Judge: Thomas D. Long, Case: 21STCV24252, Date: 2022-10-31 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV24252 Hearing Date: October 31, 2022 Dept: 48
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
|
VALLEY NATIONAL BANK, Plaintiff, vs. ARTURO MORAN GARCIA, Defendant. |
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) |
[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. October 31, 2022 |
On June 30, 2021, Plaintiff Valley
National Bank filed this action against Defendant Arturo Moran Garcia for breach
of contract and breach of implied-in-fact contract.
On
July 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative,
adjudication.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Defendant’s
request for judicial notice of the June 8, 2020 Order of Liquidation in Commissioner
of the Department of Financial Regulation v. Global Hawk Insurance Co. Risk Retention
Group (Vermont Superior Court, Washington Unit, Case No. 196-5-20 Wncv) is granted.
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
is a national banking association that provides insurance premium financing, and
Defendant operates a business that provides trucking services. (Undisputed Material Facts “UMF” 2-3.) On January 6, 2020, they entered into a Commercial
Insurance Premium Finance Agreement and Disclosure Statement (“PFA”) under which
Plaintiff agreed to loan the principal amount of $60,930.00 to Defendant so Defendant
could purchase insurance for his business.
(UMF 4-5.)
The
PFA reflects that Defendant had selected an insurance policy issued by Global Hawk
Insurance (“Global”). (UMF 6.) After Defendant executed the PFA, Plaintiff provided
financing in the amount of $60,930.00. (UMF
7.) Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff the
total amount of $64,043.90 in ten monthly installment payments of $6,404.39 each. (UMF 8.)
Defendant made five payments through June 2020. (UMF 9.)
A
default occurs if Defendant “does not pay an installment when due.” (UMF 10.)
Defendant failed to pay the July 2020 payment and all remaining payments. (UMF 11.)
As of July 30, 2022, the unpaid principal under the PFA was $28,908.05, and
the unpaid interest was $9,274.11. (UMF 12-13.) Defendant owes the total amount of $38,182.16. (UMF 14.)
Plaintiff has incurred $509.75 in costs, and it also seeks $1,374.50 in attorney
fees. (UMF 15-16.)
DISCUSSION
A
plaintiff moving for summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof
by proving each element of a cause of action.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).)
Then the burden shifts to the defendant to show that a triable issue of material
fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) To establish a triable issue of material fact,
the party opposing the motion must produce “substantial responsive evidence.” (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th
151, 162-163.)
A. Causes of Action
The
first cause of action alleges breach of contract, and the second cause of action
alternatively alleges breach of implied-in-fact contract. The standard elements of a claim for breach of
contract are (1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance,
(3) defendant’s breach, and (4) damage to plaintiff therefrom. (Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times
Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1178.)
“A cause of action for breach of implied contract has the same elements as
does a cause of action for breach of contract, except that the promise is not expressed
in words but is implied from the promisor’s conduct.” (Yari v. Producers Guild of America, Inc.
(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 172, 182.)
It
is undisputed that Plaintiff and Defendant entered into the PFA, Defendant failed
to make payments beginning in July 2020, Defendant owes a total of $38,182.16 in
unpaid principal and interest, and Plaintiff incurred $1,884.25 in legal fees and
costs. (UMF 1-16.)
Accordingly,
Plaintiff has met its initial burden as to the elements of the causes of action,
and Defendant does not attempt to dispute this.
(See generally Opposition.) Instead,
Defendant raises two defenses.
B. Defense: Failure to Mitigate
Defendant
notes that Global was seized by the State of Vermont’s Commissioner of the Department
of Financial Regulation, and all actions involving Global have been stayed. (Opposition at p. 2; see Def. RJN, Ex. 1.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff “has offered no
evidence that they have mitigated their damages by filing a claim for the unearned
premium, a right they possess.” (Opposition
at p. 4.) Citing the entirety of Insurance
Code section 673, Defendant argues that “Plaintiff has not met its statutorily created
right and mechanism to mitigate its damages and has undermined Garcia’s right to
seek redress from Global since Plaintiff has absorbed those rights from Garcia via
contract.” (Opposition at p. 6.)
It
is not Plaintiff’s burden to prove that it mitigated its damages. “Summary judgment law in this state no longer
requires a plaintiff moving for summary judgment to disprove any defense asserted
by the defendant as well as prove each element of his own cause of action. . . .
All that the plaintiff need do is to ‘prove[] each element of the cause of action.’ [Citation.]”
(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853; see
Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1) [“A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met
his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that
party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment
on the cause of action.”].)
Instead,
it is Defendant’s burden to “to show that a triable issue of one or more material
facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Defendant has not done so with respect to this
defense.
Defendant
relies on two provisions from the PFA that give Plaintiff a right to receive unearned
premiums. (See Opposition at p. 3.) Under the PFA, Defendant granted and assigned
Plaintiff “a security interest in the financed policies and any additional premiums
written to the financed policies including all gross unearned premiums, dividend
payments, and less payments which would result in a reduction to unearned premiums.” (Przespolewski Decl., Ex. 1 at p. 2, ¶ 1.) Defendant also irrevocably appointed Plaintiff
as his attorney-in-fact “with full power of substitution and full authority in the
event of default to (i) cancel the financed policies, (ii) receive any unearned
premium or other amounts with respect to the polities assigned as security herein.” (Przespolewski Decl., Ex. 1 at p. 2, ¶ 2.) These provisions give Plaintiff the right, but
not the obligation, to recover the unearned premiums from Global. And Defendant has already filed his own claim
in Global’s liquidation proceedings. (Garcia
Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. 1; see Opposition at p. 4.)
Insurance
Code section 673 governs how a lender may exercise the right to cancel a financed
insurance policy because of the default of the insured, and what the insurer must
do when a financed insurance policy is cancelled. It does not require the lender (Plaintiff) to
recover the unearned premiums from only the insurer (Global) when the policy is
cancelled.
Moreover,
in reply, Plaintiff declares that it did file a timely proof of claim with a representative
of the liquidator, but it has not received any distribution. (Grela Decl. ¶¶ 7-11 & Ex. A.)
In
sum, Defendant has not shown a triable issue of fact regarding Plaintiff’s obligation
to mitigate damages.
C. Defense: Indispensable Party
Defendant
also argues that Global is an indispensable party, but there is a stay that prevents
its additional as a party in this action.
(See Opposition at pp. 6-8.) Defendant
did not raise this defense in his answer.
An
indispensable party must be joined in an action “if (1) in his absence complete
relief cannot be accorded among those already parties or (2) he claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of
the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject
to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations
by reason of his claimed interest.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 389, subd. (a).)
Defendant
does not identify any interest Global has in the subject of this action. Global is not a party to the PFA, and there is
no risk that the parties here will incur multiple or inconsistent obligations. Defendant is seeking to recover the amount owed
by Plaintiff, and Plaintiff may continue to pursue his claim for return of the unearned
premium from Global. (See Garcia Decl. ¶
2 & Ex. 1.) If Plaintiff recovers any
funds from the liquidator, it will credit Defendant for that amount, and if Defendant
pays his full debt to Plaintiff, then Plaintiff with withdraw its claim against
Global. (Greela Decl. ¶ 13.)
Nor
does Global’s absence preclude Plaintiff’s complete relief. The PFA provides, “In the event of default [Plaintiff]
can demand agreement be paid in full regardless of whether unearned premium has
been refunded.” (Przespolewski Decl., Ex.
1 at p. 2, ¶ 8.)
Defendant
has not shown a triable issue of fact regarding Global’s need to be included as
an indispensable party.
CONCLUSION
The
motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiff
is ordered to submit a proposed judgment within 5 days.
A
Non-Appearance Case Review Re: Submission of Proposed Judgment is scheduled for
11/07/2022 at 11:30 AM.
Moving
party to give notice.
Parties
who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org
indicating intention to submit. Parties intending
to appear are encouraged to appear remotely and should be prepared to comply with
Dept. 48’s new requirement that those attending court in person wear a surgical
or N95 or KN95 mask.
Dated this 31st day of October 2022
|
|
|
|
|
Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior
Court |