Judge Thomas D. Long, Case 20STCV48642 2022-09-01 Tentative Ruling

On December 21, 2020, Plaintiff Lucas Tapia filed this action against Defendant County of Los Angeles, alleging (1) discrimination (disparate treatment) in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (2) discrimination (disparate impact) in violation of FEHA; (3) harassment (sexual favoritism) in violation of FEHA; (4) retaliation in violation of FEHA; (5) failure to prevent harassment, discrimination, or retaliation; and (6) retaliation in violation of the Labor Code. Plaintiff later dismissed the second cause of action.

On June 17, 2022, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication.

Plaintiff’s Objection No. 3 is sustained. Corbett declares he was “not involved in making any personnel and selection decisions from that list” and therefore lacks personal knowledge of how the selection was made. (Corbett Decl. ¶¶ 18.)

Plaintiff’s Objection No. 6 is sustained as to “Being assigned on or off ‘the line’ is neither advantageous nor disadvantageous for purposes of promotion” for lacking personal knowledge and is otherwise overruled.

Defendant’s Objection Nos. 27-28 is sustained as improper opinions and speculation.

Plaintiff is an employee of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (“Department”), holding the rank of (Bonus) Deputy, a supervisory position, in the Custody Division. (Undisputed Material Facts “UMF” 1.) Plaintiff and then-Deputy Jacqueline Webb both worked in the Inmate Reception Center (“IRC”), Records Unit, for the Department. (UMF 2.) Both Plaintiff and Webb applied for promotion to the rank of Sergeant in the 2017 Sergeant’s Examination. (UMF 3.) The Sergeant’s Examination consisted of an objective two-part multiple-choice examination, followed by selection by a “chief’s panel” from a resulting Eligible List. (UMF 4.) Both Plaintiff and Webb scored in Band 4. (UMF 5.) Webb was promoted to Sergeant, and Plaintiff was not promoted. (UMF 5.) There were 185 passing candidates for promotion in the Sergeant’s Examination (78 in Band 4), and 96 promotions from the Eligibility List. (UMF 9.)

At some point, a Policy of Equity complaint was filed. (See UMF 17, 26.) Plaintiff was reassigned from the Records Unit to the line. (See UMF 17, 26.)

According to Defendant, a Performance Log Entry is a confirmation of counseling, not discipline, not part of the personnel file, necessarily provided to the employee, and removed after a year. (UMF 21, 30.)

For each claim in the complaint, the defendant moving for adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by showing that one or more elements of a cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520 (Scalf).) Then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1520.) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce “substantial responsive evidence.” (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 162-163.)

The first cause of action allege discrimination based on sex. FEHA prohibits discrimination in compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of membership in a protected class. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a).) An employee’s prima facie claim of discrimination requires “(1) the employee’s membership in a classification protected by the statute; (2) discriminatory animus on the part of the employer toward members of that classification; (3) an action by the employer adverse to the employee’s interests; (4) a causal link between the discriminatory animus and the adverse action; (5) damage to the employee; and (6) a causal link between the adverse action and the damage.” (Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 686, 713.) If an employee makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. (Id. at p. 714.)

“In an employment discrimination case, an employer may move for summary judgment against a discrimination cause of action with evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. [Citation.] A legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is one that is unrelated to prohibited bias and that, if true, would preclude a finding of discrimination. [Citation.] The employer’s evidence must be sufficient to allow the trier of fact to conclude that it is more likely than not that on or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were the sole basis for the adverse employment action.” (Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158 (Featherstone).) Then the burden shifts to the employee “to present evidence that the employer’s decision was motivated at least in part by prohibited discrimination.” (Id. at pp. 1158-1159.) “The plaintiff’s evidence must be sufficient to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a substantial motivating factor in the decision. [Citation.] The stronger the employer’s showing of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the stronger the plaintiff’s evidence must be in order to create a reasonable inference of a discriminatory motive.” (Id. at p. 1159.)

In the context of a summary judgment motion, “[i]f the employer presents admissible evidence either that one or more of plaintiff’s prima facie elements is lacking, or that the adverse employment action was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors, the employer will be entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff produces admissible evidence which raises a triable issue of fact material to the defendant’s showing. . . . [I]n the case of a motion for summary judgment or summary issue adjudication, the burden rests with the moving party to negate the plaintiff’s right to prevail on a particular issue. . . . In other words, the burden is reversed in the case of a summary issue adjudication or summary judgment motion.” (Arteaga v. Brink’s Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 344 [citations and quotations omitted].)

“The employee’s ‘subjective beliefs in an employment discrimination case do not create a genuine issue of fact; nor do uncorroborated and self-serving declarations.’ [Citation.]” (Featherstone, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1159.) “To show that an employer’s reason for termination is pretextual, an employee ‘ “cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent or competent.” ’ [Citation.] To meet his or her burden, the employee ‘ “must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence,’ ” ’ and hence infer ‘ “the employer did not act for [the asserted] nondiscriminatory reasons.” ’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) “[A]n employer is entitled to summary judgment if, considering the employer’s innocent explanation for its actions, the evidence as a whole is insufficient to permit a rational inference that the employer’s actual motive was discriminatory.” (Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 361.)

Defendant argues it had non-discriminatory reasons for promoting Webb. (Motion at p. 18.) First, Defendant contends its motive was not based on illicit sexual grounds. (Ibid.) Webb declares she never had a romantic or sexual relationship with Captain Roel Garcia and Assistant Sheriff Corbett. (Webb Decl. ¶¶ 27-28.) Corbett and Garcia deny ever having a romantic or sexual relationship with Webb, and they deny making romantic or sexual overtures, suggesting that she would be promoted if they had a relationship, engaging in sexual favoritism, or promising benefits based on sex. (Corbett Decl. ¶¶ 5-9; Garcia Decl. ¶¶ 9-14.) This suggests that Plaintiff cannot prove discriminatory animus or a causal link to Webb’s promotion and Plaintiff’s denial of promotion.

Second, Defendant notes that Corbett and Garcia did not have a role in the Sergeant’s Examination process. (Motion at p. 18.) Corbett was not assigned to the Examinations Unit, was not involved in preparing or administering the examination, was not involved in placing Plaintiff or Webb on the promotion list, was not involved in placing or scoring them into a specific “band” on the list, and was not on the selection panel. (Corbett Decl. ¶¶ 14-18.) Garcia also was not involved with the Examinations Unit, was not a member of the panel making decisions, and was never in a position to make any recommendations or to comment on any applicant for that promotional process. (Garcia Decl. ¶¶ 24, 28-29.) This suggests that Plaintiff will be unable to prove causation between Corbett’s and Garcia’s actions and Webb’s promotion.

Third, Defendant argues that Webb’s selection does not imply discrimination because both Plaintiff and Webb were in Band 4 and were equally reachable. (Motion at p. 18.) But this does not preclude favoritism within Band 4 candidates if not all of them could be promoted.

Defendant’s arguments and cited evidence do not show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action—here, promoting Webb instead of Plaintiff. Instead, the argument appears to be a lack of causation due to Corbett’s and Garcia’s denials of wrongdoing and their involvement in the promotion process. Defendant’s evidence is sufficient to meet its initial burden with respect to proving a lack of discriminatory animus and a lack of causation.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Corbett’s statement and party admission that “‘it’s a female thing’ or words to that effect, shows the County’s proffered excuses for Webb’s promotion over Tapia are pretextual.” (Opposition at pp. 10-11.) Plaintiff misstates Corbett’s testimony. Corbett was asked, “Isn’t it true that you told him at one point that it came down to a female thing or words to that effect?” (Corbett Depo. at p. 69.) He responded that the question was “a bit out of context,” and he explained, “So [Plaintiff] was frustrated, and he wondered why a female got selected out of the same band over him. And my reference to him was I had no idea. I mentioned that back in the ‘80s I believe it was there was a lawsuit—the Bowman decision it was referred to—which required coveted positions and promotionals to have a ration of females. And I want to say it was 25 percent.” (Ibid.) Corbett further told Plaintiff that at that point, there was specific criteria in the department for having a certain percentage of promotes and coveted positions be female. (Id. at p. 70.) He also told Plaintiff that he did not know if that was still the case or if it still applied. (Ibid.) Corbett’s explanation was “just [his] assumption or not even supposition that possibly that was the reason because [he] had no idea.” (Ibid.) This does not prove that Defendant promoted Webb because she is female.

Plaintiff also argues that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to the motivation for promoting Webb when she was the only female in a list of five under consideration, and the only one who was not already a supervisory level deputy. (Opposition at p. 12.) However, Plaintiff does not dispute that Corbett and Garcia played no role in the promotion selection process.

The third cause of action alleges harassment based on sex. To establish a claim for harassment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he is a member of a protected group; (2) he was subjected to harassment because he belonged to this group; and (3) the alleged harassment was so severe that it created a hostile work environment. (See Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121.) Whether harassment exists based upon a hostile work environment is determined by considering all of the circumstances, which may include frequency, severity, and job interference. (Miller v. Dept. of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 462.) Harassment consists of “conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives.” (Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 646.) Harassment does not include commonly necessary personnel management actions, such as hiring, firing, job assignments, promotion, demotion, performance evaluations, excluding from meetings, and laying off. (Thompson v. City of Monrovia (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 860, 879.) To establish a hostile work environment, “‘[a] plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s conduct would have interfered with a reasonable employee’s work performance and would have seriously affected the psychological well-being of a reasonable employee and that [she] was actually offended.’” (Hope v. California Youth Authority (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 577, 588.) “[S]exual favoritism by a manager may be actionable when it leads employees to believe that ‘they [can] obtain favorable treatment from [the manager] if they became romantically involved with him’ [citation], the affair is conducted in a manner ‘so indiscreet as to create a hostile work environment,’ or the manager has engaged in ‘other pervasive conduct . . . which created a hostile work environment.’” (Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 465.)

Defendant argues that its personnel actions cannot be the basis of a claim. (Motion at p. 20.) Plaintiff alleges he was passed over for a promotion in favor of Webb, demoted, and stripped of his duties and responsibilities as a supervisor in the Records Department. (E.g., Complaint ¶¶ 29, 32, 40.) These are commonly necessary personnel management actions that do not constitute harassment. With respect to allegations that Corbett and Garcia permitted Webb to engage in timecard fraud and not report for duty (Complaint ¶ 27), the parties deny the allegations. (Corbett Decl. ¶¶ 25-28; Garcia Decl. ¶¶ 15-19.) Corbett and Garcia also deny engaging in a relationship with Webb or engaging in sexual favoritism. (Corbett Decl. ¶¶ 5-9; Garcia Decl. ¶¶ 9-14.) Defendant has met its initial burden of showing there was no actionable harassment.

In opposition, Plaintiff confirms that his claim is based on the denial of promotion and Webb’s “flex” schedule and false timecards. (Opposition at pp. 13-14.) To the extent that Plaintiff is arguing that Webb was given preferential treatment because she was not punished for submitting blank, incomplete, or false timecards (see Response to UMF 7), Plaintiff again misconstrues the testimony. Webb testified that her flex schedule meant that she was tasked to work for 40 hours a week without a set schedule. (Webb Depo. at pp. 37-38.) She sometimes had a blank timesheet because “[t]here is times that I would forget to sign my sheet or fill in the hours; just like everybody else.” (Id. at pp. 38-39.) Plaintiff testified that he observed one of Webb’s timecards that showed ten hours each day, including a day when Webb was not present. (Tapia Depo. at pp. 158-159.) Even if true, Plaintiff’s evidence does not constitute pervasive conduct or an unreasonable interference with his job performance sufficient to constitute harassment.

The fourth cause of action alleges Plaintiff was retaliated against after participating as a witness in a discrimination or harassment complaint and reporting or resisting discrimination or harassment.

Under FEHA, an employer may not discharge or discriminate against any person who opposes forbidden employment practices. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (h).) To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under FEHA, a plaintiff must show “(1) he or she engaged in a ‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action. [Citations.] Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer is required to offer a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. [Citation.] If the employer produces a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, the presumption of retaliation ‘‘‘drops out of the picture,’’’ and the burden shifts back to the employee to prove intentional retaliation. [Citation.]” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 (Yanowitz).)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s reassignment to the line occurred before the Board of Supervisors received the government claim, so Plaintiff cannot prove causation. (Motion at p. 21.) Plaintiff’s discovery responses identify June 22, 2020 as the date of his “demot[ion] to the position of Supervising Line Deputy.” (Hausman Decl., Ex. 8.) Plaintiff’s claim has a file-stamp date of June 23, 2020. (Hausman Decl., Ex. 10.) However, in opposition, Plaintiff presents his claim rejection letter, reflecting a claim presentation date of June 16, 2020. (Rowe Decl., Ex. 19.) Accordingly, there is a triable issue of fact regarding the sequence of events and causation.

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s reassignment to the line had a legitimate, good faith basis. (See Motion at p. 15-16.) A Policy of Equity complaint involving Plaintiff and Webb was filed, claiming that one violated the rights of the other under the policy. (Mancilla Decl. ¶ 7.) Both Plaintiff and Webb were assigned to the IRC Records Unit, which was a relatively small office with a small number of staff members. (Mancilla Decl. ¶ 8.) The Intake Unit recommended the separation of Plaintiff and Webb. (Mancilla Decl. ¶ 9.) Other command staff recused, so Chief Sergio Mancilla was the decisionmaker for separation through reassignment. (Mancilla Decl. ¶ 10.) He ordered Plaintiff’s reassignment from the IRC Records Unit to “the line” as a Supervising Line Deputy to physically separate him and Webb on the basis of risk management and reducing liability. (Mancilla Decl. ¶¶ 11-12.) Accordingly, Defendant has met its burden of showing a legitimate, good faith basis for reassigning Plaintiff to the line.

Plaintiff argues that his reassignment was not for risk management purposes because he has not been permitted to return to his former position at IRC Records Unit more than a year after the Policy of Equity complaint determination was made. (Opposition at pp. 15-16.) But Plaintiff’s cited evidence does not support a showing of pretext. (See Response to UMF 17.) Webb explained that she made a complaint after she overhead Plaintiff tell someone else that Webb had been promoted because of sexual favors. (Webb Depo. at p. 54.) Corbett testified that the Policy of Equity complaint was founded, and thus there was a recommendation to issue a Performance Log Entry and reassign Plaintiff away from the unit where Webb was assigned. (Corbett Depo. at p. 64.) Defendant’s PMK did not testify that an “employee should be returned to prior position,” as Plaintiff asserts. (Response to UMF 17.) Rather, she was asked a hypothetical: “Imagine a situation where a deputy has been given a new punitive job assignment because he opposed sex discrimination in the sheriffs’ department. What would correcting retaliation in that instance mean?” (Vaisa Depo. at p. 33.) She responded, “[I]f there is a punitive the department would need to correct it by reassigning them back to where they were. That’s one option.” (Vaisa Depo. at p. 34.) Her answer assumes for the sake of the hypothetical that retaliation did occur and therefore needed to be corrected. She did not testify that Plaintiff should be returned to his prior position at the conclusion of a Policy of Equity complaint, and the failure to do so would demonstrate pretext to validate a retaliation claim. Thus, Plaintiff has not shown that he was entitled to be reassigned back to the IRC Records Unit after resolution of the Policy of Equity complaint.

Defendant also argues that the reassignment to the line was not an adverse employment action. (Motion at p. 21.) According to Mancilla, this reassignment was within the scope of Plaintiff’s duties as a Bonus Deputy because it was a supervisory position and was not a demotion or diminishment in rank or grade. (Mancilla Decl. ¶ 13.) “[A] transfer into a comparable position does not meet the definition of an adverse employment action under FEHA.” (Akers v. County of San Diego (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1457.) Defendant has therefore met its initial burden with respect to the reassignment not constituting an adverse employment action.

Plaintiff argues that the reassignment is nevertheless an adverse employment action because he “was removed from a specialized administrative job in an office where he had no contact with inmates—a position he had held for many years, and in which he had significant achievements—and transferred to a line assignment, where he was in regular contact with inmates, had virtually no administrative duties, fewer meaningful responsibilities, and was less likely to lead to further promotion.” (Opposition at p. 16.) Plaintiff describes his expertise in processing inmate files, his implementation of processes, and commendations given for his work. (Tapia Decl. ¶¶ 4-10.) Plaintiff explains that in his prior position in IRC Records Unit, he “was in charge of dealing with complicated records management issues, statutory compliance for immigration matters, and ensuring that inmate releases were timely effectuated so that there were no overdetentions. [He] had regular contact with higher ranking officials within the Sheriff’s Department, including Commanders, Chiefs, and even generated reporting for the Sheriff. [His] position in IRC Records was a position in which [he] had a better chance of future promotions because of the magnitude of the responsibilities involved.” (Tapia Decl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff has therefore created a triable issue of fact regarding whether the reassignment was a material adverse action. (See Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1389-1390 [transfer with the same wages, benefits, and duties was nevertheless an adverse action when viewed collectively because it did not present the same administrative challenges and career advancement opportunities].)

In reply, Defendant contends there is no such thing as a “de facto demotion” under the Civil Service Rules. (Reply at p. 10.) Defendant’s cited case involved whether the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission has jurisdiction to entertain a claim that an employee has been subject to a “constructive” or “de facto” demotion. (Berumen v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Health Services (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 372, 374.) The Court of Appeal specifically stated that the plaintiff did not rely on FEHA, and the issue solely involved whether the plaintiff suffered a “constructive” or “de facto” demotion and whether the Commission had jurisdiction to evaluate that claim. (Id. at p. 378.) Thus, it is not relevant to Plaintiff’s claims here.

In sum, Plaintiff has shown a triable issue of material fact regarding whether his assignment to the line was an adverse employment action in retaliation for filing a government claim. But even if it was an adverse employment action, Defendant has shown it had a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for doing so.

D. Fifth Cause of Action – Failure to Prevent Harassment, Discrimination, or Retaliation

Defendant argues that because there was no harassment, discrimination, or retaliation, it also cannot be liable for failing to prevent harassment, discrimination, or retaliation. (See Motion at p. 18, fn. 4.) For the reasons discussed above, summary adjudication of the fifth cause of action is also granted.

The sixth cause of action alleges retaliation for protesting violations of FEHA and other policies.

Labor Code “section 1102.6, and not McDonnell Douglas, supplies the applicable framework for litigating and adjudicating section 1102.5 whistleblower claims.” (Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 712 (Lawson).) After a plaintiff demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that his protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse employment action, the employer must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the adverse employment action would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons even if the employee did not engage in the protected conduct. (Lab. Code, § 1102.6.) Under this standard, “plaintiffs may satisfy their burden of proving unlawful retaliation even when other, legitimate factors also contributed to the adverse action.” (Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 713-714.)

Defendant argues that the Policy of Equity and Performance Log Entry are not in Plaintiff’s government claim. (Motion at p. 22.) Before filing an action against a public entity under Labor Code section 1102.5, a plaintiff must file a timely claim under the Government Claims Act. (Le Mere v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 237, 245-247.) “Generally speaking, no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented until a written claim has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board.” (Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776.)

The government claim addresses Webb’s promotion and Plaintiff’s denial of promotion, as well as Plaintiff’s refusal to do a special favor for Garcia by arranging the release of an inmate. (Hausman Decl., Ex. 10.) Although the Policy of Equity and Performance Log Entry are not part of the claim (and are therefore barred as bases for the retaliation claim in this action), other bases for this cause of action are asserted in the government claim.

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff “will be unable to show that any decision was made with a retaliatory animus.” (Motion at p. 22.) Summary judgment law “continues to require a defendant moving for summary judgment to present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854, footnote omitted.) Defendant must therefore “present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.” (Id. at p. 855.) Defendant has not done so in this section of its motion. However, for the reasons discussed above with the first cause of action, Defendant has met its burden of showing a lack of causation and discriminatory motive for discrimination, and for the reasons discussed with the third cause of action, it has met its burden of showing a lack of harassment based on sex.

Defendant also argues that “every decision (at least to the extent it can be interpreted by the County) was made for a legitimate reason and purpose.” (Motion at p. 22.) To the extent that this cause of action is based on Plaintiff’s reassignment from the IRC Records Unit to the line, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his protected activity was a contributing factor and does not cite supporting evidence. (Opposition at pp. 18-19.) On the other hand, as discussed with FEHA retaliation claim, Defendant has provided evidence that Plaintiff’s reassignment was done on the basis of risk management and reducing liability.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. Parties intending to appear are encouraged to appear remotely and should be prepared to comply with Dept. 48’s new requirement that those attending court in person wear a surgical or N95 or KN95 mask.

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court