Judge Thomas D. Long, Case Number: 21STCV11496, Date: 2024-06-18 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Pooya Bakhtiari and Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA LLC have reached a settlement in this Song-Beverly action. Judgment was entered on May 5, 2023.

On May 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum of Costs. On May 26, 2023, Defendant filed a motion to tax costs. On July 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney fees and expenses.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff improperly claimed $18,8375.60 in costs, consisting of $9,099.15 in deposition costs, $145.00 for service of process, $9,669.00 in expert fees, and $1,967.40 other expenses. (Motion at p. 2.)

First, Defendant argues that “Plaintiff has overreached in his attempt to seek costs which are not recoverable” under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 (Motion at p. 3.) A prevailing plaintiff in a Song-Beverly action may recover all “costs and expenses . . . determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1794, subd. (d).) “[I]t is clear the Legislature intended the word ‘expenses’ to cover items not included in the detailed statutory definition of ‘costs.’” (Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137.) The costs claimed in the Memorandum of Costs are the same as those sought in Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees and expenses.

Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff provided no documentation or invoices to corroborate the costs. (Motion at pp. 3-5.) “A ‘verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of the propriety’ of the items listed on it, and the burden is on the party challenging these costs to demonstrate that they were not reasonable or necessary.” (Adams v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1486.) “[I]f the correctness of the memorandum is challenged either in whole or in part by the affidavit or other evidence of the contesting party, the burden is then on the party claiming the costs and disbursements to show that the items charged were for matters necessarily relevant and material to the issues involved in the action.” (Oak Grove School Dist. of Santa Clara County v. City Title Ins. Co. (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 678, 699.) Defendant provides no affidavit or other evidence to challenge the propriety of Plaintiff’s costs. Nevertheless, Plaintiff provides copies of invoices with his opposition. (Kasparian Decl., Exs. A-D.) Plaintiff’s costs are reasonable, supported, and recoverable.

As the prevailing party, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees and expenses. (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).) California courts apply the “lodestar” approach to determine what fees are reasonable. (See, e.g., Holguin v. DISH Network LLC (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1332.) This inquiry “begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) From there, the “lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Ibid.) Relevant factors include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) The party seeking fees has the burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784.)

Plaintiff requests a total of $434,296.86, consisting of $195,212.50 in attorney fees, $21,935.93 in costs and expenses, and $217,148.43 as a lodestar enhancement.

Plaintiff provides a copy of counsel’s billing records, which show 144.9 hours billed by California Lemon Law Center, 102.9 hours billed by Altman Law Group, and 25.45 hours billed by Anderson Law. (Motion, Exs. 2-4.) Plaintiffs’ counsel charges various hourly rates: $700 for Lucy Kasparian (134.8 hours); $550 for Aram Aslanian (9.5 hours); $175 for Khachatur “Chris” Ayvazyan (0.6 hours); $400 for Andrew Jung (53 hours); $950 for Bryan C. Altman (44.4 hours); $475 for Chris J. Urner (1.6 hours); $100 for Jessica Sotolongo (1.7 hours); $175 for Parisa Elyasi (2.2 hours); and $750 for Martin W. Anderson (25.45 hours).

The Court finds that rates greater than $495 are unreasonably high for such a straightforward lemon law action, even for experienced counsel. Accordingly, the Court recalculates the total billed time for each attorney/paralegal as follows: $66,726.00 for Lucy Kasparian (134.8 hours @ $495); $4,702.50 for Aram Aslanian (9.5 hours @ $495); $105 for Khachatur “Chris” Ayvazyan (0.6 hours @ $175); $15,900.00 for Andrew Jung (53 hours @ $300); $21,978.00 for Bryan C. Altman (44.4 hours @ $495); $480.00 for Chris J. Urner (1.6 hours @ $300); $170.00 for Jessica Sotolongo (1.7 hours @ $100); $385.00 for Parisa Elyasi (2.2 hours @ $175); and $12,597.75 for Martin W. Anderson (25.45 hours @ $495). The revised base total of attorney fees is $123,044.25.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff improperly used block-billing, which makes it “impossible to determine what tasks were completed in a reasonable time frame.” (Motion at p. 2.) Defendant identifies many billing entries that it contends are unreasonable, excessive, or vague. (Id. at pp. 2-7.) For nearly all of these billing entries, Defendant states, “This entry is vague and ambiguous as it is unclear how long each task took and was billed.” For some other billing entries, Defendant argues that they are for “a task that is normally done by paralegals and not the attorney.” A few other billing entries are purportedly “an inefficient amount of time spent.”

Block-billing is not objectionable per se, but counsel may be penalized for this practice when it obscures the nature of the work and results in a vague fee request. (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1325.) Although Plaintiff did block-bill some entries, it is clear what work was done. For example, counsel billed for “Finalize Plaintiff’s discovery responses to MBUSA,” “Receive and Review new Repair order from client,” and “Work on the Compe[n]dium of Evidence and Client's declaration based on the emails and telephone calls of this morning.” Additionally, “‘[i]n challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.’” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488.) Defendant has not met this burden.

Defendant also contends that all billing entries after May 8, 2023 “must be disregarded as this matter had settled based on the filing of the notice of judgment.” Those subsequent billing entries relate to Defendant’s motion to tax costs, settlement of fees, and Plaintiff’s motion for fees and expenses. These fees were reasonably incurred and are recoverable. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1794, subd. (d) [prevailing plaintiff may recover all “costs and expenses . . . determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred”].)

Plaintiff requests a lodestar multiplier of 2.0. “[A] trial court should award a multiplier for exceptional representation only when the quality of representation far exceeds the quality of representation that would have been provided by an attorney of comparable skill and experience billing at the hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1139.) This matter was not noticeably different from other lemon law cases, did not involve complex or novel legal issues warranting a multiplier, and Plaintiffs’ counsel has extensive experience litigating similar matters. Despite the length of time from case inception to settlement, there are no indications that Plaintiffs’ counsel engaged in any actions different from a typical strategy to achieve this result. The Court declines to add a multiplier.

With respect to the $21,935.93 in costs and expenses, Defendant argues that “Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence of the reasonableness of the costs incurred.” (Opposition at p. 11.) For the reasons stated in the Court’s ruling on the motion to tax costs, Plaintiff may recover these costs and expenses.

Considering the type of case, complexity of the case, length of litigation, and the record as a whole, the Court concludes that a reasonable amount of attorney fees is $110,739.82 (10% reduction from the $123,044.25 revised base total after rate reductions). (See Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88, 102 [a court may impose a rate reduction of up to ten percent based on its exercise of discretion and without a more specific explanation].)

The motion for attorney fees and expenses is GRANTED IN PART. The Court awards Plaintiff $110,739.82 in attorney fees and $21,935.93 in costs and expenses.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar.

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court