Judge Thomas D. Long, Case Number: 21STCV11613, Date: 2024-12-12 Tentative Ruling

On December 15, 2023, the Court entered judgment in favor of Defendant Christina Hayek and against Plaintiff Cameron Kaminski. The judgment awarded Defendant $140,000.00 in attorney fees and $4,456.50 in costs. On January 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Filing of Notice of Appeal.

On April 10, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to compel production of communications with Plaintiff’s parents and for a discretionary undertaking.

On April 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to stay enforcement or for a protective order.

On May 2, 2024, the Court granted in part Plaintiff’s motion, stayed enforcement of the judgment through May 30, 2024, and imposed an undertaking of $100,000. The Court continued Defendant’s motion to compel production of communications.

On July 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Abandonment of Appeal, thereby making Defendant’s request for a discretionary undertaking moot.

At the original September 10, 2024 hearing on the motion to compel production, the parties represented that the case has reached a settlement. The Court continued the hearing.

Plaintiff and his parents executed a Legal Services Agreement with counsel, which provided, in part, “Your parents John Kaminski and Terri Kaminski have agreed to serve as financial guarantors in this representation. As part of that role and with your support, we intend to update them on the status of the litigation so they understand the work to be performed.” (Motion, Ex. 3.) Plaintiff’s counsel later disclosed to Defendant’s counsel that “[Plaintiff’s] parents are financially committed to seeing this case all the way through trial and beyond if necessary. . . . [Plaintiff’s] parents are fully aware of the potential costs and are prepared to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on this litigation if necessary.” (Motion, Ex. 1.)

After the Court entered judgment, Defendant served third-party ORAPs and subpoenas for documents and testimony on Plaintiff’s counsel. (Motion, Ex. 6.) One category remains in dispute: “(8) Copies of all correspondence between You and Mr. Kaminski’s parents. . . . If you assert that these emails are privileged, please produce a privilege log identifying each email by date, sender, recipient/cc, and subject line, and that has a sufficient level of detail to allow the judgment creditor to evaluate the claimed basis for privilege.”

Defendant contends that “[t]he communications with Hayek’s parents are relevant to Hayek’s theory that, if the parents were paying for paying for the litigation . . . or controlling it (as the emails may show), then the judgment can potentially be amended to add the parents as additional third-party judgment debtors.” (Motion at p. 6.) Defendant argues that the communications are not privileged because Plaintiff’s counsel admitted that the only reason that the parents were “necessary” to assist in Plaintiff’s representation was for their financial assistance, not to provide assistance for attorney-client understanding during the litigation. (Id. at p. 7.) Defendant compares this case to a case involving a litigation funder, “except that here, and unlike in the usual professional litigation funding scenario, there was no agreement between the litigation funders and the attorney or client whereby the ‘litigation funders’ (here, Kaminski’s parents) agreed to keep confidential the attorney-client communications they were made privy to.” (Ibid.)

The Court does not decide whether Plaintiff’s communications with counsel are privileged because the Court finds that they are not relevant. The purpose of post-judgment examinations is “to furnish information to aid in enforcement of the money judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 708.110, subd. (a).) The judgment is against Plaintiff, not his parents. Defendant does not argue that Plaintiff’s parents and counsel are communicating to, for example, improperly hide Plaintiff’s assets—thus making the communications relevant to trace Plaintiff’s own assets. Rather, Defendant argues that because Plaintiff’s parents were willing to finance Plaintiff’s original litigation, they should also be liable for the resulting judgment against Plaintiff. That is not the law, and it is an improper use of third-party post-judgment subpoenas. “Under section 708.120, a creditor is entitled to examine a third party if it convinces the court that the ‘third person has possession or control of property in which the judgment debtor has an interest or is indebted to the judgment debtor.’ If this showing is made, ‘the court shall make an order directing the third person to appear . . . to answer concerning such property or debt.” (§ 708.120, italics added.) Under its plain meaning, this statutory language provides the trial court with the authority to permit a creditor to seek information regarding the existence of the debtor’s property in the third party's possession and/or a debt owed to the debtor. A third party document subpoena must therefore be limited to ‘confirm[ing] the existence of the subject property [and/or] debt.’” (Finance Holding Co. LLC v. The American Institute of Certified Tax Coaches, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 663, 682.)

Defendant’s argument that the communications may show that Plaintiff’s parents are alter-ego judgment debtors is unsupported. “Amending a judgment to add an alter ego of an original judgment debtor ‘“‘is an equitable procedure based on the theory that the court is not amending the judgment to add a new defendant but is merely inserting the correct name of the real defendant.”’” (Highland Springs Conference & Training Center v. City of Banning (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 267, 280.)

Defendant cites Favila v. Pasquarella (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 934, 943 (Favila) for its holding that the “trial court properly amended judgment to add former wife of judgment debtor on alter ego theory, even though she had previously been dismissed from the case on summary judgment.” (Motion at p. 6.) That is an incomplete—and thus inaccurate—summary of those proceedings. In Favila, the trial court determined that the debtor’s wife was not personally liable for the actions at issue in the lawsuit, but her post-judgment actions effectively made her the successor to an entity defendant. (Favila, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 943.) These actions included setting up bank accounts in the names of entities but using her personal Social Security number, inadequately capitalizing the entity by personally holding all assets, commingling assets, and failing to observe corporate formalities. (Id. at pp. 940-941.)

Defendant has not shown how Plaintiff’s parents can be his successors or alter egos. Defendant asserts that the communications may show the extent of the parents’ involvement in controlling this litigation, one factor for establishing alter ego liability. (Motion at p. 8.) But even if the parents fully controlled the funding and direction of this action, Defendant has not shown how Plaintiff’s parents can be his successors or alter egos. This action alleged defamation and interference with Plaintiff’s business relationships. There is no showing that Plaintiff’s parents are equivalent parties who suffered the same harms and sought the same relief. They did not have the same interests in the litigation. Plaintiff’s parents only alleged involvement is providing the financial resources for Plaintiff to bring his lawsuit and litigate Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion.

Because the communications between Plaintiff’s parents and counsel are irrelevant to enforcing the judgment against Plaintiff, the motion is denied.

The Motion for Order to Compel Production of Communications with Judgment Debtor’s Parents is DENIED.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar.

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court