Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: BC701919, Date: 2022-08-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC701919    Hearing Date: August 23, 2022    Dept: 47

CATALINA FLORES VS SWAT.FAME INC. – Case No. BC701919

TENTATIVE RULINGS ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Final Status Conference:  8/23/22

            PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Plaintiff’s MIL #1 – seeking exclusion of evidence or argument about Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim, settlement of workers’ compensation claim and/or Plaintiff’s alleged voluntary resignation.

TENTATIVE RULING:  Granted, because the evidence is irrelevant and, even if it were minimally relevant, it should be excluded under Evidence Code § 352.

            The Compromise and Release Plaintiff executed in her workers’ compensation matter effectuated a settlement that included Plaintiff’s dismissal of her Labor Code § 132a claim for disability discrimination, without any payment of damages, and a separate resolution of Plaintiff’s remaining claims in exchange for Defendant’s payment of a stipulated award of $27,500.  (Opp., p. 3; Plaintiff’s Exh. 3.)  Defendant argues that the dismissal is admissible both to show the weakness of Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim in this action and to demonstrate her failure to mitigate damage by pursuing a workers’ compensation remedy.  The Court rejects both bases for admission of Plaintiff’s § 132a dismissal. 

            Plaintiff’s dismissal of her § 132a claim in the workers’ compensation proceeding says nothing about the strength or validity of her causes of action before the Court.  It has long been the law that a § 132a claim is separate and independent from any claims an employee may have under FEHA or under the common law.  In City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal. 4th 1143, 1158, the California Supreme Court held that “section 132a does not provide an exclusive remedy and does not preclude an employee from pursuing FEHA and common law wrongful discharge remedies.”  Thus, an employee’s decision not to pursue a § 132a claim through the workers’ compensation system does not impair the employee’s very separate claims under FEHA or common law.  Given the wider scope of remedies available in litigation, moreover, an employee’s decision to pursue a lawsuit rather than a parallel workers’ compensation claim cannot be construed as reflecting any negative assessment of the strength of the claim and, instead, could be arise from a conclusion that the underlying facts could support substantial emotional distress or punitive damages if it were brought in court. 

Even if there were some probative value arising from Plaintiff’s dismissal of her §132a claim, the evidence would have to be excluded under Evidence Code § 352 because its admission would necessitate undue consumption of time explaining its significance to a jury.  Because the standards under Labor Code § 132a and FEHA are quite different, the dismissal of a claim under the former is not an even trade for a cause of action under the latter.  As the Supreme Court explained in City of Moorpark, supra,

[N]ot every instance of disability discrimination in violation of section 132a gives rise to a valid FEHA claim. The term “disability” has a specific meaning in the context of the workers' compensation law that it has in no other context. On the other hand, the FEHA includes detailed definitions of “‘Physical disability’” and “‘Mental disability’” that make no reference to the workers' compensation law. (Gov.Code, § 12926, subds. (i), (k).) Because the standards for establishing disability discrimination may well be different under the FEHA than under section 132a, a decision in an employee's favor on a section 132a petition would not establish a FEHA violation.

(City of Moorpark, supra, at p. 1158.)  Exploring and explaining the differences between Plaintiff’s §132a claim and her causes of action in this lawsuit would be a wasteful and confusing exercise that would sidetrack the trial from the key disputes to be resolved.

            Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s dismissal of her § 132a claim is evidence of a failure to mitigate by abandoning her workers’ compensation remedy.  (Opp., p. 3.)  Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that a decision not to pursue a workers’ compensation claim constitutes a species of failure to mitigate, and the Court is aware of no such authority.  This excuse for admitting the settlement is, thus, unpersuasive.

            In addition, Defendant urges the admission of the workers’ compensation settlement as evidence that Defendant has already paid a portion of the damages Plaintiff seeks in this action and argues that the workers’ compensation settlement should not be an excludable collateral source payment because it was paid by the Defendant itself to address the same damages sought in this lawsuit.  Defendant has not shown that the same damages sought in this action were also sought in the workers’ compensation proceeding.  Indeed, in light of its argument that Plaintiff’s § 132a claim was dismissed from that proceeding, it is not clear whether any overlapping claims remained to be resolved in that proceeding.  Certainly, if Plaintiffs’ workers’ compensation claim sought a monetary recovery for injuries different from the lost wages, emotional distress and other damages sought in this lawsuit, evidence of a workers’ compensation settlement would be wholly irrelevant and inadmissible here, regardless of whether it would be deemed a collateral source or a proper offset.  Moreover, even if the workers’ compensation settlement were considered an appropriate offset, Defendant does not explain why this is not simply a post-verdict offset to be applied by the Court.  Given the need to provide a detailed explanation of the provenance and significance of the workers’ compensation settlement and the Court’s view that any available offset could be accomplished after a verdict is entered, the Court finds that any relevance the workers’ compensation settlement may have to the calculation of damages is outweighed by its potential prejudicial impact and the jury confusion it is likely to engender.

            In addition to evidence of the workers’ compensation proceeding and its settlement, Defendant seeks admission of a form entitled, “Voluntary Resignation,” as evidence that Plaintiff released Defendant from all damages claimed after May 11, 2017.  For the reasons explained below in connection with Defendant’s motion in limine #1, the Court finds that this form is not relevant to any issue in this case and, even if it had some minimal relevance, it must be excluded under Evidence Code § 352 because its probative value is starkly overshadowed by the prejudice and undue consumption of time that would arise if it were admitted. 

Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to exclude evidence of and argument about workers’ compensation proceedings and the parties’ settlement in that context, including the “Voluntary Resignation” form, as irrelevant and subject to exclusion under Evidence Code § 352.  

Plaintiff’s MIL #2 – seeking exclusion of evidence or argument about Plaintiff’s romantic relationship with Enrique Calderon and Plaintiff’s conflicting professional relationship with Leticia Landeta. 

TENTATIVE RULING:  Granted, because the evidence is irrelevant and, even if it were minimally relevant, it should be excluded under Evidence Code § 352.

            Defendant argues the evidence of Plaintiff’s alleged infidelity is admissible to challenge her credibility, to demonstrate the “real” provocation for her emotional distress, and to explain her motivation for bringing this lawsuit.  None of these justifications support the admission of any evidence about Plaintiff’s romantic relationship or her subsequent conflict with a female co-worker. 

            Largely admitting that the evidence it seeks to admit is unrelated to any elements of the claims or defenses in this action, Defendant contends that proof of Plaintiff’s alleged involvement in a workplace affair is admissible to challenge her credibility.  Such evidence is plainly not admissible to attack a party’s credibility unless it tends to show the party’s bias in favor of or against the love interest or another person.  (Winfred D. v. Michelin North America, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal. App. 4th 1011, 1034.)  Tellingly, Defendant’s opposition makes no mention of either Mr. Calderon or Ms. Landeta as percipient witnesses to any of the alleged acts of discrimination underpinning Plaintiff’s claims in this action.  It appears they are listed on the Joint Witnesses List for the sole purpose of fleshing out Defendant’s plan to embarrass Plaintiff on this collateral issue.

            Defendant also argues that the evidence is necessary to “set the scene” because the emotional drama of the “love triangle” led to Plaintiff’s emotional distress and her medical leave in early October 2016.  But the genesis of Plaintiff’s emotional distress is not at issue in this action.  Instead, Plaintiff contends that Defendant terminated her while she was on medical leave on January 3, 2017 – more than five weeks before she was tentatively slated to return to work.  In a case like this, there is no reason for Defendant to “set the scene” except to besmirch Plaintiff’s reputation and impair her ability to assert her discrimination claims. 

            Even if there were some marginal relevance to the proffered evidence, the Court would exclude it under Evidence Code § 352.  Such an exclusion is particularly necessary here where the “proffered evidence involves an issue of sexual conduct, and its admission is highly prejudicial and inflammatory.”  (Id., at p. 1034 [Citations omitted].) “In addition, where the irrelevant evidence implicates the privacy concerns and reputations of nonparties, the trial court must consider the effect of admissibility on them.”  (Id., at p. 1035 [Citations omitted].)  To balance the probative value as weightier than the extraordinarily prejudicial consequences of admission would likely be an abuse of this Court’s discretion.  (Id.)

Plaintiff’s MIL #3 – seeking exclusion of Plaintiff’s Kaiser Permanente medical records because of failure to give proper notice to consumer and overbroad scope of subpoena. 

TENTATIVE RULING:  Denied, without prejudice.  Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she was denied the opportunity to object to the deposition subpoena, because she has not shown when the documents were produced by Kaiser in relation to the notice mailed to her on April 15, 2022.  With respect to the admission of any documents at trial, Defendant must make an offer of proof in advance of any effort to admit these documents to show their direct relevance to this action and Plaintiff’s resulting waiver of her privacy rights.   

Plaintiff’s MIL #4 – seeking exclusion of Plaintiff’s application for unemployment benefits.   

TENTATIVE RULING:  Granted, such evidence is irrelevant to this action and also should be excluded under Evidence Code § 352. 

Plaintiff’s MIL #5 – seeking exclusion of any evidence or argument in support of Defendant’s contention that it terminated Plaintiff because of a business hardship.  

TENTATIVE RULING:  Denied, without prejudice.  The Court lacks sufficient information to determine whether Defendant has improperly withheld relevant discovery on the hardship defense.  Other than the single excerpt from Defendant’s deposition, Plaintiff has submitted no other discovery documents that may have sought or denied information about this defense.  That said, in response to Defendant’s request, the Court granted leave to file a formal opposition to this motion, but none was filed.  (Minute Order, dated June 9, 2022, p. 2.)  Having provided no offer of evidence in support of the business hardship defense, nor any explanation for the alleged failure to produce discovery in support of that defense, the Court is inclined to conclude that it should not be presented as a viable defense at trial.  The Court will hear further argument about this issue at the upcoming final status conference.

Plaintiff’s MIL #6 – seeking exclusion of evidence or argument about Plaintiff’s parental capacity or regarding her child’s care.    

TENTATIVE RULING:  Denied, without prejudice.  The Court cannot discern from the moving papers the nature or content of the documents sought to be excluded.    

            DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Defendant’s MIL #1 – seeking order barring Plaintiff from offering any evidence of economic damages after her “Voluntary Resignation.” 

TENTATIVE RULING:  Denied, because Defendant has failed to show that Plaintiff made a knowing and voluntary settlement of her claims for economic damages or any other aspect of her claims in this case. 

            On May 11, 2017, the parties entered into a settlement agreement resolving Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim regarding cumulative injuries to her head, neck, shoulders, back, psyche and stress/shingles from November 1, 2013 through February 15, 2017.  (Defendant’s Exh. A.)  The form Compromise and Release states that, if the settlement is approved, Plaintiff will “release[ ] and forever discharge[ ]” Defendant “from all claims and causes of action, whether now known or ascertained or which may hereafter arise or develop as a result of the above-referenced injury(ies) . . . . Execution of this form has no effect on claims that are not within the scope of the workers’ compensation law or claims that are not subject to the exclusivity provisions of the workers’ compensation law, unless otherwise expressly stated.”  (Id.)  The settlement agreement also provides that it “is limited to settlement of the body parts, conditions, or systems and for the dates of injury set forth” in the document.  (Id.) Nothing in the Compromise and Release mentions Plaintiff’s claims under FEHA or common law or expands the scope of the parties’ settlement beyond the clear limitations in these provisions.

            The California Supreme Court has held that “the standard language of the preprinted form used in settling workers' compensation claims releases only those claims that are within the scope of the workers' compensation system, and does not apply to claims asserted in separate civil actions.”  (Claxton v. Waters (2004) 34 Cal. 4th 367, 376.)  The Supreme Court also ruled that no extrinsic evidence is permitted to expand or define the scope of the intended settlement.  (Id., at p. 378.)  Instead, a settlement of claims outside those asserted in the workers’ compensation proceeding must be set forth in a separate agreement.  (Id.)  Such an agreement must be “knowing and voluntary.”  (Skrbina v. Fleming Cos., Inc. (1996) 45 Cal. App. 4th 1353, 1366-67.)

            Application of these legal principles demands the denial of Defendant’s motion.  Under Claxton v. Waters, the parties’ Compromise and Release effectuates no settlement of Plaintiff’s claims in this case.  Nor can the so-called Voluntary Resignation document be construed as a separate agreement releasing Plaintiff’s right to secure economic damages or otherwise limiting her right to assert her claims in this lawsuit.  The one-page document says nothing about a release of claims that may be asserted in a lawsuit nor any relinquishment of Plaintiff’s right to recover economic or any other damages based on those claims.  The only limitation imposed by Plaintiff’s signing this document is that she “will not seek re-hire with Swat-Fame, Inc.”  It also states that Plaintiff “is no longer an employee of Swat Fame, Inc.” – a fact that is undisputed – and that the date of “separation” – which is inserted into the document to replace “resignation” – is May 11, 2017.  None of these statements nor any other language in the “Voluntary Resignation” constitute a “knowing and voluntary” renunciation of Plaintiff’s right to seek economic damages or to assert any of the claims she prosecutes in this case. 

Further, contrary to Defendant’s contention, the form does not reflect Plaintiff’s “resignation” but only her acknowledgement that she has been separated from her employment with Defendant, which is a core allegation underlying her wrongful termination claims in this action.  

Defendant’s MIL #2 – seeking order barring Plaintiff from offering testimony from her lawyers about the true intent of Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation settlement. 

TENTATIVE RULING:  Denied as moot, in light of the Court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s motion in limine #1 and Defendant’s motion in limine #2.    

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:  August 23, 2022                                 ___________________________________

                                                                                    Theresa M. Traber

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

            Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.