Judge: Thomas D. Long, Case: 21STCV13635, Date: 2024-07-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV13635    Hearing Date: July 2, 2024    Dept: 48

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

 

CHANTLY BANAYAN,

                        Plaintiff,

            vs.

 

JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA, LLC,

 

                        Defendant.

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      CASE NO.: 21STCV13635

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPENSES

 

Dept. 48

8:30 a.m.

July 2, 2024

 

Plaintiff Chantly Banayan and Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America LLC have reached a settlement in this Song-Beverly action.  On November 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney fees and expenses.

Plaintiff’s objections to the Declaration of Bryan A. Reynolds are overruled.

As the prevailing party, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees and expenses.  (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).)  California courts apply the “lodestar” approach to determine what fees are reasonable.  (See, e.g., Holguin v. DISH Network LLC (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1332.)  This inquiry “begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.”  (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)  From there, the “lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.”  (Ibid.)  Relevant factors include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.”  (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)  The party seeking fees has the burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.  (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784.)

Plaintiff requests a total of $133,021.67, consisting of $68,345.00 in attorney fees for Quill & Arrow LLP, $21,790.00 in attorney fees for West Point Legal LLP, a 1.35 multiplier enhancement on the attorney fees ($31,547.25), $5,339.42 in costs and expenses, and $6,000.00 for review of the Opposition, drafting the Reply, and attending the hearing on this motion.

Plaintiff provides a copy of counsel’s billing records.  Quill & Arrow LLP billed 166.9 hours, for a total of $73,684.42.  (Jacobson Decl., Ex. 10.)  West Point Legal LLP billed 39.9 hours, for a total of $21,790.00.  (Altman Decl., Ex. C.)

Plaintiff’s counsel charges various hourly rates: $500 for Kevin Jacobson; $425, $450, or $500 for Gregory Sogoyan; $350 for Joshua Kohanof; $375 for Nicholas Yowarski; $300 for Athena Nguyen; $350 for Kristin Messih; $950 for Bryan C. Altman; and $400 for Andrew Jung.  (Jacobson Decl. ¶¶ 6, 13, 20, 22, 24, 26; Altman Decl. ¶¶ 9, 13.)  The Court finds that rates greater than $500 are unreasonably high for such a straightforward lemon law action.  Accordingly, the Court recalculates the West Point Legal LLP fees using a rate of $400 for Bryan C. Altman, resulting in a new total of $15,960.00 for that firm.

The number of attorneys on the case indicates inefficiencies.  The billing records generally do not show inordinate conferences or phone calls among attorneys or too many attorneys working on the same task.  However, with so many attorneys working on the case, there were some inefficiencies when each new attorney needed to review the case file to learn the case, especially when a second firm associated in.  “[S]imultaneous representation by multiple law firms posed substantial risks of task padding, over-conferencing, attorney stacking (multiple attendance by attorneys at the same court functions), and excessive research.”  (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 272.)  Defendant also argues that Plaintiff overbilled for use of form pleadings, and Defendant identifies several examples.  (Opposition at pp. 6-7.)  Some deductions are warranted for these practices.

Plaintiff requests a lodestar multiplier of 1.35.  “[A] trial court should award a multiplier for exceptional representation only when the quality of representation far exceeds the quality of representation that would have been provided by an attorney of comparable skill and experience billing at the hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation.”  (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1139.)  This matter was not noticeably different from other lemon law cases, did not involve complex or novel legal issues warranting a multiplier, and Plaintiff’s counsel has extensive experience litigating similar matters.  Despite the length of time from case inception to settlement, there are no indications that Plaintiff’s counsel engaged in any actions different from a typical strategy to achieve this result.  The Court declines to add a multiplier.

Considering the type of case, complexity of the case, length of litigation, and the record as a whole, the Court concludes that a reasonable amount of attorney fees is $66,910.50 ($61,510.50 plus $5,400.00 for this motion) for Quill & Arrow LLP and $14,364.00 for West Point Legal LLP, for a total of $81,274.50 in attorney fees.  (See Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88, 102 [a court may impose a rate reduction of up to ten percent based on its exercise of discretion and without a more specific explanation].)

The motion for attorney fees and expenses is GRANTED IN PART.  The Court awards Plaintiff $81,274.50 in attorney fees and $5,339.42 in costs and expenses.

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit.  If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar.

 

         Dated this 2nd day of July 2024

 

 

 

 

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court