Judge Thomas D. Long, Case 22STCV13222 2023-03-27 Tentative Ruling

On April 20, 2022, Plaintiffs Eduardo Jarquin Vasquez, Eduardo L. Jarquin Garcia, Marcos Reyes Vasquez, Azucena Ramirez Salinas, Jose Manuel Hernandez, Elizabeth Agustin, Erick G. Chazari, Geovanni Chazari, Erick F. Chazari, Emily Chazari, Carmela Cruz Martinez, Jose Tamayo, Elvis Frias, Diana Martinez, Fernando Martinez, and Veronica Martinez (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against Defendants Mariposa 20 LLC, K3 Manager LLC, K3 Holdings LLC, Nathan Kadisha, Michael Kadisha, Luzelba Lozano Mansour, Zaki S. Mansour, Karla Stapleton, Marla Stapleton, and Angel Escobar. Eduardo Jarquin Vasquez later dismissed his claims. The Complaint arises from allegedly substandard housing conditions at a property where Plaintiffs reside, and which the defendants own and/or manage.

On September 13, 2022, Zaki S. Mansour (“Defendant”) filed a demurrer and motion to strike. Defendant demurs to the first through eleventh and the thirteenth causes of action. The twelfth cause of action is not brought against the moving defendant.

At the original February 23, 2023 hearing on the motions, counsel for Defendant argued that the Complaint is barred by the statute of limitations. When Plaintiffs’ counsel contended this was a new argument, Defendant’s counsel asserted that it was, in fact, raised in the briefing. That is not correct. Nowhere does the Notice of Motion or body of the Demurrer raise statute of limitations as a ground for the motion. Instead, on February 16, 2023—seven weeks after filing his reply, and one week before the original hearing—Defendant filed a “Supplemental Brief in Support of the Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint,” raising the statute of limitations for the first time. This filing was not authorized by the Court and raises new grounds for the motion. Defendant may not expand the scope of his motion in this manner. Accordingly, the Court orders the Supplemental Brief filed on February 16, 2023 STRICKEN for not being filed in conformity with the law, court rules, or order of the Court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)

Nevertheless, also at the February 23, 2023 hearing, the Court continued the hearing and ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of the statute of limitations. The parties timely filed supplemental briefs.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.) A special demurrer for uncertainty under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f) is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant or plaintiff cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him or her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of (1) a copy of the Interspousal Deed for the property, recorded on November 25, 2008 with the Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office as Instrument No. 20082082275, and (2) a copy of the Grant Deed for the property, recorded on July 27, 2020 with the Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office as Instrument No. 20200837934.

The Court may take judicial notice of the legal effect of documents’ language when the effect is clear, but it may not take judicial notice of the truth of statements of fact recited within the documents. (Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 265.) The request is granted only to that extent.

B. Plaintiffs Do Not Need to Provide a Copy of the Lease Agreement in This Habitability Action.

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to properly plead the existence of a contractual lease. (Demurrer at pp. 3-4.) Defendants’ cited cases involve demurrers to claims for breach of contract and the requirements for pleading the terms of the contract. Here, Plaintiffs do not allege breach of express contract or breach of the terms of their rental agreements. Plaintiffs’ claims arise from common law, implied warranties, and statutory tenant protections. Plaintiffs allege that they live at a rental property that has been inadequately maintained and rendered uninhabitable by the defendants. (E.g., Complaint ¶¶ 1-4, 7, 34, 45, 49-55.) Pleading the contractual terms of the leases is not required. Indeed, tenancy does not require or depend upon the existence of a formal lease agreement. (See, e.g., Civ. Code, §§ 1943-1946.)

C. Plaintiffs Sufficiently Plead the Existence of a Landlord-Tenant Relationship.

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to plead the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between them. (Demurrer at pp. 4-5; see id. at pp. 5-10 [first through fifth, seventh through tenth, and thirteenth causes of action].) Plaintiffs allege that they are tenants to the property, Defendant held title to the property and had an ownership interest in it from in or around January 1994 to in or around July 2020, and he was an owner and/or manager of the property. (Complaint ¶¶ 1, 34; see also, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 85, 94, 107, 120, 152, 161, 185, 196.) As discussed above, Plaintiffs need not plead the specific terms of the lease agreements, if any.

Defendant also argues that he has not owned the property since 2008 and therefore does not have a duty to Plaintiffs. (Demurrer at p. 4.) Defendant relies on an interspousal transfer deed dated February 11, 2008, through which Defendant granted the property to Luzelba Lozano Mansour. (RJN, Ex. A.) Defendant also relies on a July 9, 2020 grant deed through which Luzelba Lozano Mansour granted the property to Mariposa 20 LLC. (RJN, Ex. B.)

The legal effect of these two documents is the property transfer on the date of the deeds. They do not, however, prove that Defendant did not own the property during any intervening or preceding period.

Additionally, some Plaintiffs allege that they resided at the property since 2007. (Complaint ¶¶ 15-19.) “For years, Defendants neglected to properly maintain the Property,” and beginning on January 31, 2008, the Los Angeles Housing Department issued Notices and Orders to Comply for violations—with the January 31, 2008 notice issued to Defendant. (Complaint ¶¶ 47-49.) This was before the February 11, 2008 interspousal transfer deed, when Defendant does not dispute that he owned the property.

Furthermore, the Complaint alleges that each defendant “was the agent, employee, and representative of every other Defendant and DOE, and in doing the things herein alleged, was acting within the course and scope of such agency, service, and representation, and directed, aided and abetted, authorized, or ratified each and every act and conduct herein alleged. Each and every Defendant is the alter ego of the other Defendants or entities herein.” (Complaint ¶ 43.)

D. The Sixth Cause of Action – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress – Is Sufficiently Pleaded.

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not alleged any specific facts regarding any extreme and outrageous conduct by Defendant, Plaintiffs’ injuries, or a causal link. (Demurrer at pp. 8-9.)

“‘[T]o state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must show: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’ [Citation.] ‘Conduct, to be ‘outrageous’ must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.’ [Citation.]” (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1259.)

Plaintiffs allege that all defendants knew of Plaintiffs’ vulnerability and abused their positions of authority by “knowingly failing and refusing to abate a dangerous and unhealthy nuisance; failing to maintain each Plaintiff’s unit and the common areas of the Property in a sanitary and safe condition; threatening to evict some Plaintiffs for arbitrary matters; verbally abusing and disparaging Plaintiffs; harassing and intimidating Plaintiffs about entering into and refusing to sign defective buy-out agreements; and ignoring government orders to comply with housing laws and regulations, all the while knowing that the conditions in the Property were causing sickness, injury, and emotional distress to Plaintiffs. Defendants and their agents abused their position as purveyors of low-income housing in an atrocious manner by refusing to make the Property safe and habitable, and engaging in aggressive, hostile conduct directed at Plaintiffs, all the while demanding and collecting full rent.” (Complaint ¶¶ 134-136.) As a result, “Plaintiffs suffered and/or continue to suffer illness, physical injury, mental stress, severe emotional distress, anguish, feelings of anxiety, sadness, anger, fearfulness, worry, disgust, helplessness, frustration, and shame.” (Complaint ¶ 137.) This sufficiently alleges the required elements.

E. The Eleventh Cause of Action – Violation of Unfair Competition Law – Is Sufficiently Pleaded.

Defendant argues that the conclusory allegations do not explain how he specifically violated any statute. (Demurrer at p. 10.)

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) includes any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) The UCL embraces “anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180.) “By proscribing any unlawful business practice, section 17200 borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” (Ibid.; see Klein v. Earth Elements, Inc. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 965, 969 [“Virtually any law can serve as the predicate for a section 17200 action.”].)

Plaintiffs allege that all defendants engaged in unfair and unlawful conduct by violating health, safety, and housing codes. (Complaint ¶¶ 175-176.) This cause of action incorporates all prior allegations (Complaint ¶ 174), which identify numerous statutes that were allegedly violated (e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 69, 95-96, 108, 122, 141, 153, 162, 167).

F. Defendant Has Not Shown That the Complaint Is Facially Barred by the Statute of Limitations.

In his Court-ordered supplemental briefing, Defendant argues that most of the Plaintiffs never lived at the property while he was the owner (until November 25, 2008), and he cannot be liable for any conditions at the property after that date. Defendant argues that any claims against him based on conditions at the property during his ownership began to accrue at the latest in 2008, so the applicable statutes of limitations have already run.

However, this ignores the previously discussed allegations that each defendant “was the agent, employee, and representative of every other Defendant and DOE, and in doing the things herein alleged, was acting within the course and scope of such agency, service, and representation, and directed, aided and abetted, authorized, or ratified each and every act and conduct herein alleged. Each and every Defendant is the alter ego of the other Defendants or entities herein.” (Complaint ¶ 43.) Thus, Defendant may still be liable on these alternative theories for any wrongdoing to the Plaintiffs who continued to reside at the property within the applicable limitations periods.

The demurrer is OVERRULED. Defendant is ordered to file an answer within 10 days.

The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b).)

Defendant moves to strike allegations relating to and the prayer for punitive damages. A plaintiff can recover punitive damages in tort cases where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn. omitted.)

The Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs, some of whom were children, suffered uninhabitable living conditions due to the defendants’ failure to maintain the property despite knowing about the substandard conditions. (E.g., Complaint ¶ 2.) These conditions included bug and rodent infestations, lack of heat and hot water, crumbling walls and ceilings, defective plumbing, filthy common areas, broken windows, fire hazards, and mold/mildew. (E.g., Complaint ¶¶ 2, 59-60.) Other safety issues included lack of smoke and/or carbon monoxide detectors and inadequate maintenance of the elevator, stairs, and lighting in the common areas. (Complaint ¶¶ 61.) If Plaintiffs prove that Defendant failed to respond to complaints about these conditions, a jury could conclude Defendant acted with oppression or malice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. Parties intending to appear are encouraged to appear remotely and should be prepared to comply with Dept. 48’s new requirement that those attending court in person wear a surgical or N95 or KN95 mask.

Hon. Thomas D. Long

Judge of the Superior Court