Judge: Theresa M. Traber, Case: BC720314, Date: 2024-01-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC720314    Hearing Date: January 25, 2024    Dept: 47

Annabel Aghajanian v. City of Glendale, Case No. BC720314

TENTATIVE RULINGS ON CERTAIN MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Plaintiff’s MIL # 1:  seeking to exclude any evidence, testimony, or argument regarding Plaintiff’s prior lawsuit against her former employer. 

TENTATIVE RULING:  GRANTED. 

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that evidence of her prior lawsuit should be excluded as irrelevant under Evidence Code §§ 350 and 210 and as unduly prejudicial, confusing and time-consuming under Evidence Code § 352.  In Lowenthal v. Mortimer (1954) 125 Cal. App. 2d 636, 643, our Court of Appeal reversed a jury verdict in favor of defendant, based on an improper ruling allowing evidence on 15 prior lawsuits in which the plaintiff and her husband were involved.  The appellate court ruled that these lawsuits were irrelevant to the issue of plaintiff’s alleged negligence in the case that was tried, not probative of any “nervousness” on plaintiff’s part in confronting the situation that led to the recent accident, and improper and prejudicial as a means of attacking the credibility of the plaintiff.  (Id., at pp. 340-342.)  The same must be said here.  Evidence of Plaintiff’s prior lawsuit has no probative value in assessing the strength or credibility of her claims here and does nothing to undercut or bolster her credibility in making those claims.

Defendants argue that the prior lawsuit should be admitted as evidence of a “pattern of making false complaints against her supervisors when her work performance is criticized,” and that it is admissible under subdivision (b) of Evidence Code §1101 to show Plaintiff’s plan or design to use litigation to secure financial gain rather than to assert valid complaints about discrimination and retaliation.  The Court is not persuaded by these arguments.  That Plaintiff lost a previous lawsuit for discrimination against a prior employer says nothing about the righteousness of her claims here.  Nor can it be said that it reflects a “plan” or “scheme” on Plaintiff’s part since evaluating such a pattern necessarily involves an objective assessment of the underlying misconduct being alleged in each case as much as Plaintiff’s subjective evaluation of her employment circumstances.  Further, Plaintiff’s efforts to assert her rights under protective legislation like the FEHA should not be undermined by allowing Defendants to disparage her “intent” or “motive” to enforce those rights against multiple employers as somehow nefarious or improper. 

As an alternative basis for admission, Defendants urge the Court to permit evidence of Plaintiff’s prior lawsuit to prove that her emotional distress arising from Defendants’ alleged misconduct complained about in August 2018 was in fact generated by her difficulties with her previous employer in her employment with the City of Los Angeles from January 2007 to April 2008. (Defendant’s Exh. B, p. 31.) This is simply not plausible.  Plaintiff’s allegations of misconduct by the City during 2007-2008 is sufficiently remote in time from the misconduct asserted against Defendants that it cannot be said that any such misconduct would have been an alternate, pre-existing impetus for Plaintiff’s current emotional injuries.  Certainly, Defendants have pointed to no evidence supporting their contention that Plaintiff’s experience with the City a decade beforehand contributed in any way to the emotional distress damages she claims to have suffered in this case.

Defendant also urges the Court to allow evidence of the past lawsuit to be used to impeach Plaintiff’s testimony in this case that she never treated with a mental health care professional (Exh. D, p. 80) by pointing to interrogatory answers in the prior lawsuit. It is not clear to the Court that there is any contradiction between Plaintiff’s recent deposition testimony and her July 2009 interrogatory answers.  (Exh. B, p. 46.)  In those answers, Plaintiff stated that she treated with Dr. Karo Isagholian for an “[e]xamination and treatment for workplace/industrial injuries (mental/emotional and physical/orthopedic)” on September 6, 2007, and January 10, 2008.  (Id.)  Although Defendant may be able to prove otherwise, it does not appear that Dr. Isagholian was a “mental health care professional,” but rather a worker’s compensation doctor or general physician treating Plaintiff for her orthopedic injury and stress.  Subject to additional proof that there is a real conflict in Plaintiff’s sworn statements, the Court denies Defendant’s effort to use Plaintiff’s 2009 interrogatory answer to impeach her recent deposition testimony.  

Finally, even if there were some minimal probative value to be ascribed to Plaintiff’s prior lawsuit, the Court would exclude the evidence under Evidence Code § 352 because its scant relevant is starkly outweighed by the prejudice Plaintiff would suffer by being pegged as a litigious employee, the confusion the jury would experience in wondering how to assess Plaintiff’s prior work experience in ruling on this case, and the waste of time and resources that would be necessary to explore Plaintiff’s complaints in the prior case to compare and contrast them with those in this case.  The Court concludes, therefore, that evidence of Plaintiff’s prior lawsuit must be excluded. 

Plaintiff’s MIL # 2:  seeking to exclude any evidence of or reference to anonymous letters about Plaintiff’s job performance.

TENTATIVE RULING:  GRANTED. 

The Court disagrees with Defendants that there is any legitimate non-hearsay purpose for admission of the anonymous letters.  The idea that the letters prompted an investigation is all well and good, but the fact that Defendants could not identify the author of the letters, confirm the facts and incidents on which the author based his or her accusations against Plaintiff, or analyze the possible biases or motivations of the author renders the content of the letters to be purely inadmissible hearsay.  Defendants’ witnesses may be able to say they conducted an investigation in response to anonymous letters, if the reason or impetus for their investigation are relevant, but they cannot seek admission of the substance of the letters without running afoul of the hearsay rule.  Moreover, given the flimsy basis for a non-hearsay purpose – that Defendants reasonably relied on unsubstantiated charges raised by anonymous sources to reach legitimate reasons for their actions – any substantive reference to the letters would provoke a prejudicial response in the jury that would be starkly outweighed by any probative value.