Judge: Thomas D. Long, Case: 20STCV48642, Date: 2022-07-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV48642    Hearing Date: July 26, 2022    Dept: 48

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

On December 21, 2020, Plaintiff Lucas Tapia filed this action against Defendant County of Los Angeles, alleging discrimination; harassment (sexual favoritism); retaliation; failure to prevent harassment, discrimination, or retaliation; and whistleblower retaliation.  On June 15, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Pitchess motion under Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 and Penal Code section 832.5.  Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”) filed an opposition as a real party in interest.  (See Evid. Code, § 1040, subd. (b).)

A party may discover a law enforcement officer’s personnel file through a Pitchess motion.  (See Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.)  The Pitchess motion has been partly codified in Evidence Code, section 1043, which makes law enforcement personnel records, public complaints against officers, and reports relating to those public complaints privileged and subject to disclosure only by noticed motion.  (Evid. Code, § 1043.)  The statutory scheme governing Pitchess motions is set forth in Evidence Code sections 1043 to 1047 and Penal Code sections 832.5, 832.7, 832.8.  (See People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226.)  These statutes provide the exclusive means of discovery of such records in both criminal and civil proceedings.  (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1605, 1609-1610.)

“[A] party seeking discovery of a peace officer’s personnel records must follow a two-step process.  [Citation.]  First, the party must file a written motion describing the type of records sought, supported by ‘[a]ffidavits showing good cause for the discovery . . . , setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records.’  [Citation.]  This initial burden is a ‘relatively relaxed standard [].’  [Citation.]  Information is material if it ‘ “will facilitate the ascertainment of the facts and a fair trial.”  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]  ‘[A] declaration by counsel on information and belief is sufficient to state facts to satisfy the “materiality” component of that section.’  [Citation.]”  (Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1085-1086 (Haggerty).)  The motion must provide a “specific factual scenario” that establishes the materiality of the discovery sought.  (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 85-86.)  The documents must be requested “with adequate specificity” to preclude the possibility that the moving party is engaged in a “fishing expedition.”  (People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 678.)

“Second, if ‘the trial court concludes [a party] has fulfilled these prerequisites and made a showing of good cause, the custodian of records should bring to court all documents “potentially relevant” to the [requesting party’s] motion . . . .  The trial court “shall examine the information in chambers” [citation], “out of the presence and hearing of all persons except the person authorized to possess the records and such other persons the custodian of records is willing to have present.” . . . Subject to statutory exceptions and limitations . . . the trial court should then disclose to the defendant “such information [that] is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.”  [Citations.]’ ”  (Haggerty, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1086.)

Under the two-step process, “[o]nce a court conducts an in camera hearing, section 1045 governs the documents that may be disclosed.”  (Haggerty, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1087.)  Section 1045, subdivision (a) allows “the right of access to records of complaints, or investigation of complaints, or discipline imposed as a result of those investigations, concerning an event or transaction in which the peace officer . . . participated, or which he or she perceived, and pertaining to the manner in which he or she performed his or her duties, provided that information is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.”  Section 1043 does not state that all documents relating to the investigation of a complaint made by an officer are subject to the Pitchess process; instead, it allows discovery of officer personnel records.  (Riske v. Superior Court (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 647, 655 (Riske) [explaining “Evidence Code section 1043 requires the party seeking the discovery of peace . . . officer personnel records or information from those records to file a motion with the court . . . .”].) 

Plaintiff requests 4 categories of documents.  Plaintiff’s counsel declares he believes Defendant is the governmental agency that has custody of the records and information sought by Plaintiff and that such records and information are kept in the ordinary course of business.  (Rowe Decl. ¶¶ 5, 15.)  Counsel believes the requested documents will show whether Garcia has a pattern of conduct of selecting or favoring female deputies over male deputies on the basis that he finds said female deputies sexually attractive.  (Id. at ¶ 10.)  Information regarding a Brady List will reveal whether Garcia has a history of making false statements or false reports, which could undermine his credibility and be used as impeachment evidence at trial.  (Id. at ¶ 11.)  Counsel also believes non-privileged communications by, between, or about Garcia may reveal discussions of Garcia’s actions in this case, or inculpatory statements about prior acts by Garcia, which implicate the same or similar issues as those alleged by Plaintiff.  (Id. at ¶ 12.)  The requested documents could also show what investigations have taken place, who was interviewed, and what statements were made (if any), which would reveal the scope of Defendant’s investigation, potential witnesses, and possible admissions, denials, or contradictions by Garcia.  (Id. at ¶ 13.)  Counsel believes the facts present a plausible account of Garcia’s illegal and illicit behavior, and it is plausible that Garcia used his position of authority as Lieutenant or Captain to commit illegal acts of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, and to avoid discipline of any sort.  (Id. at ¶ 14.)

The Court rules as follows:

A.        Request No. 1

Request No. 1 seeks all documents concerning Defendant’s internal investigation into prior complaints of sexual harassment, sexual favoritism, inappropriate relationships with subordinates, or retaliation made against Roel Garcia by any other person.  This request includes, but is not limited to, memoranda of interviews, witness statements, internal affairs investigative reports, performance log entries, policy of equity complaints, and the PRMS record.

LASD argues the request is vague, overly broad as to time and scope, and not relevant.  (Opposition at p. 7.)  LASD also argues there are no facts about Plaintiff being sexually harassed or being made the victim of an inappropriate relationship.  (Ibid.)  Plaintiff contends the documents “could speak to whether the County knew or should have known that Garcia was exploiting his position as a high-ranking official within LASD by providing favors to female subordinates he finds sexually attractive,” and “[i]t is plausible that if Garcia attempted to do so, that certain female subordinates would consider the overtures to be sexual harassment.”  (Reply at p. 3.)

The Complaint alleges Garcia demonstrated sexual favoritism toward Deputy Webb, and he was responsible for putting Webb on the promotion list.  (Complaint ¶¶ 20-22, 24, 31, 61.)  Plaintiff was also demoted after filing his Government Claim.  (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 38, 40.)  Complaints relating to similar discrimination, harassment, or retaliation may be material, but prior complaints of sexual harassment are not material to Plaintiff’s claims for discrimination, sexual favoritism, and retaliation.  The request for “all documents” is also overbroad and includes documents outside the scope of what is discoverable through the Pitchess process.

The motion is granted in part, limited to materials in Roel’s Garcia’s personnel file, as defined by Penal Code section 832.8, related to complaints of sexual favoritism, inappropriate relationships with subordinates, or retaliation.

B.        Request No. 2

Request No. 2 seeks all documents purporting to be a “Brady List” for Defendant containing Roel Garcia, noting Garcua as having “Brady issues” or the like, including any reports or other documents demonstrating the bases on which Roel Garcia is on the Brady List.

LASD argues this category is overbroad and irrelevant.  (Opposition at p. 7.)  Plaintiff argues “the Brady List is a list of law enforcement officers who are believed or known to have credibility issues,” so this information could provide a basis for impeachment of Garcia’s sworn testimony.  (Reply at p. 3.)  The information could be relevant to Garcia’s credibility.  However, the request is overbroad and includes documents outside the scope of what is discoverable through the Pitchess process.

The motion is granted in part, limited to materials in Roel Garcia’s personnel file, as defined by Penal Code section 832.8.

C.        Request No. 3

Request No. 3 seeks any and all non-privileged communications about this litigation by or about Roel Garcia in Defendant’s possession, custody, or control, which the County contends are protected by the Pitchess doctrine.

LASD argues this request is vague, ambiguous, and overly broad.  (Opposition at p. 7.)  The request is sufficiently specific, limited to non-privileged communications about this litigation that are also by or about Garcia.  However, the request for “any and all non-privileged communications” includes documents outside the scope of what is discoverable through the Pitchess process.

The motion is granted in part, limited to materials in Roel Garcia’s personnel file, as defined by Penal Code section 832.8.

D.        Request No. 4

Request No. 4 seeks any and all written reports documenting any investigation into the allegations made by Plaintiff in this litigation, or as a result of Plaintiff’s government claim, in Defendant’s possession, custody, and control, including, but not limited to, memoranda of interviews, witness statements, internal affairs investigative reports, performance log entries, and policy of equity complaints.

LASD argues the request seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and is overly broad and vague.  (Opposition at p. 8.)  This information is material and Plaintiff has shown good cause, but it goes beyond officers’ personnel files and public complaints.  It is also overbroad and does not request any particular officer’s personnel records.

The motion is denied.

E.        Conclusion

In sum, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

In-Camera Hearing of Roel Garcia’s Personnel Records from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department is scheduled for 08/03/2022 at 09:00 AM in Department 48 at Stanley Mosk Courthouse.  (August 3, 2022)

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit.  Parties intending to appear are encouraged to appear remotely and should be prepared to comply with Dept. 48’s new requirement that those attending court in person wear a surgical or N95 or KN95 mask.

         Dated this 26th day of July 2022