Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: BC717200, Date: 2022-12-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC717200 Hearing Date: December 19, 2022 Dept: 47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE: December 19, 2022 TRIAL DATE: January 1, 2023
CASE: Yoav Botach et al. v Newmark of Southern
California, Inc., et al.
CASE NO.: BC717200
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MOTION TO QUASH
DEPOSITION SUBPOENA FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant Gibran Begum.
RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Estate
of Yoav Botach
CASE
HISTORY:
STATEMENT
OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants conspired
to induce Plaintiff Yoav Botach to sell the Garfield Building at 403 W. 8th
Street, Los Angeles, CA (hereafter “the subject property”) to sell the subject
property to Kyriakos Kerry Bonnis for well below its listed price. Plaintiffs
allege causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, declaratory
relief, financial elder abuse, and negligence.
Defendant
Gibran Begum moves to quash a deposition subpoena for production of documents,
or, in the alternative, for a protective order.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant’s Motion to Quash
the Subpoena for Production of Documents is DENIED.
Defendant’s alternative
Motion for a Protective Order is DENIED.
Both parties’ Requests for
Sanctions are DENIED.
//
//
DISCUSSION:
Defendant
Gibran Begum moves to quash a deposition subpoena for production of documents,
or, in the alternative, for a protective order.
Legal Standard
Code
of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 governs subpoenas as follows:
If a subpoena requires the attendance of a
witness or the production of books, documents, or other things before a court,
or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the
court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), .
. . may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or
directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall
declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other
order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or
oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy
of the person.
(Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1(a).)
There is no meet and confer
requirement set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1. However, there
is a separate statement requirement:
(a) Separate statement required
Any motion involving the content of a
discovery request or the responses to such a request must be accompanied by a
separate statement. The motions that require a separate statement include a
motion:
. . .
(5) To compel or to quash the production of documents or
tangible things at a deposition . . . .
(Cal. Rule of Court 3.1345(a)(5) (bold emphasis added.) This separate statement must set forth the
particular documents or demands at issue and the factual and legal reasons why
production should not be compelled and meet the other requirements of Rule of
Court 3.1345(c) and (d).
Code of
Civil Procedure section 2025.420, which governs requests for protective orders,
provides, in relevant part:
(a) Before, during, or after a
deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or
organization may promptly move for a protective order. The motion shall be
accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.
(b) The court, for good cause shown,
may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or
other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment,
or oppression, or undue burden and expense. This protective order may include,
but is not limited to, one or more of the following directions:
. .
.
(10) That the scope of the examination
be limited to certain matters.
(Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.420(a); (b)(10).) There is a meet
and confer requirement for a motion for a protective order.
Meet and Confer
Before
filing a motion for a protective order, Defendant is required to file a
declaration stating its efforts to meet and confer with the opposing party to
resolve this dispute, showing a “reasonable and good faith attempt” to resolve
informally the issues presented by the motion before filing the motion. (Code
Civ. Proc. § 2016.040.)
Defendant
filed a declaration stating that Defendant reached out to Plaintiff’s counsel by
email to meet and confer concerning the subpoena but received no response.
(Declaration of Thomas J. Kearney ISO Mot. ¶ 4, Exh. B.) Defendant has
therefore complied with the statutory meet and confer requirement.
Analysis
Defendant
Gibran Begum moves to quash a deposition subpoena for production of documents,
or, in the alternative, for a protective order. Defendant contends
that the subpoena should be quashed, or, in the alternative, a protective order
should be entered narrowing the scope of the request, on the basis that the
documents sought constitute an invasion of Defendant’s privacy.
In ruling on a privacy objection in the
context of discovery, the party asserting a privacy right must establish a
legally protected privacy interest. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3
Cal.5th 531, 552.) The party asserting a privacy right must also establish an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances. (Id.)
Further, the party asserting a privacy right must establish a threatened
intrusion that is serious. (Id.) The Court need not proceed to the
fourth step of balancing competing interests if all three of the above are not
satisfied. (Id. at 555.)
If the Court reaches the fourth step, the
Court must balance these competing considerations: The party seeking
information may raise whatever legitimate and important countervailing
interests disclosure may serve. (Id. at 552.) The party seeking
protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or
protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. (Id.)
Courts may not require the party seeking discovery to demonstrate a “compelling
need” simply because discovery of any facially private information is sought. (Id.
at 556-557.) When a privacy interest is asserted, the party seeking production
must show that the information sought is directly relevant to a cause of action
or a defense. (Harris v. Superior Court (Smets) (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th
661, 665, citing Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859-62.)
Defendant improperly
argues that Plaintiff must demonstrate a compelling need for discovery of
private documents. However, as Plaintiff states in opposition, that
requirement, as articulated in Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (1981)
119 Cal.App.3d 516, 524, was overruled by the California Supreme Court in 2017.
(Williams, supra, 3 Cal. 5th at 557.) The burden therefore rests on Defendant
to demonstrate a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy under the circumstances, and a serious threatened
intrusion. Defendant makes no effort to do so, instead improperly expending his
efforts on attempting to demonstrate that Plaintiff cannot articulate a
compelling need, while ignoring the requirement that Defendant must first
demonstrate a legally protected privacy interest, a reasonable expectation of
privacy, and a threatened intrusion that was serious. Defendant has therefore
failed to justify these objections.
Sanctions
Both
parties seek sanctions against the other. As Defendant is not the prevailing
party on this motion, he is not entitled to sanctions. Further, although
Plaintiff also requests sanctions, Plaintiff does not cite a statutory basis
for the request and does not specify whether sanctions are demanded against
Defendant, Defendant’s counsel, or both. The Court therefore declines to award
sanctions on this motion.
CONCLUSION:
Accordingly, Defendant’s
Motion to Quash the Subpoena for Production of Documents is DENIED.
Defendant’s alternative
Motion for a Protective Order is DENIED.
Both parties’ Requests for
Sanctions are DENIED.
Moving party to give
notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 19,
2022 ___________________________________
Theresa
M. Traber
Judge
of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the
tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the
email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling
the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on
the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the
hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative,
and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.