Judge: Thomas D. Long, Case: 21STCV36830, Date: 2023-05-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV36830    Hearing Date: May 11, 2023    Dept: 48

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

On October 6, 2021, Plaintiffs Lizette Rodriguez and Jorge A. Rodriguez (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against Defendant Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., arising from Plaintiffs’ purchase of an allegedly defective vehicle from a non-party dealership.

On September 29, 2022, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and stayed this action pending the completion of arbitration.

On April 14, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration.

Within ten days of service of an order, a party may move for reconsideration based on new facts, circumstances, or law.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a); see also Mink v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1342.)  The moving party shall state by affidavit what application was made before, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to be shown.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd .(a).)  “[T]he party seeking reconsideration must provide not only new evidence but also a satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce that evidence at an earlier time.”  (Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1457.)  The legislative intent was to restrict motions for reconsideration to circumstances where a party offers the court some fact or circumstance not previously considered and some valid reason for not offering it earlier.  (Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.)

The Court entered its order granting Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration on September 29, 2022, and Defendant gave notice electronically on the same day.  Accordingly, the ten-day period for Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration has long passed.

After the ten-day period for a party’s motion, a court may, at any time and on its own motion, enter a different order if the court determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (c).)

This Court had found that Defendant could compel arbitration despite not being a signatory to the arbitration agreement based on equitable estoppel, relying on Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486, 495 (Felisilda).  Plaintiffs now seek reconsideration of that order due to the recent Court of Appeal opinion in Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324 (Ochoa).

The Ochoa court determined that equitable estoppel did not apply because the plaintiffs failed to show that their claims were founded in or intertwined with the sales contracts.  (Ochoa, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1332-1336.)  The court “disagree[d] with Felisilda that ‘the sales contract was the source of [FCA’s] warranties at the heart of this case.’”  (Id. at p. 1334.)  The Ochoa court also “disagree[d] with the Felisilda court’s interpretation of the sale contract as broadly calling for arbitration of claims ‘against third party nonsignatories.’”  (Ibid.)  The court instead read the language “including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract” as “a further delineation of the subject matter of claims the purchasers and dealers agreed to arbitrate.”  (Id. at pp. 1334-1335.)

Although this Court may be more persuaded by Ochoa’s reasoning when deciding future motions to compel arbitration, Felisilda was the only binding authority directly on point at the time of the Court’s September 29, 2022 order.  Plaintiffs could have, but did not, appeal that order.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1294, subd. (a).)  Ochoa did not overrule Felisilda, so this Court could still choose to either follow Felisilda or instead adopt Ochoa’s reasoning.  (Sarti v. Salt Creek Ltd. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1193 [“All trial courts are bound by all published decisions of the Court of Appeal . . . Unlike at least some federal intermediate appellate courts, though, there is no horizontal stare decisis in the California Court of Appeal.”].)

“Once a court grants the petition to compel arbitration and stays the action at law, the action at law sits in the twilight zone of abatement with the trial court retaining merely a vestigial jurisdiction over matters submitted to arbitration.  This vestigial jurisdiction over the action at law consists solely of making the determination, upon conclusion of the arbitration proceedings, of whether there was an award on the merits (in which case the action at law should be dismissed because of the res judicata effects of the arbitration award [citation]) or not (at which point the action at law may resume to determine the rights of the parties).”  (Brock v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1796.)

Accordingly, the Court does not appear to have jurisdiction to interfere in the arbitration proceedings and order the case back to proceed in this court.  Even if the Court had authority, it would still decline to exercise it here.  Plaintiffs contend that the parties have not conducted any evidentiary hearings in arbitration, but the claim has already been submitted to arbitration and Defendant’s answer was already due.  (Jacobson Decl. ¶ 11; Orquiola Decl. ¶¶ 3-4 & Ex. C.)  With the arbitration underway, it is not appropriate for this Court to intervene in that process by changing its order seven months later.

The motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

Defendant’s request for sanctions is also denied.

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit.  Parties intending to appear are encouraged to appear remotely and should be prepared to comply with Dept. 48’s new requirement that those attending court in person wear a surgical or N95 or KN95 mask.

      Dated this 11th day of May 2023