Judge: Thomas D. Long, Case: 21STCV17999, Date: 2023-04-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV17999 Hearing Date: April 4, 2023 Dept: 48
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
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WEBER ENTERPRISE TRUCKING CORPORATION, Plaintiff, vs. FOREST LAWN MEMORIAL-PARK ASSOCIATION, Defendant. |
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[TENTATIVE] ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER; DENYING
MOTION TO STRIKE Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. April 4, 2023 |
On
October 26, 2022, Plaintiff Weber Enterprise Trucking Corporation filed a first
amended complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants Forest Lawn Memorial-Park Association,
Michael Manzanares, Clint Granath, and Robert Wong.
On
January 20, 2023, Michael Manzanares, Clint Granath, and Robert Wong (collectively,
“Defendants”) filed a combined demurrer and motion to strike. “Motions to strike and demurrers should be filed
as separate documents.” (Weil & Brown,
Cal. Prac. Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group June 2022 Update)
¶ 7:162.1.)
Defendants’
request for judicial notice of the Declaration of Clint Granath in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment (Exhibit 1) is denied.
Defendants rely on this declaration as evidence of facts (Motion at pp. 23-24
& fn. 9), but the Court cannot take judicial notice of the truth of its contents,
nor can the Court consider additional evidence on demurrer.
DEMURRER
Defendants
demur to the second through fifth causes of action. The first cause of action is not brought against
Defendants.
A
demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740,
747.) When
considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting
the alleged facts as true. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai
Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.) “Because a demurrer challenges
defects on the face of the complaint, it can only refer to matters outside the pleading
that are subject to judicial notice.” (Arce
ex rel. Arce v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471,
556.)
A. Plaintiff Agrees to Dismiss Defendants
From the Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action.
Defendants
argue that they cannot be liable for anticipatory breach of contract and breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because Plaintiff does not
allege a contract with them. (Motion at pp.
14-16.)
Plaintiff
concedes that Defendants were inadvertently named as individual defendants on these
causes of action, and it agrees to dismiss them. (Opposition at pp. 6-7.)
The
demurrer to the fourth and fifth causes of action is sustained without leave to
amend.
B. The Misrepresentation Causes of Action
Are Not Pleaded With Specificity.
The
second cause of action alleges intentional misrepresentation, and the third cause
of action alleges negligent misrepresentation.
“The essential elements of a count for intentional misrepresentation are
(1) a misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to induce reliance,
(4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage. [Citations.]
The essential elements of a count for negligent misrepresentation are the
same except that it does not require knowledge of falsity but instead requires a
misrepresentation of fact by a person who has no reasonable grounds for believing
it to be true. [Citations.]” (Chapman v. Skype Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th
217, 230-231.) “Causes of action for intentional
and negligent misrepresentation sound in fraud and, therefore, each element must
be pleaded with specificity.” (Daniels
v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1166.)
Defendants
argue that misrepresentation claims are not pleaded with specificity. (Motion at pp. 16-17.) Plaintiff alleges that “[b]eginning in February
2020,” Forest Lawn, through Defendants, made three specific misrepresentations. (FAC ¶¶ 15, 22.) These representations were also confirmed in the
written Agreement, which was executed by Wong, Manzanares, and others. (FAC ¶¶ 15, 22.) This does not allege with specificity who made
which representation, when they made the representations, and whether the representations
were written or oral.
The
demurrer to the second and third causes of action is sustained.
C. The Misrepresentation Causes of Action
Improperly Seek to Turn a Breach of Contract Into a Tort.
Defendants
argue that the misrepresentation causes of action seeks tort recovery for contractual
breaches. (Motion at pp. 17-19.)
“Quite simply, the economic loss rule ‘prevent[s] the law of contract
and the law of tort from dissolving one into the other.’” (Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp.
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 988 (Robinson Helicopter).) However, tort damages may be permitted when the
breach of contract is accompanied by a tort, such as fraud. (Id. at pp. 989-990.) “Tort damages have been permitted in contract
cases . . . where the contract was fraudulently induced. [Citation.]”
(Erlich v. Menezes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 543, 551-552.) To plead around the economic
loss rule, a party must plead the existence of a duty that arises independent of
any contractual duty and independent injury, other than economic loss, that arises
from the breach of that duty. (Robinson Helicopter, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 988-991.)
Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants, on Forest Lawn’s behalf, made representations about three
things that Forest Lawn would do, and those representations were “confirmed in writing
in the Agreement.” (FAC ¶¶ 15, 22.) Specifically, Forest Lawn would make one million
cubic yards of soil available, pay Plaintiff to process and set aside interfering
portions of stockpile improvements, and allow Plaintiff to add soil to the stockpiles. (FAC ¶¶ 15, 22.) As a result of these misrepresentations, Plaintiff
was harmed “in a sum exceeding $19,665,000.”
(FAC ¶¶ 19, 26.) But these representations
are the same as what was promised, and the harm is the same harm that Plaintiff
suffered, in connection with Forest Lawn’s breach of contract: “Forest Lawn breached the Agreement by failing
to make 1,000,000 cubic yards of soil available to Weber as agreed, by failing to
pay Weber for removing and separating steel reinforcing encountered in processing
concrete structures, and by failing to allow Weber to add soil and other materials
to the Stockpiles.” (FAC ¶ 11; see FAC ¶
8 [contract terms]; see FAC ¶ 12 [$19,665,000 in damages from the breach of
contract].)
Even
if the Court were to construe the misrepresentation claims as claims for fraudulent
inducement, Plaintiff does not allege any other harm that was caused
specifically by the misrepresentations.
Instead, Plaintiff’s damages arise from Forest Lawn’s subsequent breach of
the Agreement that also contained the misrepresentations.
Plaintiff
contends that it “can add facts and details to the allegations that will further
distinguish and describe the alleged conduct as fraud as opposed to a breach of
contract.” (Opposition at p. 9.) However, any such amendment would contradict the
allegations that the misrepresentations were “confirmed in writing in the Agreement”
and that Plaintiff’s damages from the misrepresentations are the same damages that
Plaintiff suffered from Forest Lawn’s breach of contract.
The
demurrer to the second and third causes of action is sustained without leave to
amend.
D. Conclusion
The
demurrer is SUSTAINED. Because Plaintiff
did not show how it can remedy the deficiencies, no leave to amend is granted.
The
Court orders that Michael Manzanares, Clint Granath, and Robert Wong be DISMISSED
from the FAC without prejudice.
MOTION TO STRIKE
The
court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion: (1) strike out any irrelevant,
false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any
part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California,
a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b).)
A. The Request to Strike Punitive Damages
Is Now Moot.
Defendants
move to strike paragraphs 20, 36, and 39, related to punitive damages. (Motion at pp. 21-23.) A plaintiff can recover punitive damages in tort
cases where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed
is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.]
Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but
facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d
159, 166, fn. omitted.)
Paragraph
36 is within the fifth cause of action, from which Plaintiff agreed to dismiss Defendants. The motion is now moot as to this paragraph.
Paragraph
20 is related to the second cause of action, and paragraph 39 is the prayer for
punitive damages on the second and fifth causes of action. The second cause of action alleges intentional
misrepresentation, which is a type of fraud that could support an award of punitive
damages. However, the Court concurrently
sustains the demurrer to the second cause of action. Accordingly, there is no longer any basis for
punitive damages from Defendants, and Defendants’ motion to strike paragraphs 20
and 39 is moot.
B. Defendants Have Not Shown That Paragraph
9 Violates the Statute of Frauds.
Defendants
also move to strike ““or, in the alternative, by an executed oral agreement that
modified the Agreement” from paragraph 9.
In full, paragraph 9 alleges: “In
the Agreement, or in the Agreement as modified in writing or, in the alternative,
by an executed oral agreement that modified the Agreement, Forest Lawn agreed that
Weber could add soil and other materials to Stockpiles #1 and #2, to blend with
materials in the Stockpiles, to create soil and related products for sale.” Defendants argue that this allegation violates
the statute of frauds because the oral agreement could not be performed within a
year: the Agreement is effective June 2, 2020, but the collection, processing, and
hauling would be completed no later than December 31, 2024 for Stockpile #2 and
December 31, 2028 for Stockpile #2. (Motion
at p. 23; see Civ. Code, § 1624.) This language
from the Agreement is not in the FAC, and the FAC does not attach a copy of the
Agreement. Defendants do provide the Agreement
in the form of Exhibit E to Exhibit 1, and Defendants asked the Court to take judicial
notice of Exhibit 1. (See Motion at p. 23,
fn. 8.) However, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of the truth of the contents of Exhibit 1, and it is those contents that
purport to authenticate the Agreement as Exhibit E.
Because
the FAC refers to the Agreement, the Agreement would be an appropriate matter for
judicial notice. (Align Technology, Inc.
v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 949, 956 fn. 6.) But even if the Court were to consider it, the
Court would still deny the motion on this ground. Plaintiff alleges additional misrepresentations,
beyond just the orally modified terms. (FAC
¶¶ 15, 22.) Moreover,
this allegation is no longer applicable to Defendants after Plaintiffs agreed to
dismiss them from the fourth and fifth causes of action and after the Court sustained
the demurrer to the second and third causes of action.
The
motion to strike is denied for paragraph 9.
Moving
party to give notice.
Parties
who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org
indicating intention to submit. Parties intending
to appear are encouraged to appear remotely and should be prepared to comply with
Dept. 48’s new requirement that those attending court in person wear a surgical
or N95 or KN95 mask.
Dated this 4th day of April 2023
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Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior
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