Judge: Thomas D. Long, Case: 20STCV09255, Date: 2023-08-15 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 20STCV09255    Hearing Date: January 30, 2024    Dept: 48

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

 

SOK HUN YUN, et al.,

                        Plaintiffs,

            vs.

 

BAE GUEN SONG, et al.,

 

                        Defendants.

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      CASE NO.: 20STCV09255

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER

 

Dept. 48

8:30 a.m.

January 30, 2024

 

On August 15, 2023, the Court sustained the demurrer of Defendants Jamie Park, Chris Hong, Audrey Jung, Propent Real Estate Inc., B&B Investment Properties LLC to the second amended complaint (“SAC”).

On September 5, 2023, Plaintiffs Sok Hun Yun and Sun Yung Ahn filed a third amended complaint (“TAC”).

On October 3, 2023, Defendants filed a demurrer to the second, third, and fourth causes of action.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)  When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true.  (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.)

A.        Plaintiffs Do Not Plead Facts Showing a Relationship Requiring an Accounting.

“A cause of action for accounting requires a showing of a relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant . . . that requires an accounting or a showing that the accounts are so complicated they cannot be determined through an ordinary action at law.”  (Fleet v. Bank of America N.A. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1413.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot state a claim for accounting because they cannot allege a fiduciary relationship.  (Demurrer at p. 6.) 

Like the SAC, the TAC alleges that non-moving Defendants Bae Guen Song and Jung Sook Song entered into agreements with the moving Defendants to secretly transfer the Songs’ property to Defendants Hong and Park in order to hinder Plaintiffs’ collection of a judgment against the Songs in a prior personal injury case.  (E.g., TAC ¶¶ 32-33, 44.)  There are no factual allegations of any relationship or involvement with Plaintiffs other than the conclusory allegation that “a legal relationship exists between Plaintiffs and the Defendants due to Plaintiff[s’] equitable interest in the subject properly created by the First Judgment creating constructive Notice of same.”  (TAC ¶ 70.)

The demurrer to the second cause of action is sustained.

B.        Plaintiffs Do Not Plead Sufficient Facts to Support Their IIED Claim.

“‘[T]o state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must show: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’  [Citation.]  ‘Conduct, to be ‘outrageous’ must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.’  [Citation.]”  (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1259.)  “Liability under the rule attaches only if the actor intended or should have recognized his conduct is likely to cause the resultant harm.”  (Spackman v. Good (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 518, 529.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege IIED because the alleged conduct of buying and selling real property is not extreme or outrageous.  (Demurrer at pp. 6-7.)  Plaintiffs allege that Defendants knew that Plaintiffs were entitled to a monetary award from the Songs, and they knew that the subject property “was the only asset of the Song Defendant[s] that was subject to an equitable lien and would be used to satisfy a monetary award that would be made in the Second phase of the personal case in January 2020.”  (TAC ¶ 78.)  Plaintiffs suffered extreme emotional distress “when they learned that they may not be receiving any compensation as a result of the SONG Defendants’ negligence that left Plaintiff SOK HUN YUN paralyzed and the secret and fraudulent sale of subject properly in which Plaintiffs had an equitable lien.”  (TAC ¶ 78.)  Plaintiffs’ allegations make clear that any alleged extreme emotional distress resulted from the Songs, not the moving Defendants.  The only alleged conduct by Defendants involves the purchase of the property, which is not extreme or outrageous.

The demurrer to the third cause of action is sustained.

C.        Plaintiffs Do Not Allege Facts Establishing a Duty For NIED.

“[T]here is no independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress.  [Citation.]  The tort is negligence, a cause of action in which a duty to the plaintiff is an essential element.  [Citations.]  That duty may be imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.  [Citation.]”  (Potter v. Firestone Tire &Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 984-985.)

Like the SAC, the TAC does not include any facts regarding the moving Defendants’ status in relation to Plaintiffs such that they owe Plaintiffs a duty.

The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is sustained.

D.        Conclusion

The demurrer to the second, third, and fourth causes of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Defendants are ordered to file an answer to the remaining first cause of action within 10 days.  (California Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(j).)

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit.  If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar.

 

         Dated this 30th day of January 2024

 

 

 

 

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court