Portico, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at 478.) Defendants neglect to mention, however, that the Portico court reached that conclusion because the statutory time to amend the arbitration award had long since lapsed, and the trial court lacked the authority to cure the defects under Code of Civil Procedure section 1218 et seq. (Portico, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at 477.) Here, in contrast, no such statutory restrictions are in play.

            Defendants next argue that this motion is improper because section 187 is most commonly utilized to add judgment debtors on the theory that they are an alter ego of the original judgment debtor, and Plaintiff has not offered evidence to support an alter ego theory. This argument is not well-taken. It is readily apparent that this motion seeks merely to correct a procedural defect, and not to target some bad faith actor seeking to hide behind a corporate veil. (See Associated Vendors Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co. (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 825, 842.)

            Similarly unpersuasive is Defendants’ argument that naming Defendant Pyle in his capacity as trustee poses some risk to his constitutional rights to due process. Defendant Pyle was named as a Defendant in the Complaint in 2009. (See generally Complaint.) The Complaint alleges that Defendant Pyle contracted with Plaintiff in his capacity as trustee, and that this contract was the basis for the claims against Defendant Pyle and the Trust. (Complaint ¶ 5-8.)

            Defendants’ final argument is that this motion is barred by the doctrine of laches. "If, in light of the lapse of time and other relevant circumstances, a court concludes that a party's failure to assert a right has caused prejudice to an adverse party, the court may apply the equitable defense of laches to bar further assertion of the right." (In re Marriage of Fellows (2006) 39 Cal.4th 179, 183.) Defendants argue that the delay between the filing of the Complaint and this motion is itself a basis to deny the motion under the doctrine, principally relying on Alexander v. Abbey of the Chimes, a 1980 appellate opinion that held that a motion to amend a judgment was barred by laches because of a seven-year delay where the moving party “knew or should have known that appellant was the alter ego of Abbey either at the time of the original proceedings or shortly thereafter.” (Alexander v. Abbey of the Chimes (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 39, 47.) However, as Plaintiff notes in reply, Alexander generally represents a departure from otherwise-settled precedent that a party must show prejudice to prevail on a defense of laches. Subsequent appellate opinions have either distinguished or outright rejected Alexander as improper. (See, e.g, Highland Springs Conference & Training Center v. City of Banning (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 267, 288.) Further, our Supreme Court has reaffirmed the requirement that there must be a showing of prejudice to apply the defense of laches. (In re Marriage of Fellows (2006) 39 Cal.4th at 183.) Defendants make no showing of prejudice, nor can the Court find any, since, as stated, the trust and the trustee were both named in the Complaint and the underlying facts arise from Defendant Pyle’s conduct as trustee, as he was specifically stated to be in the Complaint. The Court therefore declines to conclude that the doctrine of laches bars Plaintiff’s motion, notwithstanding the age of this action.

CONCLUSION:

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Judgment is GRANTED.

Moving Party to give notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:  April 6, 2023                          ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.