Judge Thomas D. Long, Case Number: 22STCV08472, Date: 2024-06-18 Tentative Ruling

On March 9, 2022, Plaintiffs filed this action against multiple named defendants and Doe defendants. On May 22, 2023, Plaintiffs named Malin Asset Management Inc. as Doe 1.

On July 12, 2023, Defendant Malin Asset Management Inc. filed a demurrer and motion to strike.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.) A special demurrer for uncertainty under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f) is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant or plaintiff cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him or her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

Defendant (formerly Doe 1) demurs to the entire complaint for lack of specific allegations about its role and involvement. (Demurrer at p. 6.) Defendant specifically refers to a paragraph that alleges that “Plaintiffs are unaware of the true names, capacities, or basis for liability of defendants DOES 1 through 60,” and “are informed and believe and thereon allege that defendants DOES 1 through 60, inclusive, and each of them, are in some manner liable to Plaintiffs, or claim some right, title, or interest in the Subject Property that is junior and inferior to that of Plaintiffs, or both.” (Complaint ¶ 10; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 474 [“When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint . . . and such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly”].)

Plaintiffs alleges that “Defendant ELOISE WILLIAMS, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, is, and at all times relevant to this action was, an individual and a trustee of the WILLIAMS TRUST DATED AUGUST 2, 1988 doing business in the County of Los Angeles, State of California.” (Complaint ¶ 2.) “Defendants have been, during all relevant times, the owners and/or managers of the premises.” (Complaint ¶ 8.) “At all pertinent times, a Landlord-Tenant relationship existed between Plaintiff and Defendants.” (Complaint ¶ 9.) This, along with the fact that all causes of action are brought against all Defendants, sufficiently alleges Defendant’s identity, role, and basis for liability.

Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that each defendant, including the Doe defendants, were “the agent, servant, employee, partner, joint venturer, alter ego or surety of the other defendants.” (Complaint ¶ 11.) Defendant does not challenge this allegation.

The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b).)

Defendant seeks to strike paragraphs 68, 86, 87, 105, 106, and 121, which relate to punitive damages, as well as the prayer for punitive damages. Defendant argues that there are only legal conclusions, not facts, about malice. (Motion at p. 7.)

A plaintiff can recover punitive damages in tort cases where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn. omitted.)

Plaintiffs allege that they “constantly and consistently complained to the Defendants” about “slum-housing and untenantable conditions,” but Defendants repeatedly failed to address or abate the issues. (Complaint ¶¶ 23-24, 26.) Defendants were notified of many code violations after investigations by Housing and Community Investment Department, but Defendants did not remedy the issues. (Complaint ¶¶ 32-36, 39-40.) During this time, Plaintiffs were “exposed to dilapidated and contaminated conditions, including the presence of rodents, an infestation of cockroaches and other insects, and bed bugs. These vermin made the property decidedly unsafe.” (Complaint ¶ 43.) Defendants knew that bedbugs and other vermin had infested the property, but they intentionally did nothing to get rid of them. (Complaint ¶ 119; see Complaint ¶ 48.) Defendants’ construction also created “excessive amounts of noise, unsanitary common areas, safety hazards throughout the premises,” and leaks. (Complaint ¶ 44.) These facts, if proven, would support a finding of oppression or malice.

Defendant also seeks to strike the prayer for attorney fees because Plaintiffs “cannot articulate a basis either in contract or statute that Defendant MAM would be responsible for Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees should Plaintiff prevail.” (Motion at p. 8.) The Complaint identifies specific sections of the Civil Code and Los Angeles Municipal Code that authorize an award of attorney fees. (Complaint ¶¶ 68, 76.)

Defendant is ordered to file an answer within 10 days. (See California Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(j).)

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar.

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court