Judge Thomas D. Long, Case Number: 20STCV10368, Date: 2025-01-23 Tentative Ruling

On December 6, 2024, a jury returned a verdict on the remaining claims in (1) Paradigm Industries’ fourth amended complaint; (2) Strada Developments L.P.’s first amended cross-complaint (“FACC”); and (3) A’s Match Dyeing Co. Inc.’s and Young Chul Kim’s cross-complaint.

On December 26, 2024, Strada filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, Or in the Alternative, For a New Trial.

One of Strada’s six exhibits is “a copy of the December 3, 2024, Trial Transcript, that I received from the Court Reporter.” (Clark Decl. ¶ 2.) This transcript is “an uncertified draft that has been prepared in rough edit form at counsel’s request and for counsel’s convenience. No representations are made about its accuracy.” (Clark Decl., Ex. 1 at p. 1, formatting omitted.)

A court reporter’s record “when prepared as a rough draft transcript, shall not be certified and cannot be used, cited, distributed, or transcribed as the official certified transcript of the proceedings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 273, subd. (b).) Accordingly, the Court cannot consider this transcript as admissible evidence for this motion.

The court must render judgment notwithstanding the verdict whenever a motion for a directed verdict for the aggrieved party should have been granted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 629.) “A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be granted only if it appears from the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party securing the verdict, that there is no substantial evidence in support.” (Sweatman v. Department of Veterans Affairs (2001) 25 Cal.4th 62, 68.) “If the evidence is conflicting or if several reasonable inferences may be drawn, the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be denied.” (Hauter v. Zogarts (1975) 14 Cal.3d 104, 110.)

A. Strada Did Not Meet Its Burden for Breach of Contract Against A’s Match (FACC’s First Cause of Action).

The jury found that Strada and A’s Match entered into a contract and that Strada did all or substantially all of the significant things that the contract required it to do, but the conditions required for A’s Match’s performance did not occur and those required conditions were not excused.

Strada argues that there was no evidence that A’s Match did not have to perform under the lease. (Motion at p. 8.)

First, Strada relies on the “admission” by A’s Match during closing argument that it breached the lease. (Motion at p. 8.) Strada contends that “[e]ven though A’s Match told the jury to answer in the verdict form that it breached the Lease and admitted that it was undisputed that A’s Match breached the Lease, the jury disregarded the evidence and erroneously entered a verdict that A’s Match did not breach the Lease.” (Ibid.) Strada cites only the inadmissible rough trial transcript of the statement made during closing arguments. Regardless, the Court instructed the jury, “What the attorneys say during the trial is not evidence. In their opening statements and closing arguments, the attorneys talk to you about the law and the evidence. What the lawyers say may help you understand the law and the evidence, but their statements and arguments are not evidence.” (Jury Instruction No. 60 [CACI 5002 Evidence].)

Second, Strada argues that it is undisputed that A’s Match was required to pay rent under the lease and that A’s Match failed to restore the property. (Motion at p. 8-9.) Strada proceeds to list the various amounts that A’s Match purportedly owes. (Id. at pp. 8-10.) This goes to the amount of damages, not whether there was an unexcused breach.

Finally, Strada contends that “there was no evidence presented by any party that A’s Match’s performance was somehow excused such that it did not need to perform its obligations under the Lease.” (Motion at p. 10.) According to Strada, “[t]he jury was clearly confused about both Questions 4 and 5 in the verdict form [about excuse] . . . as neither was an issue in the litigation.” (Ibid.) To obtain a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Strada is required to meet the same standard as for a directed verdict, and as the cross-complainant on this cause of action, it was Strada’s burden to prove all necessary elements of its claim, including that A’s Match was not excused from performance. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 629, 630.)

Strada was fully aware of how the jury would be instructed and what they would need to answer. In the parties’ Joint List of Proposed Jury Instructions, filed on December 2, 2024, Strada requested CACI 300 (Breach of Contract – Introduction) and agreed to Paradigm’s request for CACI 302 (Contract Formation). These instructions were given as Instruction Nos. 26 and 27. Additionally, Strada provided Verdict Forms on December 3, 2024, and its proposed form for “VF-300. Breach of Contract (as to Cross-Defendant A’s Match)” was given to the jury in the same form. This was the same form that Strada also proposed on November 5, 2024, before trial began. Strada therefore knew—and invited—the jury to consider excused performance, but it failed to prove to the jury that the required conditions for A’s Match’s performance occurred or that those required conditions were excused.

Strada also observes that “[t]he jury actually inquired during the trial as to the meaning of the term ‘excused’ and a substantive response was not provided, only a statement that excused meant what is commonly included in the dictionary.” (Ibid.) On December 5, 2024 at 4:00 p.m., the jury submitted a question: “Please provide clarity with regard to the term ‘excused’ and ‘not excused’ in the following questions: Instruction 1, Question 5 (Page 2)[;] Instruction 2, Question 3 (Page 4)[;] Instruction 2, Question 5 (Page 4)[;] Instruction 9, Question 3 (Page 17)[;] Instruction 10, Question 3 (Page 19).” The next day, the Court and counsel conferred regarding the jury question and returned the answer to the jury in the jury deliberation room. (See Minute Order 12/06/2024.) The jury received the following response: “The word ‘excused’ in the form has the same meaning as it has in the ordinary use of the English language.”

Strada cannot now complain about jury confusion when it agreed to the jury instructions for breach of contract, proposed the verdict form that inquired about conditions required for performance and excused conditions, and did not object to the Court’s answer to the jury’s question about excuse.

The Court determines that when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party, several reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence to support the verdict.

B. Strada Did Not Meet Its Burden for Breach of Guaranty Against Young Kim (FACC’s Third Cause of Action).

The jury found that Strada and Young Kim entered into a contract and that Strada did all or substantially all of the significant things that the contract required it to do, but the conditions required for Kim’s performance did not occur and those required conditions were not excused.

Strada argues that there was no evidence that Kim did not have to perform under the guaranty agreement. (Motion at p. 11.) According to Strada, “it is undisputed that A’s Match breached the Lease and, therefore, the undisputed evidence shows that pursuant to the Guaranty Agreement Kim is equally liable for all of Strada’s monetary damages.” (Ibid.)

The verdict form was the same as the one used for A’s Match, with the substitution of Kim’s name. This form was proposed by Strada. It was Strada’s burden to prove all necessary elements of its claim, including that Kim was not excused from performance.

Additionally, the jury submitted a question related to this cause of action. On December 5, 2024, the jury submitted a question: “In a lease agreement, does a guarantor need to sign individually?” The Court and counsel conferred regarding the jury question and returned the answer to the jury in the jury deliberation room. (See Minute Order 12/05/2024.) The jury received the following response: “Yes. That individual signature may or may not be found in the lease itself, any amendments to the lease or any other document referencing a guaranty.” There was no evidence presented of Kim’s individual signature as a guarantor.

The Court determines that when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party, several reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence to support the verdict.

C. Strada Did Not Meet Its Burden for Trespass Against Paradigm (FACC’s Fifth Cause of Action).

The jury found that Strada owned the property and Paradigm recklessly entered the property without Strada’s permission, but Paradigm’s entry was not a substantial factor in causing harm to Strada.

Strada argues that it lost $619,693.64 in market value rent during Paradigm’s trespass, and “there is no basis to find that Paradigm trespassed on the property for over a year and somehow Strada was not damaged. The law does not support a situation where Paradigm could conduct business at the premises without compensating Strada as the landlord.” (Motion at p. 12.) Strada also incurred $1,238,308.81 in repairs. (Id. at p. 13.) According to Strada, “given the undisputed evidence, once the jury found that Paradigm trespassed, it had to find damages.” (Ibid.)

Strada did present evidence of delinquent rent and maintenance/service charges; however, the summary of invoices shows a grand total of $5,335,808.19 owed by A’s Match. (Clark Decl., Ex. 2.) The summary of repairs shows $1,238,308.81 owed by A’s Match. (Clark Decl., Ex. 3.) Strada does not cite any evidence showing that Paradigm was solely responsible for causing all of these damages. As A’s Match notes, “Strada failed to inform the jury of the cost of restoring the premises from permissible changes to the premises made by A’s Match and Paradigm from the cost of restoring the premises for ordinary wear and tear. Instead, Strada lumped all of the restoration costs into one figure, $1,238,308.81. Thus, the Jury had no guidance, and could not guess, as to cost to restore the premises for permissible changes from the costs for ordinary wear and tear.” (Opposition at p. 4.) Additionally, as argued by A’s Match, there is a reasonable inference that Strada was already compensated for its damages through its default judgment against A’s Match for past due rent and holdover damages. (Id. at p. 5; see Duff Decl., Ex. E.) In light of the lack of clarity about the damages in Strada’s exhibits, it is reasonable to assume that the jury may have rejected witness testimony or other evidence about damages. (See Jury Instruction No. 8 [CACI 107 Witnesses].)

The Court determines that when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party, several reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence to support the verdict.

D. Strada Did Not Meet Its Burden for Fraud Against Jun and Paradigm (FACC’s Eighth Cause of Action).

The jury found that Jun knowingly or recklessly made a false representation of fact to Strada, Jun intended that Strada rely on the representation, and Strada reasonably relied on the representation, but Strada’s reliance was not a substantial factor in causing harm. The jury found that Paradigm did not make a false representation of fact to Strada.

Strada argues, without citing any evidence, that “[t]he evidence showed that Jun was acting individually and on behalf of Paradigm, so any misrepresentation made by Jun should equally be imputed to Paradigm,” and “[t]he jury’s finding of fraud conflicts with a finding that there were no damages.” (Motion at p. 13.) Strada requests an award of $619,693.64 in market value rent and $1,238,308.81 for restoring the property after the repairs because “[w]ithout the fraud, Paradigm would not have been given access to the property, not been permitted to conduct its business, and not been permitted to perform the construction or damage. Strada could also have recovered its property earlier and secured a rent paying tenant.” (Id. at pp. 14-15.)

For the same reasons as the trespass causation and damages, the jury could reasonably be uncertain about the causation and damages attributed to only the fraud.

The Court determines that when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party, several reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence to support the verdict.

Alternatively, Strada argues that it is entitled to a new trial. (Motion at pp. 14-15.)

A verdict may be vacated and a new trial ordered due to irregularity in the proceedings that prevented a party from having a fair trial, misconduct of the jury, accident or surprise, newly discovered evidence, excessive or inadequate damages, insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict, or error in law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657.) “A new trial shall not be granted upon the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict . . . unless after weighing the evidence the court is convinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences therefrom, that the court or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 657.)

Strada argues that “the jury could not have relied on evidence in making its findings as to these claims,” “[t]he jury’s verdicts were a series of contradictions,” and the jury “also apparently (and erroneously) repeatedly relied on evidence or arguments that were not made and/or were not part of the record.” (Motion at p. 15.)

For the same reasons as with the motion for judgment without the verdict, the Court is not convinced that the jury clearly should have reached a different verdict.

The Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, Or in the Alternative, For a New Trial is DENIED.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar.

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court