Judge: Thomas D. Long, Case: 22STCV17795, Date: 2024-12-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV17795    Hearing Date: December 17, 2024    Dept: 48

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

On February 20, 2024, Plaintiffs Richard C. Gallegos and Christina L. Gallegos filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) against Defendant General Motors LLC for violations of the Song-Beverly Act and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.  The FAC alleges (1) breach of express warranties, (2) breach of implied warranty, (3) violation of section 1793.2, and (4) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

On August 1, 2024, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

The Court does not rule on Plaintiffs’ objections because the objected-to evidence is not material to the Court’s decision.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice of this Court’s February 13, 2024 minute order is denied as unnecessary because the document is already part of this case’s record.

Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice of a Court of Appeal opinion is denied as irrelevant.

BACKGROUND FACTS

On May 20, 2021, pursuant to the purchase option provision found in the original April 20, 2018 Chevrolet Form Lease, Plaintiffs purchased the subject vehicle used with 36,160 miles from Premier Chevrolet of Buena Park.  (Undisputed Material Facts “UMF” 1-2; see Response to UMF 2.)  Defendant was not a party to the transaction between Plaintiffs and Premier Chevrolet.  (UMF 3.)

Defendant did not issue or provide any new or additional warranty coverage to Plaintiffs or the vehicle when Plaintiffs bought the Traverse used in May 2021; Plaintiffs received only the balance of coverage under the Warranty that Defendant issued on April 20, 2018.  (UMF 8.)

LEGAL STANDARD

For each claim in the complaint, the defendant moving for adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by showing that one or more elements of a cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to a cause of action.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520 (Scalf).)  Then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1520.)  To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce “substantial responsive evidence.”  (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 162-163.)

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiffs purchased their vehicle used, not new, and Plaintiffs cannot pursue Song-Beverly claims for a used vehicle.

A.        Plaintiffs Cannot Maintain the First and Second Causes of Action Under the Song-Beverly Act.

The first cause of action is for breach of express warranties, and the third cause of action is for failure to repair.

“[A] motor vehicle purchased with an unexpired manufacturer’s new car warranty does not qualify as a ‘motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty’ under [Civil Code] section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2)’s definition of ‘new motor vehicle’ unless the new car warranty was issued with the sale.”  (Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189 [557 P.3d 735, 737].)  This also applies in the broader context of the Song-Beverly Act’s provisions distinguishing between new and used goods.  (Id., 557 P.3d at p. 744.)

It is undisputed that Plaintiffs purchased the vehicle used.  (UMF 1-2.)  At that time, Defendant did not issue or provide any new or additional warranty coverage to Plaintiffs or the vehicle.  (UMF 8.)

Summary adjudication of the first and third causes of action is granted.

B.        Plaintiffs Cannot Maintain the Second Cause of Action For Breach of Implied Warranty.

Defendant argues that the second cause of action for breach of implied warranty also fails as a matter of law because Defendant is the manufacturer, not the seller, of the used vehicle.  (Motion at pp. 7-8.)

The Song-Beverly Act defines the implied warranties that accompany the sale of consumer goods, and it permits a buyer to bring an action for damages and other relief when the implied warranties are breached.  (See Civ. Code, §§ 1791.1, 1794.)  “[I]n the sale of used consumer goods, liability for breach of implied warranty lies with distributors and retailers, not the manufacturer, where there is no evidence the manufacturer played any role in the sale of the used car to plaintiff.”  (Nunez v. FCA US LLC (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 385, 398.)  “[O]nly distributors or sellers of used goods—not manufacturers of new goods—have implied warranty obligations in the sale of used goods.”  (Id. at p. 399.)  A manufacturer may partner with a dealership to sell used vehicles directly to the public by, for example, offering an express warranty as part of the sales package, thereby stepping into the role of a retailer and becoming subject to the obligations of a retailer.  (Kiluk v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 334, 340.)

Plaintiff purchased the used vehicle from Premiere Chevrolet, not directly from Defendant.  (UMF 2-3; AMF 10.)  Plaintiffs allege that Premiere Chevrolet is an agent and authorized dealership of Defendant.  (FAC ¶¶ 4, 8-10, 39.)  Plaintiffs rely on Defendant’s Form 10-K Report, which states that Defendant “market[s] vehicles and automotive parts worldwide primarily through a network of independent authorized retail dealers.”  (Opposition at p. 14; Yang Decl., Ex. 5.)  Plaintiff also contend that Defendant’s Statement of Information “unequivocally establishes that GM is in the business of ‘manufactur[ing] and sell[ing] of vehicles.’”  (Opposition at p. 14; Yang Decl., Ex. 6.)  These general statements do not show that Defendant acted as a distributor or retailer in connection with Plaintiffs’ specific purchase.

Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant “authorized Premier Chevrolet to act as its express agent and to lease and sell the Subject Vehicle to Plaintiffs [and] also authorized it to execute the subsequent RISC pursuant to consumers’ purchase options found in their prior lease agreements,” citing Exhibits 5-7.  (Opposition at p. 14.)  Exhibits 5 and 6 do not show this.  Exhibit 7 is an internal email for Defendant, ordering that dealers with specific Business Association Codes stop the delivery of certain 2014 vehicles (not Plaintiffs’ 2018 vehicle).  The Court does not see the relevance of this exhibit, nor is any further explanation given in the Opposition.

Plaintiffs have not shown a triable issue of material fact regarding Defendant’s status as only a manufacturer and not a distributor or seller of the used vehicle.

Summary adjudication of the second cause of action is granted.

C.        Plaintiffs Cannot Maintain a Cause of Action Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

“Magnuson-Moss ‘calls for the application of state written and implied warranty law, not the creation of additional federal law,’ except in specific instances in which it expressly prescribes a regulating rule. . . . [F]ailure to state a warranty claim under state law necessarily constitute[s] a failure to state a claim under Magnuson-Moss.”  (Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 833.)

Because the Court grants summary adjudication of the underlying state law claims, the Court also grants summary adjudication of this claim.

CONCLUSION

The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Defendant is ordered to submit a proposed judgment within 5 days.

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit.  If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar.

         Dated this 17th day of December 2024