Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: BC649395, Date: 2025-03-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC649395 Hearing Date: March 5, 2025 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: March 5, 2025 TRIAL
DATE: NOT SET
CASE: State of California v. Bruce E. Fishman,
M.D.
CASE NO.: BC648395 ![]()
ORDER
TO SHOW CAUSE RE: RECONSIDERATION OF EVIDENCE PRESERVATION LETTER![]()
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs State of California, the Counties of Los Angeles,
Kern, San Bernardino, Ventura, Santa Barbara, the Cities of Los Angeles and
Bakersfield, the School Districts of Los Angeles, McFarland, Visalia and Kern,
the Health Care District of Tehachapi, ex rel. Med-Legal Associates, Inc. and
CLCI, Inc;
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendants Bruce
E. Fishman, M.D., Bruce E. Fishman, M.D., FISC, Inc. and Family Urgent Care
& Industrial Medical Clinic, Inc.
CASE
HISTORY:
·
01/27/17: Complaint filed under seal.
·
11/06/17: Order lifting seal entered.
·
12/22/17: First Amended Complaint filed under
seal. (Not on eCourt, but attached as exhibit to a filing.)
·
02/17/21: Judgment on the Pleadings
·
02/22/21: Appeal filed by School Districts of
Los Angeles, McFarland, et al. and GLC Operations, Inc., et al.
·
03/16/23: Remittitur filed, judgment reversed.
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is a qui tam action alleging that Defendant Bruce E. Fishman lied
on his application (concealing a felony conviction) to serve as a qualified
medical evaluator (“QME”) in connection with the examination of injured workers
for purposes of their eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants billed Plaintiffs for medical evaluation
services Defendant Fishman unlawfully performed under the pretense of being a
validly appointed QME and collected public funds for these services.
On January
24, 2025, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause re: Reconsideration of the
Court’s December 19, 2024 order directing the preparation of an evidence
preservation letter. The Court instructed the parties to brief (1) the efficacy
of an evidence preservation letter at this juncture and the range of documents
to be preserved; (2) the basis for Plaintiffs’ proposed list of recipients; (3)
the burden to be imposed on the recipients and the mechanisms to challenge the
imposition of those burdens; (4) whether the privacy rights of any patients are
implicated by the letter, and, if so, how those rights should be balanced
against the need for the letter; and (5) whether the letter will have an unduly
deleterious effect on Defendants’ current reputation and medical practice. The
parties have completed their briefing, and the Court now issues a ruling.
TENTATIVE RULING:
On November
27, 2024, the Court ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding the
preparation of a letter directing pertinent insurance companies to preserve
records of potential relevance to this action. (November 27, 2024 Minute
Order.) After reviewing the joint statements of the parties and a proposed
letter, the Court ordered Plaintiff to prepare a final version of the letter
with a list of proposed recipients. (December 19, 2024 Minute Order.) Plaintiffs
submitted a final draft of the letter and listed over 900 proposed recipients
of the notice. (See Notice of Final Proposed Evidence Preservation Letter filed
January 10, 2025.) On January 24, 2025, in response to this extraordinary
number of proposed recipients, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause re:
Reconsideration of the Court’s December 19, 2024 order directing the
preparation of an evidence preservation letter.
The Court
has the inherent authority to amend and control its process and orders to
conform to law and justice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 128(a)(8).) The Court may therefore
reconsider its prior interim orders at any time during the pendency of the case.
(Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1108 [distinguishing the
Court’s inherent authority to reconsider rulings sua sponte from the prescribed,
time-limited authorization for the parties to seek reconsideration by written
motion].)
As part of
the Order to Show Cause, the Court instructed the parties to brief (1) the
efficacy of an evidence preservation letter at this juncture and the range of
documents to be preserved; (2) the basis for Plaintiffs’ proposed list of
recipients; (3) the burden to be imposed on the recipients and the mechanisms
to challenge the imposition of those burdens; (4) whether the privacy rights of
any patients are implicated by the letter, and, if so, how those rights should
be balanced against the need for the letter; and (5) whether the letter will
have an unduly deleterious effect on Defendants’ current reputation and medical
practice.
At the
outset, the Court must address the largely non-responsive nature of Defendants’
papers. Rather than directly address the
issues on which the Court ordered briefing, Defendants’ counsel has once again
devoted his attention and efforts to uncivil attacks on the relators and their
counsel and irrelevant discussions of merits issues. The purpose of the Court’s
solicitation of briefing is to obtain the assistance of counsel in framing the
legal and factual issues and the application of law to facts. In this respect,
Defendants briefing is of little material value. The Court instructed
Defendants to brief specified issues. As Defendants have not heeded that
instruction, the Court has little need or interest in considering Defendants’
briefing in ruling on this matter.
1.
Efficacy of Evidence Preservation Letter
Plaintiffs assert that an evidence
preservation letter is necessary because, according to Plaintiffs, the Court’s
orders restraining discovery have hindered Plaintiffs’ ability to collect
evidence regarding monetary recovery, thereby somehow necessitating an evidence
preservation letter. Tellingly, however, an evidence preservation letter is not
a form of discovery, and Plaintiffs do not and cannot contend that they have
been barred from seeking an evidence preservation letter in the past or that
any discovery stay issued in this case has prevented them from doing so. Moreover, invocation of the discovery stays
that have been imposed in this case misses the point of the Court’s inquiry:
given the age of the litigation and the expiration of Defendant’s QME license
in 2014, what evidence would remain to be preserved at this late date?
Plaintiffs have not addressed this question. While Plaintiffs have explained
the scope of the inquiry from 2003 to the present as based on the additional
allegations of falsified medical reports, they have not answered the threshold
question of whether an evidence preservation letter would be of any use.
2.
Basis for Recipients
Plaintiffs assert that the list of
recipients was “carefully crafted” because it was unknown which insurance
companies and payors received bills from Defendants, and, therefore, it is not
possible to narrow the list of recipients. The Court is not persuaded. A list
of 915 recipients is not, by any measure, “carefully crafted,” and the
assertion that it is not possible to narrow the list of recipients does not
militate in favor of issuing the letter to those recipients.
3.
Burden on Recipients
Plaintiffs offer no factual basis
for their speculation that the letter imposes minimal burden and costs upon the
recipients, nor do they address how any recipient might challenge the burden
imposed upon them.
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4.
Implication of Privacy Rights
Plaintiffs state, without
explanation, that the privacy rights of patients are not implicated by the
preservation letter. A bare assertion that does not demonstrate how Plaintiffs
have reached their conclusion is not persuasive. Plaintiffs have offered no evidence, for
example, that the targeted insurance companies are likely to have electronic
records organized to allow for searches of the designated Qualified Medical
Examiner, as opposed to records listed by the name of the individual claimants
or their insurance-covered employers. In
the absence of such evidence, the Court cannot conclude either that the burden
of the search is minimal or the privacy disclosure insignificant.
5.
Deleterious Impact on Reputation of Defendants
Plaintiffs contend that the
substance of the letter is innocuous, and that any reputational implication to
the Defendants is the natural and inescapable consequence of any third-party
discovery. Leaving aside the unsupported nature of this assertion, Plaintiffs elide
the central issue that the breadth of the proposed list of recipients, and not
merely the name of the case, alerts such a wide range of entities to the
existence of this litigation. Moreover, the evidence sought to be preserved expressly
carries negative implications regarding Defendants’ medical legal reports.
Plaintiffs have offered the Court no
meaningful explanation for the utility, breadth, or distribution of their
proposed Evidence Preservation Letter. The Court authorized the preparation of
an Evidence Preservation letter to mitigate the potential loss of evidence due
to the age of this action. Plaintiffs’ proposal to send this letter to a
purportedly irreducible list of 915 recipients strongly suggests that
Plaintiffs have taken the Court’s order as an opportunity to weaponize this
proceeding to harm Defendants’ reputation, without providing any support for a
conclusion that it will have any constructive utility.
The Court therefore reconsiders and
vacates its December 19, 2024 ruling directing the preparation of an Evidence
Preservation letter. No evidence preservation letter shall be issued.
Court to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 5, 2025 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
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tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
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